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This research project examines ‘propositionality’ within theatre, specifically within the two 
theatrical environments of immersive theatre / performance and proscenium arch theatre, in 
order to offer an alternative perspective for viewing theatre. Permeating the thesis is the research 
question: what is being actuated within the interplay of objects and/or things in theatre and 
performance? An examination of how objects communicate actualization offers a method for 
exploring an audience member / participant’s willingness to immerse. To do so, I insert myself 
as participant, spectator, performer, researcher, interviewer etc., and use Object-Oriented-
Ontology’s (OOO) flat ontological placement to analyse the entertainment of propositional lures 
created by the interacting qualities of theatrical objects. It offers propositionality as an 
alternative means of theatrical analysis to semiotics positing that semiotics cannot effectively 
analyse the difference between a sign in proscenium arch theatre and a sign in immersive theatre. 
In chapter one, I define and explain what propositionality is as a means of analysis, and how the 
enactment of propositional claims differs within the two theatrical environments. In chapter two, 
I explore and analyse how propositions are enacted and agreed in the performances of Riptide’s 
The Lucky Ones: Lucy (2018), The Lucky Ones: Lailah (2018), The Great Gatsby (2019), The 
Murdér Express (2019), Romeo & Juliet (2019) and Dorian (2019) and the effect that the 
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Interest in this research derived from personal exploration into the immersive, and the state of 
immersion, within the final year of my undergraduate degree at the University of Huddersfield. 
Through my own experience of interacting with audience members, as a performer, in an 
immersive style performance and environment, I came to question how audiences become 
immersed in what they perceive and experience.  
Naively, I thought it possible to create a universal template depicting the exact process that 
audiences go through to become immersed in a theatrical experience.1 I presumed that in 
immersive theatre, and even immersive-style performance, immersion and belief were one and 
the same, since, per Locke, there is ‘no immediate belief’ just as there is no immediate 
immersion. My research proved that audience-participants become immersed via assenting to 
observed propositions. The term ‘proposition’ is stipulated regularly throughout this thesis and a 
thorough unpacking of the term shall occur in the ‘Proposition’ chapter, but it shall become clear 
that propositions are to be viewed as sharable objects of cognitive acts and attitudes. Sharable 
objects (propositions) lure those who entertain them into a “different way of feeling their world” 
(Gaskill & Nocek, 2014, p. 6). My research showed that this different way of feeling, whatever 
the specific feeling / emotion, leads to immersion. That way of feeling may even be the sensation 
of immersion itself, and entertaining, engaging, and interacting with the sharable object impacts 
on one’s state of immersion. Both the sensation and state of immersion is not binary as Biggin 
                                                          
1 See Appendix 1.   
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elucidates (2017). Therefore, if the process of immersion is non-binary, then what are the steps 
or layers that audiences go through to reach a state of immersion in a theatrical world?  
This question intrigued and excited me. I found myself researching neuroscience and cognition 
to unpack what process our brains go through to reach the sensation of immersion. I learnt that 
the brain creates meaning through neurons; the electrochemical aspect of neurons allows them to 
transmit messages and signals to each other (Eagleman 2015; McConachie & Hart 2010; Bear 
2016; Gazzaniga 2009). However, I discovered that there was not a feasible way to test the 
process of immersion within a brain without a portable FMRI machine. Until a portable FMRI 
machine is available for this area of research we will not know for sure how the brain is 
perceiving fictional immersive experiences. Similarly, there was no feasible way to state that a 
process was the universal process for all immersive-style performances and all audience-
participants through qualitative research methods. Bruce McConachie states, in his book 
Engaging Audiences, that “theatre and performance scholars will need to move beyond postshow 
interviews, audience’s surveys, and similar methods, however, to deploy the tools of 
experimental linguistics and neuroscientists that can clock the language recognition in 
milliseconds and take pictures of the brain thinking” (McConachie, 2008, p.16). Not only are 
audience surveys not a strong enough model to identify any true scientific findings but there 
could also be areas of bias in the answers – be it a desire to please the author or perhaps not 
wanting to commit themselves to an extreme answer – but I shall delve more into this in my 
thesis. Yet, what came out of this line of enquiry was the notion of ‘propositionality’. 
My usage of the term ‘proposition’ within this thesis derived from research into ‘belief’. 
Specifically, from Henry H. Price’s book, Belief (1969). Price suggests what it means to believe 
(in and that,) something and its relation to knowledge along with the various sorts of evidence 
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we have for our beliefs. He discusses two modes of analysis to consider belief: ‘occurrence 
analysis’ and ‘dispositional analysis’. Occurrence analysis is the traditional approach to belief in 
which belief is regarded as a mental act or occurrence. Dispositional analysis, on the other hand, 
is viewed not as an occurrence, but as a disposition. Price compares this view of belief to be like 
having an interest “in cricket or a disdain for gardening” (Price, 1969, p.20) since, like these, a 
belief shows itself, or manifests, as an occurrence in certain situations, but it is not itself an 
occurrence.  
 
Price uses the term ‘proposition’ from the outset of Belief to both analyse occurrence and 
dispositional analyses. For example, “[w]hen we say of someone ‘he believes the proposition p’ 
it is held that we are making a dispositional statement about him” (Price, 1969, p.20). However, 
he never states what he means when using the term. The implicit semantic meaning I derived, on 
first reading, is that when Price speaks of ‘believing a proposition’, he is referring to an object, 
thing, or concept. In studying Price and other philosophers’ views on belief, inter alia Plato, 
Aristotle, Locke, and Hume, I theorised how the state and sensation of immersion occurred for 
audience-participants in theatre, specifically immersive styled performance. Using qualitative 
audience-participant feedback from performances of Forget Me Not – an immersive-style 
devised piece created by Sean Sewell, David Field and myself – I created a hypothetical 
template suggesting a process for how audience-participants within immersive styled theatrical 
performances, worlds and/or environments, became immersed in said events. 
Forget Me Not was originally created for our final year project of our BA undergraduate degree 
at the University of Huddersfield with the aim of exploring the telling of stories through 
different performance languages in an immersive environment. The piece is set in the day room 
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of the fictional ‘Forget Me Not’ nursing home (for Alzheimer’s and Dementia sufferers) and the 
audience-participants are welcomed into the home by a nurse whom asks them to sign their 
name in the visitor’s book, take a seat wherever they choose and help themselves to 
refreshments. There are eight round tables spread out in an oval shape around the performance 
space with chairs for both audience and performers to use if they so choose.2 For the duration of 
the performance there are only three patients in the day room, the characters, ‘Malcolm’, ‘Alf’, 
and ‘George’. All three of the men suffer with either Alzheimer’s disease or a form of Dementia. 
‘George’ is the youngest of the three and the only one who is aware they are all in a nursing 
home. ‘Malcolm’ and ‘Alf’ are older than George and have deteriorated quicker than him too, 
for example, they both believe they are at the local Working Men’s Club (WMC) – not in a 
nursing home – and are initially unaware of their disease.  
The audience-participants are invited to follow the day-to-day lives of the three men and can 
actively converse with the characters/performers if they so choose, or, they can passively watch 
the story as it unfolds around them at either a table, or in the middle of the performance space. 
The production explores the telling of the character’s stories through immersive style 
performance, naturalism, physical theatre, tableaus, song, dance etc. The performance always 
ends in the same way, with the character ‘Alf’ mistaking an audience member for his son and 
then becoming very distressed when he realises where he is. The nurse quickly and abruptly tells 
everyone to leave so she can tend to ‘Alf’. The stage lights do not go off and the audience must 
                                                          
2 The Forget Me Not performances were performed in a square studio space but staged similar to theatre-in-the-
round. It was staged with eight round tables spaced out in an oval shape around the studio. There were four-five 
audience members per table, with additional seats at each table for the performers to go and sit with the audience 
members. The space in the middle between all the tables was used as a performance space but audience members 
could freely enter and exit the space if they chose too. For a visual depiction of the set, performance space and 
layout, please view the Appendix 2.  
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let themselves out when they are told it is time to go. The performance is left as if the home and 
the characters still exist inside that performance space even when there is no one there to view it.  
The template I created was a sort of offspring to Forget Me Not, yet it was flawed on two counts. 
Its creation arose from audience-participants’ responses to a questionnaire that I created 
regarding their immersion and belief in the fictional world of the Forget Me Not performances. 
However, most participants that experienced the performances and took part in the questionnaire 
knew me personally, and so there potentially could have been a high ratio of bias in the gathered 
data due to social desirability bias (SDB). SDB is when a respondent provides an answer that 
differs from their personal belief or attitude. This occurs “if subjects change their answers for 
impression management (to look better to others)” (Larson, 2019, p.534). My friends, family, 
acquaintances, colleagues etc., may have been answering the questions how they thought I 
would like them to answer because social norms were perhaps suggesting a particular answer 
was socially preferred (2019:534). The second mistake was only asking questions to audience-
participants within one specific show – Forget Me Not. The template could not be used 
universally for all immersive-styled performances since all it could suggest is a potential process 
for how audiences perceive and engage with Forget Me Not.  
Despite its flaws, creating this template led to a deeper line of enquiry: ‘propositionality’. The 
interpretation of Price’s Belief meant that ‘believing a proposition’ was referring to an object, 
thing or concept. By this logic, when audiences believe something in theatre, they are believing 
in objects. This notion makes no reference to what I deemed the most important aspect of a 
theatrical performance: the actor. Believing something is human-oriented – as far as we know 
only humans ‘believe’ – but that does not mean that humans only believe in (/ that) humans 
(exist); one can believe in ghosts, spirits, gods or aliens. Other than humans, concrete and 
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abstract concepts and objects give rise to interpretations, meanings and beliefs. An object within 
theatre can perform similarly to that of an actor as we know from the Prague Semioticians – who 
put forward the idea of the dynamics of objects (Bogatyrev 1936; Honzl 1940) – and actor-
network-theory (ANT). ANT “doesn’t designate a domain of reality or some particular item, but 
rather is the name of a movement, a displacement, a transformation, a translation, an 
enrollment.” (Latour, 2005, pp.64-65). ANT socially associates entities with one another, be they 
human or non-human. But how does an object (socially) perform? I argue that it performs 
through ‘propositionality’. This is the basis from which my investigation begins. 
Propositionality is like ANT in that it offers an understanding of how social interactions operate 
yet is distinct from ANT since my usage of it is (mainly) in participatory theatre practices (such 
as immersive theatre) where the sensory dimension differs to that of conventional theatre 
practices. I am analysing propositions and the impact that objects have on immersion through 
this specific lens: propositionality in both the forms of immersive and proscenium arch 
productions. ANT will therefore not be explored any further in this work. Propositionality can 
highlight the difference in the effects of a proposal within the forms and can be used to ask 
questions which continually need to be asked, rather than presuming the answers. Questions 
such as what happens in this scenario? Why? What do we gain? Etc. Studying propositionality in 
theatre allows us to offer proposals for answering these questions but does not directly answer 
them. This work proposes in a way that theatre proposes. It echoes it. It plays with it. And as this 
thesis develops, it will become clear that anything (including actors and humans) are objects, and 
that objects connote propositions.3 This thesis posits objects as equal to humans in terms of 
                                                          
3 “OOO means “object” in an unusually wide sense: an object is anything that cannot be entirely reduced either to 
the components of which it is made or to the effects that it has on other things” (Harman, 2018, p.43). 
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“An Examination of Propositionality and Immersion in Theatre.” The title establishes that a 
detailed inspection of the concepts ‘Propositionality’ and ‘Immersion’ shall be undertaken. An 
inspection which determines the essences of these terms within the context of theatre, since I am 
interested in how theatre lures and affects one’s way of feeling. This research is neither practice-
based nor practice-led, as a creative artefact is not the basis of my contribution to knowledge, 
and the research does not lead to new understandings about a practice. Instead, a thorough study 
of a multitude of practices, creative artefacts, performances, texts and interviews in theatre shall 
be explored. This exploration predominantly occurs from the perspective of an observer / 
audience / participant as opposed to a creator / performer / actor, although the theatre-makers 
position is discussed too. The research mostly places me as an observer / audience / participant 
in various theatrical performances as a tool to analyse the concepts of propositionality and 
immersion, but again, there are discussions where other beings take on the role of spectator. My 
position as subject in the case studies and research places me in the ‘examination’ process. 
However, whilst I am placed in it, I am not at the centre of it. Instead, I use my experiences to 
                                                          
4 See pp.31-32 for an explanation of what is meant by the equality of objects and humans i.e., a flat ontology, per 
Bryant (2011) and other ontological realists.  
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articulate propositionality. In doing so, I must take on the position of the viewer to both pose and 
answer the research question. Whilst my work here defines the concepts of ‘propositionality’ and 
‘immersion’ and narrows their meanings, my point of arrival is for others to understand the 
concept of propositionality within theatre and performance as a means of analysis. I hope that 
these examinations can offer theatre theorists, academics, practitioners, artists, critics, spectators 




The aim of the research is to comprehend what is being actuated within the interplay of things or 
objects in theatre and performance. Theatre is unequivocally reciprocal, but what is being 
proposed by the art to its audience, and how is that thing being proposed? How is the proposition 
being enacted and agreed? In the works that will be discussed, understanding the what and how 
of the performances’ specific proposition(s) is key to deciphering what is being actuated. 
Deciphering how objects communicate actualization offers a method for exploring an audience 
member / participant’s willingness to immerse. 
Interest in this research derived from personal exploration into the immersive, and the state of 
immersion, within the final year of my undergraduate degree at the University of Huddersfield. 
Through my own experience of interacting with audience members, as a performer, in an 
immersive style performance and environment, I came to question how audiences become 
immersed in what they perceive and experience. What grew out of this line of inquiry was the 
notion of propositionality. Yet, how does the concept of immersion relate to propositionality? 
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Propositions exist in all forms of theatre and performance, and likewise, all theatre is 
propositional. But as this thesis shall prove, the proposition’s possibility differs in various forms 
of theatre depending on its qualities. And this is where the concept of immersion meets 
propositionality.  
Identifying the differences in theatrical signs and what is being actuated in participatory 
performance practices (e.g., immersive theatre) as opposed to performances with more orthodox 
or traditional audience arrangements (e.g., proscenium arch theatres), helped me to choose the 
most appropriate examples of performances to spectate and participate in to analyse and 
contextualise my work. By ‘traditional’ audience arrangements, I am describing specifically 
proscenium arch theatres, not all theatres that might be described as ‘traditional’ or having 
traditional audience arrangements within the field, such as arena or thrust stages – despite the 
thrust conjuring images of the first theatres built by the ancient Greeks. The chosen 
performances which describe themselves as immersive in some way, all appear to promise a 
representational inclusion within the work itself and demonstrate a sensory dimension which is 
not accessible in traditional arrangements. Whereas the chosen performances which took place 
on a proscenium arch stage were there to be passively observed with no special attention paid to 
the tangibility of the art, requiring a greater theatrical distance.  
It is worth noting that whilst this study only analyses performances and works that belong within 
the practices of immersive theatre / immersive styled-performance and proscenium arch theatre, 
there exists an extensive volume of work between these spaces and poles. Hybridised practices 
and performances which blur the boundaries between performance / installation / ritual / game / 
dance / circus / performance art etc., are perhaps more common in contemporary theatre than 
performances which are solely framed within one genre i.e., immersive theatre or proscenium 
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arch performance. For example, the umbrella term of Applied theatre which encompasses a 
multitude of theatre practices such as Theatre in Education (TIE), Prison Theatre, Forum theatre, 
Disability theatre and so on, structure participatory theatre experiences for audiences / 
participants to provoke change. Yet, one would not define these practices which make use of 
different elements of theatre performance(s) as being immersive theatre as they had moments of 
explicit participation or being proscenium arch theatre because they were performed on a 
proscenium arch stage. Performances can overtly interact with audiences without belonging to 
the genre of immersive theatre e.g., in performance art, such as Marina Abramovich’s The Artist 
is Present (2010), and likewise, performances staged on a proscenium arch can be interactive 
with an audience and not be restricted to the confines of the stage space e.g., stand-up comedy, 
magic, musicals etc. However, this thesis uses the poles of immersive performance and 
proscenium performance as a tool to demonstrate the differences in propositionality when 
spectators’ perspectives are altered from active to passive, tangible to intangible. This leaves 
scope for further projects to be examined which interrogate theatrical works that unsettle 
spectators’ perspectives in hybridised systems.  
The term ‘propositionality’ has been used in other areas of research, such as, pragmatics, 
language and cognition, but this is the first study to make use of the term ‘propositionality’ in 
relation to theatre and performance. Sperber & Wilson (1986), Wilson & Sperber (2002), 
Carston (2010), Golding (2016) all discuss propositions and propositionality to explore 
communication. Golding (2016) even includes the term in his title: Beyond Propositionality: 
Metaphor in the Embodied Mind. Previous works on inferential communication, such as Sperber 
& Wilson (1986), for example, emphasise the dominance of propositions in communicating 
meaning. Golding’s thesis (2016), however, explores how non-propositional information 
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contributes to inferential communication, and he focuses his study on metaphoric utterance 
comprehension. For Golding, “any account of communication and cognition must incorporate 
both propositional and non-propositional information” (Golding, 2016, p.9). I also use the term 
‘propositionality’ to explore communication. More specifically, the communication of theatrical 
objects. Propositionality is the term I have chosen to describe a method of theatrical analysis. A 
method that supplements semiotics. For me, theatre semiotics is a branch of theatre 
propositionality. Analysing propositions and their possibilities within theatre and performance 
gives us a way of thinking about theatre slightly differently. We can currently use semiotics to 
analyse signs and symbols on stage, but I shall argue that semiotics cannot effectively analyse 
the difference between a sign in proscenium arch theatre and a sign in immersive theatre. I am 
not claiming that semiotics is context insensitive. After all, Mukarovsky states that: 
the theater is not inevitably bound to any of its components and that therefore the 
freedom of regrouping in it is inexhaustible.  
Nor are the individual components of the theater bound by anticipated and unchangeable 
relations, as it might often appear from the standpoint of rigid convention. There is not a 
pair of components, no matter how related they may be, whose relation cannot be set in 
motion.   
Mukarovsky, 1977, p.208 
 Mukarovsky highlights the dynamic theory of theatre here, as Bogatyrev (1936) and Honzl 
(1940) do too. Veltrusky following Mukarovsky’s transformability of theatre – the concept of 
theatre has an ‘elastic core’ – “reminds the reader that different theatre models […] manifest 
vastly different structurings of the basic sign systems” (Pladott, 1988, p.292). Prague 
Structuralism and semiotics is consequently context sensitive meaning that it allows for the 
discussion of possibilities and interpretations. Where it falls short in effectively analysing the 
difference in a sign between the two forms is in its sensory dimension. For example, in Forget 
Me Not, porcelain cups and saucers are laid before the audience-participants on their chosen 
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table. The participants can fill their personal porcelain cup with tea from the teapot on the table 
if they so choose. Now, if this cup was a cardboard cup, then semiotically the cardboard cup 
does the same thing as the porcelain cup: it serves as a sign of a cup. Yet, a cardboard cup does 
not have the same effect as a porcelain cup: the sensory dimension is different. The porcelain 
cup evokes something that is beyond a simple signifier because it is tangible, and the real-object 
(its executant “I”) always retreats.5 The porcelain cup also holds the possibility of bringing with 
it memory associations to personal experiences of drinking from old-fashioned china with 
members of the older generation – possibly in a nursing home! Propositionality pinpoints the 
materiality and tangibility of objects and how they proposition audiences in a way that differs 
from a simple signification.  
Propositions differ from simple significations due to how they are enacted / claimed. Victor 
Turner’s The Anthropology of Performance (1988) teaches us that most theatrical performances 
“belong to culture’s ‘subjunctive’ mood” (1988:101). Turner quotes Webster’s definition of 
‘subjunctive’ as “the mood of were, in ‘if I were you.’” (101, emphasis in original). Audiences 
therefore perceive theatre as if it were true / real / believable etc. One may assume that the 
claims made by theatre companies, productions and performances only exist in the realm of 
possibility and supposition; in what Stanislavski calls the magic if. Yet, what happens if 
theatrical objects propose a thing to be accepted in the quasi-indicative or indicative-mood? I.e., 
as an actual occurrence, state or fact etc. Is this possible in live performance? If so, how is the 
proposition enacted and agreed? Do audience members accept a proposition as being actual 
because it was proposed as such? At the heart of this thesis, it will be claimed that in the form of 
                                                          
5 OOO and Harman use Ortega y Gasset’s ‘The Executant “I”’ to explain how the inwardness of an object is never 
accessible. One only sees a sensual-object of the real-object when perceiving objects. See pp.35-36 for an 
explanation of ‘The Executant “I”’.  
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immersive theatre, the object that proposes the thing to be accepted is in the indicative-mood. 
The implied realism of the form makes the claim that an object is the thing it stands for.  
From this research we gain an alternative perspective for analysing how audiences perceive and 
invoke meaning in theatre. If one analyses theatrical objects in both proscenium and immersive 
theatre, one can gauge the limit of the subjunctive-mood in these forms. It opens for discussion 
how things are proposed to audiences in these forms; what is being proposed; how the 
proposition is enacted and agreed etc. all of which might be different forms of propositions: big 
and small propositions etc. And how does a spectator distinguish them from each other?  
My contribution to knowledge is an offering. An offering of an alternative perspective for 
viewing and analysing theatre.  
 
Context 
There is a specific branch of propositional analysis, or ‘propositionality’, that this research refers 
to. Prior to its exploration though, one must understand what a proposition is within this context. 
It will become clear (particularly within the ‘Proposition’ chapter of this thesis) that propositions 
are the sharable objects of cognitive acts and attitudes and that they operate as lures which 
create possibilities via a network of sub-propositions. Treating propositions in this way enables a 
means of discussing and analysing theatre ‘propositionally’. But how does this differ from past 
and current analytical approaches?  
20 
 
There already exists a multitude of theoretical approaches, both systematic and critical, for 
studying and analysing theatre.6 The origins of which are rooted in structuralism and semiotics. 
The general theory of semiotics was developed by Ferdinand De Saussure (1916) as a theory of 
language. Theatre semiotics arose as a subdiscipline from semiotics and “can be considered the 
first major general theory of theatre that attempted to encompass all aspects of the medium” 
(Balme, 2008, p.82). As a discipline, theatre semiotics investigates the use of signs within 
theatre. Pioneering the structuralist school of thought were the Prague Semioticians (1928-1948): 
Mukarovsky (1936a; 1938; 1966), Veltrusky (1941; 1942a; 1942b; 1973), Bogatyrev (1936a; 
1936b; 1938; 1940), Honzl (1940; 1943) etc. 
What all the Prague Schools’ contributions, as well as Pierce’s theory of signs, miss out, is what 
the sign(s) propositioned. Semiotic analysis allows audiences to interpret signs for meaning and 
understanding, but it does not propose or proposition anything to them. Propositionality is not a 
form of semiotics, semiotics is a branch of propositionality. So, let us say there is a ‘Proposition 
of the Sign’, which is semiotics, and this inherently proposes that the signifier corresponds with 
the signified. This is not a proposition within logic, as the relationship between the two is 
arbitrary, but this proposition works through the agreement of the writer and reader / speaker and 
                                                          
6 Approaches such as poststructuralism - which emerged in the 1960s from French philosophy due to the likes of 
Derrida (1978 [1968]) and Jean Francois-Lyotard by building upon and rejecting the ideas of structuralism - and 
psychoanalysis; phenomenology - based and developed from the nineteenth century philosophical positions of 
Husserl, particularly Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1970 [1900]), it is concerned with direct experience and 
emphasises the perceiving subject and consciousness. For phenomenology in theatre see States (1985) -; cultural 
materialism – influenced by a Marxist view of art and philosophy, cultural materialism “identifies economic 
material factors as the determining forces shaping society” (Balme, 2008, p.87). For cultural materialism in theatre 
see Williams (1980) -; theatricality i.e. a “mode of perception” (Burns, 1972), posits that things are not inherently 
theatrical, “but rather are rendered as such by a combination of aesthetic conventions” (2008:90); performance 
theory – the foundations of which derive from Richard Schechner in the 1960s (see Schechner 2003) and transcend 




listener / actor and spectator. In linguistics, this is the word as we know from Sperber & Wilson 
(1986), Wilson & Sperber (2002), Carston (2010), Golding (2016) etc.; in theatre, as briefly 
touched on earlier, it could be the word, the object, the body, etc. and the actor / spectator 
accepts the proposed correspondence between sign and referent. The other type of 
propositionality offers an alternative approach to semiotics; that the object does not signify but 
represents/symbolises/imitates etc. all of which might be different forms or attitudes of 
propositions. Yet, in theatre, specifically immersive theatre, the proposition is not about 
representing or imitating, but a claim that the object is the thing it stands for. 
Immersive theatre is mainly the genre of theatre that will be investigated within this thesis. There 
are various theatrical works and performances discussed which are not defined as being a part of 
the form of immersive theatre. Instead, these performances align with other forms and genres 
such as site-sympathetic theatre, spite-specific theatre, promenade theatre, environmental 
theatre, pervasive theatre and so on.7 Or, they may have immersive-like qualities by being 
interactive with the audience in some way. These styles of theatre and performance will then be 
compared with proscenium arch performances which maintain the performer-audience divide 
between stage and auditorium. The genres and styles of the proscenium stage performances are 
not the same. The styles differ from romantic Shakespearean comedies to contemporary 
inspirations from classic texts.  
As the thesis develops, reviews of the forms and styles of theatre mentioned here shall unfold. It 
will also become clear how research into the topics of performance analysis, immersion, 
theatrical signs and propositions differ from the work that already exists in these fields.  
                                                          
7 These terms shall be explored and defined as the thesis progresses.  
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Rationale for Performances 
Since this project mostly places me as an observer / audience / participant in various theatrical 
performances, I chose to attend and examine performances which were either presented as 
immersive in their style (and not always / necessarily their form) or performed on the traditional 
proscenium arch stage. A thorough description and exploration of the field of immersion in 
theatre shall come later, but the most famous active theatre company that is associated with the 
term ‘immersive’, is Punchdrunk. Unfortunately, it was not feasible for me to attend a 
Punchdrunk show during my research period as all their shows were being performed in either 
Thailand or New York. Instead, I chose the longest running immersive theatre show in London: 
The Immersive Ensemble’s, The Great Gatsby (2019). For my other immersive-styled case 
studies, I decided to choose productions which did not meet all the requirements that comprise 
the form of immersive theatre, per Machon’s scale of immersivity (2013, pp.93-102), yet were 
tangibly accessible to the audience and consisted of immersive-styled qualities to see if this 
affected propositionality’s limits. Firstly, I chose Funicular Productions’ The Murdér Express 
(2019), as it incorporated a more passive audience arrangement that differs from The Great 
Gatsby (2019) and from immersive theatre as a form – plus, it was advertised as an ‘immersive 
dining experience’ and I wanted to explore if the addition and consumption of food affected the 
quality of the theatrical claims and proposals – and secondly, I chose to work closely with a 
theatre company that would let me interview how and why they made their work. As a researcher 
living in West Yorkshire, the Leeds based site-sympathetic theatre company, Riptide, was ideal. 
Riptide’s artistic director, Alexander Palmer, was not only local to me and had a willingness to 
be interviewed and studied, but their pervasive-theatre productions of The Lucky Ones: Lucy 
(2018), and The Lucky Ones: Lailah (2018) actively attempted to blend quotidian objects with 
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theatrical ones during the day-to-day lives of its participants.8 Exploring how audience-
participants assess the objects before them and accept the enactment of the proposition(s) allows 
for a discussion of how propositionality can explore one’s willingness to immerse. Therefore, 
Riptide, specifically their ‘Lucky Ones’ productions, were the perfect choice to examine 
propositionality. 
For the proscenium arch environment case studies, I chose the RSC’s Romeo & Juliet (2019) and 
Proper Job’s Dorian (2019). My rationale in choosing Shakespeare’s Romeo & Juliet was to 
contrast contemporary immersive-styled performances which do not have ‘conventional’ 
audience arrangements, with what one may consider a ‘traditional theatre text’. In the same vein, 
selecting the RSC as the performing theatre company seemed appropriate since they could be 
considered to almost exclusively perform Shakespeare’s work ‘conventionally’, or 
‘traditionally’. Similarly, to Riptide, Proper Job’s Dorian (2019) was chosen for its locale. 
Dorian (2019) was performed at a local proscenium arch theatre i.e., the Lawrence Batley 
Theatre in Huddersfield, West Yorkshire. I have also worked with Proper Job theatre company 
on their LAB projects which are aimed at helping adults with their communication and 
confidence skills for employability through theatrical workshops.  
 
Methodology 
For this research I will be using a mix-method approach. I, as spectator and performer, have 
experienced many theatrical productions and experiences in my lifetime. Within this thesis, I 
                                                          
8 By ‘pervasive’ theatre / experiences, I am referring to experiences which instill a sense of play in their participants. 
See pp.79-80 for a detailed explanation of the difference between immersive / pervasive experiences / theatre and 
the connection that pervasive theatre has to gameplay and the magic circle. 
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have chosen to discuss aspects of propositionality, including how it operates as a means of 
analysis, in both immersive and traditional environments. This project started as a purely 
phenomenological investigation, but now it includes various perspectives that are not always 
from the first-person point of view, but initially, back in 2016, I gathered qualitative data in the 
form of questionnaires and interviews to the immersive-styled performance Forget Me Not, 
which Sean Sewell, David Field, and I devised and performed. These first-person responses 
helped develop my understanding of the field of immersion in theatre and performance; 
improved my ability to gather and analyse data and phenomena; and, enabled me to develop a 
theory of propositionality which explores the willingness, state, and quality of one’s immersion 
in theatre. As previously mentioned, my initial findings were limited to the Forget Me Not 
(2016) show, and so in order to broaden the scope of my research, I shifted my focus from trying 
to grade the states and process of an immersive sensation within a show, to exploring the 
propositional qualities of objects in immersive and traditional theatrical environments. In doing 
so, I firstly decided to not include my art and practice from the research process so that my 
desirability bias had been removed from the interviewees. But I soon realised that this did not 
account for the bias and different interpretative communities of the audiences attending the 
external performances. So, rather than creating specific focus groups to gather the qualitative 
data, or interview whomever attended my chosen performance case studies, I decided to place 
myself in the role of the spectator / participant in both immersive and traditional audience 
arrangements. This is not to say that other perspectives are not considered – there are interviews 
and theatre blogs which are key to my exploration and analysis of propositionality – but for the 
most part, the discourse this thesis creates has developed from my responses and direct 
experience of specific theatrical performances. My position as subject in the case studies and 
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research places me in the ‘examination’ process. In doing so, I feel it prudent to note my identify 
at this stage since it could be argued that this impacts on the research and how it is presented and 
perceived. To both pose and answer the research question, I must take on the position of the 
viewer.  Does my position as subject impact on the research? Alongside this question, there is 
the question of to what extent one’s positionality is the same as politics: is it the same or 
different? My identity and politics could be different from another audience member, participant, 
reader, and so on. My identity can be defined as young, educated, white, male, and so on. And 
my politics could be described as left-wing. However, whilst I am placed in the research, I am 
not at the centre of it. Instead, I use my experiences to articulate propositionality. And whilst 
acknowledging subjectivity is essential, human beings also experience things similarly. One’s 
race, gender, health condition etc., does not negate experience, but how one interprets is 
separate. I mention this to declare my awareness of the potential limitations of using oneself as a 
barometer and to acknowledge doubt. This method and thesis offer informed ideas about 
propositionality in theatre, but there is a difference between an idea e.g., the participant’s 
proposition – which in most situations is my entertainment of a possibility, or my analysis of 
objects – and a fact e.g., the readers’ acceptance of these ideas and proposals. Also, since my 
contribution to knowledge is an offering of an alternative perspective for analysing theatre, it is 
my hope that propositional analyses of performances are undertaken by individuals with varying 
positions and identities. However, the investigation of politics and identity is not within the 
scope of this research project.  
Since I am largely formulating an approach to analysing propositionality in theatre based on my 
own experiences, the questions posed in this thesis are questions about (my) experience and so a 
contextualist position that uses phenomenology as an approach and method is used. Yet, the 
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philosophical and ontological position of this work does not solely belong to contextualism. For 
the gathering of qualitative data and research I have also used other methods. I constructed semi-
structured interviews for Riptide’s artistic director, and for audience members that attended the 
third lot of Forget Me Not performances in 2018. These interviews asked what the conditions 
were that allowed x to happen. Throughout this thesis, I am trying to pinpoint what the causality 
of x is. Therefore, I decided to combine a phenomenological method with a speculative realist 
research method. Speculative realism combines a realist ontology with a constructivist 
epistemology. This may appear that I am leaving out the relativist way of being which is 
phenomenology and the study of phenomena, but I do not. Both contextualism and limited 
realism gain a theory of knowledge through constructivist epistemologies. Whilst speculative 
realism is flat and neutral and maintains that there is a world that we can never truly know, 
phenomenology maintains that one cannot escape one’s position in the world, only one’s shared 
reality. As theatre is experiential, I have blended these positions and methods to propose 
plausible explanations about theatrical experiences in both immersive and proscenium 
environments.  
In the immersive environment, I chose The Great Gatsby (2019) by The Immersive Ensemble 
and The Murdér Express (2019) by Funicular Productions, and outside of the field of immersion 
and form of immersive theatre, I chose the RSC’s Romeo & Juliet (2019) and Dorian (2019) to 
explore if propositionality still works as a means of analysis in traditional audience arrangements 
and if / where it breaks down or reaches its limits. The analysis of propositionality within these 
specific performances are of my personal and direct experience, since, at all these performances, 
I was an audience member. The specific term one might use to describe my role as audience 
member arguably differs between the two environments of the immersive and proscenium. In the 
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proscenium arch performances, I was sat in an auditorium passively spectating the action. 
Whereas, in the immersive theatre production, I was an active participant in the action and 
narrative. Machon describes how “the naming of ‘the audience’ as such becomes a vexed term” 
(2013:98) and lists several terms for the audience that are used by artists in the field of 
immersion. “These include Barrett’s ‘comrades’, Howell’s ‘audience-participant’ Lundahl and 
Seitl’s ‘visitors’, Holdsworth’s ‘co-creators’, Mercuriali’s ‘guest-performers’, Stevens’s 
‘playing-audience’ or Wilson’s ‘“attendant” audience’” (2013:99). My preferred choice is 
Howell’s ‘audience-participant’, and in the immersive and pervasive arrangements discussed, 
this is the term I shall use as Machon (2013) predominantly does. Augusto Boal’s term, ‘spect-
actor’, also combines the duality of spectating and acting. Boal used the term for an individual 
engaged in Forum Theatre. Yet, as White pinpoints, the notion of a passive spectator was “to be 
less than a man, less than fully human” (cited in White 2013:20) for Boal. This thesis does not 
place spectatorship within the framework of negative perception – just as Rancière’s The 
Emancipated Spectator (2009) challenged this perception – but it does posit that participation 
and tangibility in immersive works affect the enactment of theatrical propositions and lures. The 
other aspect of this research interviews Alexander Palmer (Founder and Artistic Director) of 
Riptide about how he facilitated immersive experiences for his audience in the pervasive-theatre 
performances of Riptide’s The Lucky Ones: Lucy (2018) and The Lucky Ones: Lailah (2018). 







This thesis is split into two main chapters. Both chapters have various subchapters and case 
studies which explore different yet interwoven intentions. Chapter one, “What is 
Propositionality?” discusses and pinpoints the foundation for propositional analysis in theatre. 
The introduction has already posited theatre propositionality to be an umbrella term for 
materialist-semiotics, placing it among semiotics as a means of theatrical analysis. Chapter one 
expands on this and defines a theory of theatre propositionality as a means of analysis within the 
specific theatrical environments of immersive theatre and/or performance, and proscenium arch 
theatre. This chapter deliberates the dense theory that underpins theatre propositionality.  
Firstly, the ontological placement of theatre propositionality as a flat ontology is explained and 
justified. Theatre propositionality treats everything within theatre as objects. Analysing theatre 
through this lens allows for the consideration of how the qualities of an object propose a specific 
thing to be considered. Then, a thorough examination of the term ‘proposition’ within the 
context of theatre propositionality is gradually arrived at: propositions are sharable objects of 
cognitive acts and attitudes and they operate as lures which create possibilities via a network of 
sub-propositions. Once propositionality has been defined, the two theatrical environments which 
are to be investigated in chapter two – immersive theatre and proscenium theatre – are described. 
Chapter one ends by explaining how the propositional ‘lure’ and claim that is made in an 
immersive environment differs to that of a proscenium via its actuality.  
In chapter two, “Exploring Propositionality”, the thesis explores how the actuality of 
propositions functions in its enactment and agreement and what the consequences of these 
agreements are. Chapter two includes the bulk of my practical research as artist, participant, 
29 
 
spectator, interviewer and researcher. The chapter begins by explaining the catalyst that 
commenced my exploration into propositionality within the field of immersion and theatre. It 
discusses my practice at an undergraduate level and how my misconceptions and mistakes led 
me to develop the conditions for an overall theory of propositionality that are interrogated in this 
thesis. Afterwards, the analysis of my five chosen performances / case studies begins. The order 
and placement of these performances was not chosen on a chronological, synchronic, or 
diachronic basis, but on a thematic one. That being said, each case study does tend to analyse 
theatrical objects chronologically as they were directly experienced by audience-participants and 
me. ‘The Lucky Ones’ chapter produces the most diversity in the temporality of its structure due 
to its lengthy time-specificity.9 The Lucky Ones productions took place over the course of a 
month, and whilst the objects do tend to be analysed in the order that Ladley (2018) experienced 
them, there are occasions within the interviews with Palmer where our dialogue skips backwards 
and forwards to specific moments within the month-long experience.  
The thematic structuring of the case studies is due to the productions’ performance styles. The 
first performance and case study to be explored is a theatrical performance which most closely 
resembles reality. As the case studies progress, each one becomes more theatrical and artificial 
in its performance style. It is my contention that propositionality thrives and is most fruitful in 
environments and performance styles whose (quasi)indicative claims are the more forcefully 
vivacious. As the aesthetic distance increases and audience members develop a greater 
awareness of fictionality, the number of sub-propositions decrease meaning that propositionality 
develops more limits in its ability to propose further things and discussions to be considered.   
                                                          
9 Wakefield defines ‘time-specificity’ as the “experience of the passing of time through performance” (Wakefield, 
2016, p.33).  
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 ‘The Lucky Ones’ chapter examines the documentation I have gathered and researched through 
interviews and blogs and uses that documentation to explore how interacting qualities of specific 
theatrical objects from The Lucky Ones productions proposed things to be considered. It also 
explores the concept of sub-propositions and their relation to a production’s main-proposition. 
This case study, along with ‘The Great Gatsby’ chapter, helps to identify what ‘the goal’ of 
immersive theatre and performance is, for me. ‘The Great Gatsby’ chapter also shows how one’s 
state of immersion can be affected by the changing conditions of a proposition. This chapter 
analyses the two interwoven intentions of location and scene and how the theatrical objects 
within those intentions facilitated immersion through transportation and absorption for me as an 
audience-participant. Similarly, ‘The Murdér Express’ chapter further elucidates how shifts in a 
proposition’s conditions can affect and effect one’s immersion and engagement in a theatrical 
world, but also, it explores how sub-propositions do not always have to aid the main proposition 
for immersion to occur. Finally, the ‘Romeo & Juliet and Dorian’ chapter examines the 
limitations that propositionality has as a means of analysis in proscenium work compared to 
interactive theatrical experiences.  
In the conclusion I stipulate how I have answered my research questions and addressed my 
specified aims and objectives. I reiterate my contribution to knowledge and explain the 
significance and implications of propositionality as a means of theatrical analysis within the 
context of this work and in wider concerns by proposing potential further questions and studies 
that are possible because of this paper.  
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Chapter 1 – What is Propositionality? 
1.1 Ontological Placement and 
Justification 
 
Before discussing and exploring propositionality in immersive theatre, the ontological placement 
of the work to follow must be asserted so that one understands how theatrical objects are to be 
viewed and analysed throughout. The lens in which this research will peer through is the lens of 
Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO). OOO is a form of flat ontology which places all objects – 
human and nonhuman – as equal in terms of being; all objects have an executant “I” (Ortega y 
Gasset). For Bryant, “the being of objects is an issue distinct from the question of our knowledge 
of objects” (Bryant, 2011, p.18). The question that ontological realists – Harman, Morton, 
Bryant, Bogost, Latour, Bennett etc. – are interested in is the question of object, i.e., what are 
substances? Due to philosophy being governed by an epistemological realism rather than an 
ontological one (i.e., Plato, Kant, Locke, Russell etc.), the question of objects has been how we 
know the object through the nature/culture split; what is its relation to a subject or human? What 
effect does it have on things? Etc. Starting with a flat ontology as OOO does, one can see that 
“the difference between humans and other objects is not a difference in kind, but a difference in 
degree” (Bryant, 2011, p.26). Bryant’s The Democracy of Objects “attempts to think the being of 
objects unshackled from the gaze of humans in their being-for-themselves” (Bryant, 2011, p.19).  
 
It may seem strange to view theatre through the lens of a flat ontology rather than epistemology 
since theatre is experiential; in theatre sensual objects are perceived by the gaze of humans. 
However, as Bryant proclaims, a democracy of objects “does not entail the exclusion of the 
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human. […Humans] are rather objects among the various types of objects that exist or populate 
the world” (2011:20). When a human enters a theatrical world, they are subjects to it, yet 
subjects are objects among objects. What an ontology of objects declares is that subjects are not 
“constant points of reference related to all other objects” (2011:22). I am not the first to apply 
sociomaterial perspectives such as Bryant’s to theatre. Frank Camilleri (2019) draws the ideas of 
Latour’s ANT (2005), Barad’s ‘agential realism’, – which offers a framework for understanding 
the role of both human and nonhuman in scientific practices (2007) – and Delanda’s assemblage 
theory (2006; 2016) which emphasizes the multifunctionality of assemblages, i.e. that objects 
can “serve different functions in other environments and circumstances” (Camilleri, 2019, p.4), 
to re-discuss performer training in theatre and performance. Camilleri also makes good use of 
Ihde’s post-phenomenological perspective to think about the ways we look and think about 
performer training. Ihde “combines phenomenology with pragmatism within a technoscience 
context that is sensitive to the situated materiality of lived experience” (2019:20-21). Where Ihde 
becomes relevant to Bryant, OOO and this specific research is through his foregrounding of an 
organism/environment model as opposed to subject/object model (Ihde, 2009, pp.9-10). Still, in 
theatre we are a subject and an object, perceiving, experiencing, analysing and translating 
sensual objects for our understanding, knowledge, belief, judgment, entertainment and 
immersion.  
On the epistemological front, the subject/object distinction has the curious effect of 
leading the epistemologist to focus on propositions and representations alone, largely 
ignoring the role that practices and nonhuman actors play in knowledge-production. As a 
consequence, the central question becomes that of how and whether propositions 
correspond to reality. In the meantime, we ignore the laboratory setting, engagement with 
matters and instruments, and so on. It is as if experiment and the entities that populate the 
laboratory are treated as mere means to the end of knowledge such that they can be safely 
ignored as contributing nothing to propositional content, thereby playing no crucial role 
in the production of knowledge. Yet by ignoring the site, practices and procedures by 
which knowledge is produced, the question of how propositions represent reality 
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becomes thoroughly obscure because we are left without the means of discerning the 
birth of propositions and the common place where the world of the human and the 
nonhuman meets.  
 
Bryant, 2011, p.24 
 
This passage from Levi R. Bryant’s The Democracy of Objects beautifully explains why a flat 
ontology must precede epistemological questions for such epistemological questions to be 
answered. How can one answer the question of how propositions represent reality if we do not 
have an accurate representation of reality? Yet, this passage illuminates much more than simply 
advocating ontological realism. It also elucidates how ontological realism can answer the 
epistemological question. The answer lies in the misconstruing of propositions. OOO offers a 
flat ontology and therefore a means for understanding how propositions represent reality. 
Propositions, as one shall see, are translatable objects; it is the quality / qualities of an object 
which denotes the proposition. This abstract concept will be unpacked and defined in the next 
chapter. A definition of propositions and other relevant terms is required to understand how 
OOO relates to propositions and propositionality in theatre. Firstly though, the intricacies of 
OOO’s origins, theory and development need to be outlined to understand what objects are 
within this materialist framework. 
 
One of the leading exponents of Object-Oriented Ontology is the professor of philosophy at SCI-
Arc in Los Angeles, Graham Harman. In Harman’s, Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of 
Everything (2018), he suggests that he has been using the term OOO since the late 1990s, 
publicising the term “in a lecture called “Object-Oriented Philosophy”, [which was] later 
published in [his] book Towards Speculative Realism [(2010)]” (2018:279). The ‘extensive 
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influence’ of OOO, listing its broad philosophical ontology, did not begin until the ‘first 
conference on the topic’ which was ‘held at Georgia Tech in Atlanta in April 2010’ (2018:8). 
This novel movement does not only consist of Harman, – yet he will be the main source of focus 
in this thesis – there’s also Ian Bogost (2006; 2012), Levi R. Bryant (2011), Timothy Morton 
(2013a; 2013b) etc. whom also deploy the principles of OOO in new combinations and fields.  
 
OOO by no means only entails new ideas previously undiscussed in philosophy, in fact, it is a 
Heidegger-influenced school of thought10. Heidegger, of course, is not the only influence. An 
‘object’ for Heidegger was the thing reduced to a human’s perception or use of it, and the word 
‘thing’, meant the hidden thing, in its own right. Husserl (1970), Brentano (1874), Twardoski 
(1977) and Meinong (1983), (to name a few), albeit not all phenomenologists, referred to 
‘objects’ in a much broader sense; a sense that is “nearly as broad a sense as OOO” (2018:42). 
The main principle of OOO, is that objects exist independently from human perception; objects 
are not ontologically exhausted through relations with humans and/or other objects. But what 
does OOO consider an object? “OOO means “object” in an unusually wide sense: an object is 
anything that cannot be entirely reduced either to the components of which it is made or to the 
effects that it has on other things” (Harman, 2018, p.43). For Harman, everything is object-
oriented that is irreducible in both directions. This does not exclude humans or even events – 
despite Manuel Delanda’s (initial) objections11. Harman posits that other philosophical stances 
exclude things from being objects by using the notions of undermining, overmining and 
duomining. Within his own work, Dante’s Broken Hammer (2016:176-182), he explains that 
                                                          
10 Harman (2011). Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects.  
11 I include ‘initial’ since DeLanda has since ‘partially revoked’ (Harman, 2018:52) his objections regarding objects 
and events in The Rise of Realism (2017) which was published with Harman.   
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“the underminer is a thinker who eliminates objects by telling us what they are made of; the 
overminer gets rid of them by telling us how they appear or what they do; the duominer does 
both at once” (Hickman, 2018). All three ‘mining’ techniques for describing objects do not 
include a definition or description of the real object; what remains outside of its constituents, 
appearance or function. For describing objects, Harman posits the ‘Quadruple Object’ theory 
(Harman, 2018, p.80).12  
 
As briefly mentioned, objects and their qualities (to the OOO thinker) can either be real or 
sensual: “real objects and qualities exist in their own right, while sensual objects and qualities 
exist only as the correlate of some real object, whether human or otherwise” (2018:80). Whether 
an object be real or sensual, OOO thinkers believe that an object cannot exist without qualities, 
and its qualities cannot exist without objects. A Real-Object can have either Real-Qualities or 
Sensual-Qualities, and a Sensual-Object can have either Sensual-Qualities or Real-Qualities: 
there are four possible combinations. As Harman does in his book, I shall abbreviate the four 
combinations to their first letters for simplification e.g., RO-SQ stands for a Real-Object with 
Sensual Qualities. The development of the four possible combinations not only derives from 
Harman’s understanding of Heidegger and Husserl, but from his extensive study of the Spanish 
philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset, and his essay “An Essay in Esthetics by Way of a Preface” 
(1914). In this essay, Ortega discusses ‘The Executant “I”’ (1975:131-134). This discussion 
illustrates “that every non-human object can also be called an “I” in the sense of having a 
                                                          
12 Please see Appendix 3 for an image of ‘Figure 1 – The Quadruple Object’ which depicts a table of 
RO/SO/RQ/SQ. “There are two kinds of objects and two kinds of qualities: real and sensual, in both cases. […] 
Since objects cannot exist without qualities and vice versa, there are only four possible combinations, indicated by 
four lines between the circles [which can be seen in appendix 3]” (Harman, 2018, p.80).   
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definite inwardness that can never be fully grasped” (2018:70). In Ortega’s words (and I quote at 
length): 
“I” means, then, not this person as distinct from another, nor, even less, people as distinct 
from things, but rather all things – men, things, situations – inasmuch as they are 
occurring, being, executing themselves. Each of us is “I” according to this, not for 
belonging to a privileged zoological species equipped with a project-making apparatus 
called consciousness, but more simply because he is something. This red leather box that 
I have before me is not an “I” because it is only an image I have, and an image is exactly 
not what is imaged. Image, concept, etc., are always image, concept of…, and that of 
which they are in image is the real being. There is the same difference between a pain 
that someone tells me about and a pain that I feel as there is between the red that I see 
and the being red of this leather box. Being red is for it what hurting is for me. Just as 
there is an I-John Doe, there is also an I-red, an I-water, and I-star. 
Everything from a point of view within itself, is an “I”.  
Ortega, 1975, pp.133-
134.  
I include this – which is also one of the reasons why Harman appreciates the essay – because it 
pinpoints that fundamental aspect which makes a being (which does not have to be a living or 
conscious being) ‘real’13. The inwardness of an object, human or non-human, is what Harman 
and OOO calls a RO. The ‘image’ of an object, human or non-human, is what OOO calls a SO. 
There is more to Harman’s development of the four possible combinations, which he explains in 
his book, but for understanding how objects and their qualities relate to propositions, we need 
not invest our scope any further into this development. 14 
Objects have an “I” and they have qualities. ROs have both an “I” and qualities (these can either 
be real or sensual), and SOs have only either RQ or SQ; they do not have an “I” since they are 
an ‘image’ of a RO which has an “I”. Objects are not separate from their qualities as originally 
                                                          
13 This opposes Husserl’s view. For him, only conscious beings can have an “I”; inanimate objects only role are to 
be objects for a thinking-mind.  
14 Heidegger, Husserl etc.  
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presumed through research into analytical philosophers; there is no bundle-theory of objects per 
Hume. Theatrical objects therefore have an “I” too; they are occurring objects that have an 
agency within the theatrical world. Every object – human and nonhuman – within a theatrical 
world and environment has an equal being. Schechner’s fifth axiom teaches us this: all 
production elements speak their own language. He poses the question “why should the 
performer be any more important that other production elements?” (Schechner, 1994, p.xl). And 
it is the same question which is relevant and ever present today in philosophical trends, 
phenomenology, ecology and so on. So then, how does OOO’s opinions regarding objects relate 
to propositions within theatre?  
1.2 Proposition 
 
As I have already stated: propositions are the sharable objects of cognitive acts and attitudes and 
they operate as lures which create possibilities via a network of sub-propositions. I shall now 
unpack what this statement means and how I arrived at a definition of the term proposition 
within the context of theatre propositionality and this thesis. 
The term has many uses which leads to many definitions. McGrath and Frank in their essay 
“Propositions” for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explain that: 
The term ‘proposition’ has a broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is used to refer to 
some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and 
other “propositional attitudes” (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.), the referents of that-
clauses, and the meanings of sentences. […] 
The best way to proceed, when dealing with quasi-technical words like ‘proposition’, 
may be to stipulate a definition and proceed with caution, making sure not to close off 
any substantive issues by definitional fiat. 
McGrath & Frank: 2018. 
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I shall heed McGrath & Frank’s advice and proceed with caution in defining propositions. This 
definition will not encompass all the roles propositions perform, but one that will be used 
throughout this thesis to explain the type of propositionality I am exploring in immersive theatre. 
Since I have already quoted McGrath and Frank, here is their stipulation of the term: 
“propositions, we shall say, are the sharable objects of the attitudes and the primary bearers of 
truth and falsity” (2018). This definition incorporates propositions as meanings i.e., propositions 
express attitudes via sharable objects/types/universals, and as bearers of truth-value i.e., the 
proposition is what is true (or false). For McGrath and Frank, propositions are two-fold: they use 
sharable objects to express a theory of meaning and a theory of truth. Interestingly, Turner 
shows that theatre is typically expressed and accepted as if it were true rather than being true. 
Propositions, however, operate differently, “flourish[ing] best in the indicative mood of the 
cultural process” (Turner, 1988, p.102). How then, can a proposition exist indicatively within a 
subjunctive cultural process such as theatre? The definition that will be arrived at will claim that 
theatrical propositions are expressed (quasi-)indicatively but are still accepted by the receiver in 
the subjunctive-mood; as if it were true. But before jumping ahead, there is more information to 
draw from McGrath and Frank’s definition. What is significant about their definition, is that it 
does not specify language or sentences as the mode for expression, but the sharable objects of 
attitudes. This rather ambiguous phrase allows a proposition to be expressed and 
accepted/rejected by physical and abstract objects, not only semantical language. This is key to 
how propositionality functions and behaves and so it shall be defined, but its consideration needs 
deferring briefly whilst continuing to analyse McGrath and Frank’s stipulation.  
McGrath and Frank’s definition of the term excludes thought- and utterance-tokens as being 
propositions because “presumably [they] are not sharable, [nor] concrete events or facts, which 
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presumably cannot be false” (2018)15. This is relevant because the definition I shall arrive at 
includes ‘object-tokens’ as propositions. A token is often considered as the relation of 
instantiation or exemplification of a type. In linguistics, a type can be considered as an object: 
abstract objects such as numbers and sets, rather than properties and relations (Wetzel:2002). A 
token then is an instance of a type. For example, if one were to utter the phrase “grass is green” 
twice, there would be two utterance-tokens of the same utterance-type. The reason that tokens 
cannot be disregarded from this definition of propositions, and the analysis of propositionality 
within theatre, is because of contextual utterances that contain indexicals. Indexical signs are 
when the signifier is caused by the signified. The most commonly used example of this being 
smoke signifying fire. Atkin explains in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s “Pierce’s 
Theory of Signs” that “if the constraints of successful signification require that the sign utilize 
some existential or physical connection between it and its object, then the sign is an index” 
(Atkin, 2010, n.p.) (emphasis in original).  Professor Cohen of the University of Washington 
offers an example within his lecture notes that shows how sentence-tokens express propositions: 
For sentences containing indexicals, at least, it does not seem that one and the same 
entity can be both a meaning and the bearer of a truth-value. Let S = the sentence-type ‘I 
am hungry now’. S is unambiguous: it means that the person who utters it is hungry at 
the time of utterance. So S should have a single meaning. But if the meaning of S is the 
proposition that S expresses, what proposition might that be? The problem is that 
different tokens of S express different propositions. Bill’s utterance of S at midnight 
expresses the proposition that Bill is hungry at midnight. George’s utterance of S at noon 
expresses the proposition that George is hungry at noon. Bill uses it to say something 
true; George uses it to say something false. So the meaning of S is not the same as the 
proposition(s) it expresses. Hence, if we want to preserve propositions as the bearers of 
truth-value (as I think we should), then we need to find other entities to be meanings (at 
least for sentences containing indexicals).  
                                                          
15 They discuss the consequences of their definition in the article, but we shall not focus our attention on those here. 
See McGrath, M. & D. Frank. (2018) "Propositions" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for a discussion of 
the consequences in contemporary usage.  
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Cohen, 2008, p.14. 
Putting aside the search for a separate entity to take on the role of meaning for a moment, what 
Cohen clearly demonstrates with this example is that sentence- and utterance-tokens express 
propositions in utterances that contain indexicals. For these indexical utterances, the sentence- 
and utterance-type contains a meaning which is not the same as the proposition expressed by the 
utterance. What happens then with propositional content – in the form of tokens – which isn’t in 
the form of a sentence i.e., objects; abstract and concrete objects? Tomasz Wiśniewski in 
Complicite, Theatre and Aesthetics discusses how theatrical objects, such as that of a chair, 
illustrate an object’s “fluctuating semantics” (Wiśniewski, 2016, p.168). Wiśniewski provides 
examples from Complicite’s A Disappearing Number and The Master and Margarita where “the 
chair frequently participates in depicting different means of transport” (2016:169). In the former, 
“a particular arrangement of chairs delineates a plane, a taxi or a train” and in the latter, “the 
tram […] where the Master encounters Margarita” (169). This exemplifies the transformability 
of DeLanda’s assemblage theory of objects. Now, suppose there are two chairs on a stage which 
are used within a scene to depict a bench in a park – similarly to that of The Master and 
Margarita. The same two chairs are then used in a later scene to depict a car. The chairs are 
positioned in the same place and arrangement creating an ‘object-token’, yet the proposition 
expressed differs from scene-to-scene due to its situated-utterance. This can be seen in the 
National Theatre’s The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time (2012) where the half a 
dozen white boxes on stage depict and construct different meanings in different scenes due to 
their situational interactions with objects. In one scene a white box conveys a seat, in another a 
television, or a fish tank. And this is down to the interacting qualities of the theatrical objects 
within the particular situated-utterance. The performer interacts with the white box by sitting on 
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it depicting a stool. In a latter scene, the white box lights up and depicts a television. The 
interacting qualities of the performing objects and their situated-utterance informs the audience 
of the proposition’s difference in expression. In the hypothetical chair example then, the sensual 
objects – the image of the chairs – ‘contain’ or signify the meaning of the proposition in the 
form of an indexical, yet express different propositions16. The two chairs which depict a park 
bench propose that the current scene is located within a park. Whereas the token of the two 
chairs in the latter scene depict a car, proposing that this scene is located within a vehicle.17 The 
signified meaning of the proposition is (currently) an unidentified entity which Cohen states 
needs to be found, and the proposition expressed is its truth-value. However, objects in this 
context do not contain a truth-value. This type of propositionality removes the question of truth / 
falsity and replaces it with acceptable / unacceptable since propositions are not things to be 
deemed true or false by a receiver but are considered possibilities which can either be accepted 
or rejected. 18 Accepting or rejecting a possibility leads one to feeling differently about the 
perceived reality.  
The chair example presents an object-oriented depiction of Cohen’s example. If one transfers the 
terminology associated with the philosophy of language over to an ontology of objects, then the 
                                                          
16 The word ‘contain’ in this context is not directly transferrable from a philosophy of language to an ontology of 
objects; a sentence has components to which it is made, and this is where its meaning lies. An object, on the other 
hand, cannot be reduced to the components of which it is made; it does not ‘contain’ a meaning, only an “I”. An 
assemblage can be reduced to its components as Camilleri (2019) explains, but an object itself cannot. When I refer 
to an object containing a meaning, I am referring to the signified meaning interpreted by the perceiver.  
 
17 The aesthetics of these scenes would propose more than a ‘main-proposition’, such as location, to its audience. 
The objects would also propose ‘sub-propositions’ too which will be explored in more detail throughout the analysis 
of the perceived performances and interview with Alexander Palmer. For this example, only the main-proposition is 
necessary for its understanding.  
18 Gaskill and Nocek (2014) pinpoint how Whitehead viewed a proposition as a lure – a possibility – in his Process 
and Reality (1929). When we entertain the possibility, we feel differently about the experience and world. This shall 
be expanded on in detail shortly.  
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‘object-type’ (the two chairs) – which OOO refers to as the sensual object – contains a meaning, 
and the proposition(s) it expresses are contained in the ‘object-tokens’ – the tokens of a sensual 
object. The proposition expressed is its ‘acceptable-value’, rather than truth-value. Obviously, it 
could be true or false that either scene is set within a park or a vehicle, but truth and falsity relate 
to judgements of propositional statements rather than objects. Whether something is true or false 
is unknown without the offering of other propositional content to support the judgement, be it in 
the form of the word, body, another object etc. What is expressed by the object-type and object-
tokens is that the perceiver performs a cognitive act of the sharable objects to either accept or 
reject the proposal offered. The sharable objects in the cognitive act of experiencing a sensual 
object are the qualities of an object. It is an object’s qualities which denote a proposition as 
either acceptable / unacceptable or a meaning to its perceiver.  
To qualify the insertion of acceptable / unacceptable in propositions, I shall briefly move away 
from utterance and object tokens for a moment to discuss lures. Gaskill and Nocek in Lure of 
Whitehead fortify that propositions are not rooted in truth and falsity, but in possibilities, and use 
Whitehead’s “lure for feeling” in Process and Reality (1929) to do so: 
Whitehead defines a proposition as a “lure for feeling”: not a statement about the world 
to be judged true or false, not a tool for unveiling the truth behind appearances, but a 
possibility that draws those who entertain it into a different way of feeling their world.  
Gaskill & Nocek, 2014, 
p.6 
Whitehead’s conception that a proposition lures indicates how propositions can affect an 
individual’s feelings towards their surroundings if said individual entertains the qualities of the 
proposal. A proposition offers a possibility to “those who [choose] to entertain it”. The insertion 
of choose in Gaskill and Nocek’s notion pinpoints how acceptable / unacceptable is relevant to 
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propositionality. Accepting or rejecting the lure of a propositional possibility leads the thinker 
“into a different way of feeling their world”. For example, in Forget Me Not, tea and biscuits are 
offered as propositional lures. The drinking of the tea is a fragment of a possibility that 
complements / supplements / facilitates one’s engagement in the theatrical world. By accepting 
the possibility / proposal, one has a fragment of the fictional world. One becomes immersed in 
that detailed fragment which leads to a “different way of feeling [the perceived] world”. It shall 
become clear that in immersive theatre this different way of feeling is immersion through 
transportation and/or absorption; it is the blurring of boundaries between the theatrical and the 
real. Also, it shall become evident that a lure which affects feeling occurs through detailed 
fragments of objects which come together creating a network of sub-propositions. There is a lot 
that needs unpacking in these sentences, and the argument is very delicate, but before we can 
arrive at this point, caution must be maintained.  
Moving back to the previous discussion where terms within the philosophy of language were 
being transferred over to object-oriented ontology, one sees that utterances cannot be completely 
cast aside in the discussion of propositions. According to Michael Bennett, “the utterance of 
propositional content in theatre is tripartite: 1) an utterance in theatre, is a subject/predicate of an 
unpronounced indexical19 pointing to a specific state of affairs, 2) performs a function in that the 
counterfactual condition is projected forward in the type of response/action, and 3) is a part, 
functions as, or is the event, itself, that the audience is there to witness. There is a fourth 
element, too, and that is that metaphorical interpretation is the outgrowth of the tripartite 
structure” (Bennett, 2018, p.148). Theatre is deceptive; it makes us think that propositional 
                                                          
19 Bennett is referring to Pierce’s Index or Indexical Sign within his three sign modes: symbolic sign, iconic sign 
and indexical sign. An indexical sign is a mode in which the signifier may not resemble the signified object, yet it is 
directly connected to the object in some way e.g., fire and smoke; a mole and mole hill. These examples are 
elaborated on in “Pierce’s Theory of Signs” (Atkin, 2010).  
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utterances are the fictional world of the play, when veritably, propositional utterances function 
within the fictional world of the play. However, “outside of the world of the play—to the 
audience—the utterances of the propositions contained in theatrical statements function as, and 
are, the theatrical event, itself” (2018:149). A few aspects of propositional content in the form of 
utterances can be elucidated by Bennett here.  However, the focus of propositional content in 
this thesis is not in the form of theatrical utterances, but as object-types. Object-tokens are to be 
considered within propositionality yet do not consume a lot of attention, since, within the 
analysed productions, object-tokens are quite rare. The RSC’s Romeo & Juliet does make use of 
object-tokens via a large and partially-open-faced cube which is the focal point of the set. This 
shall be analysed in due course.  
The definition of the term ‘proposition’ is still no closer to being stipulated within this context, 
but one has not ruled out propositional tokens from the definition as McGrath and Frank do with 
utterance-tokens. Whilst continuing to proceed with caution, it is time to closely examine their 
definition: propositions “are the sharable objects of the attitudes and the primary bearers of truth 
and falsity” (2018). To begin unpacking this, let us start with the latter part of their definition: 
the primary bearers of truth and falsity. As previously mentioned, propositions for Whitehead 
are “not a tool for unveiling the truth behind appearances” (2014:6), so why are they the primary 
bearers of truth and falsity for McGrath and Frank? What does their statement mean? It means 
that when p is held true, it does not have to be true. In this case, the object of an act or attitude of 
holding something true is viewed as the bearer of truth and falsity. Nuchelmans offers an 
example of this in Theories of the Proposition (1973). He states that “one of the uses of the 
expression ‘--- is true (false)’ is to state the outcome of a critical examination. The open place in 
this sentence frame may be filled by such phrases as ‘What he asserted’, ‘That Zeno is the father 
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of dialectic’. What these phrases stand for we may call the bearers of truth and falsity, the 
possessors of truth-values” (Nuchelmans, 1973, p.3). ‘That Zeno is the father of dialectic’, for 
example, is the object of said attitude, which means it is the bearer of truth and falsity, as it is 
being held true. These examples by Nuchelmans are very useful for understanding what the 
bearer of truth is i.e., the proposition. Yet, these examples are dedicated to linguistics; they are 
verbal statements which designate objects and/or entities fitting the propositional role. Within 
theatre, verbal statements or utterances are not the only form of propositional content in play; the 
proposition works through the agreement of the speaker / listener actor / spectator. This could be 
the word, the object, the body, etc. and the actor / spectator accepts the proposed correspondence 
between sign and referent. In theatre then, we can use Whitehead’s notion of the “lure for 
feeling”, which is caused by objects and the elements of the production, as the possibility for 
considering psychological or cognitive propositions occurring within the mind of its audience. 
Cognitive propositions are capable of being true or false, but it is the entertainment of that 
capability which leads us to feeling differently about the thing, object, world etc. Defining 
propositions from this perspective is crucial to understanding how the specific type of 
propositionality operates for audiences in theatre.  
Scott Soames, in Cognitive Propositions, states that: 
propositions aren’t things we interpret, they are the interpretations we give; propositions 
aren’t instruments we use to carry information, they are the information carried; and 
propositions aren’t things we endow with intentionality; they are inherently 
representational entities capable of being true or false, independent of any actual use to 
which we put them. 
Soames, 2014, p.479. 
We do not interpret propositions, we interpret signs. Propositions are the interpretations we give 
(to signs). Propositions are the information carried – and of course that information is open to 
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interpretation as we know from the Prague Semioticians – not the ‘instruments we use to carry 
information’. It is not the sign-vehicle20 nor the object that are the proposition; they are means in 
aiding how we are able to entertain the proposition. The proposition is a representational 
cognitive act. Soames (2014) offers an example for the reader which is helpful for understanding 
how we (mentally) perform propositions; the inclusion of this example is essential as it explains 
how propositions are cognitive acts: 
Propositions are repeatable, purely representational, cognitive acts or operations; to 
entertain one is to perform it. When I perceive or think of a certain ball B as red, I 
perform the act predicating redness of B, which is to represent B as red. The act itself 
represents B as red in a sense similar to that in which some acts are said to be intelligent, 
stupid, thoughtful or irresponsible. […] For an act to be one of these is for it to be one 
the performance of which involves behaving intelligently, stupidly, thoughtfully, or 
irresponsibly – which is how intelligent, stupid, thoughtful or irresponsible agents often 
act.  
Soames, 2014, p.480. 
Relating this to an audience member’s/participant’s perception within a theatrical production, the 
example cleverly depicts that what the individual perceives, is performed as an act within the 
individual’s inner realm. When I consider Malvolio’s infamous yellow stockings in Twelfth 
Night, I perform the act predicating yellowness of the stockings; to think of Olivia’s abhorrence 
for the colour yellow, I perform the act predicating abhorrence of yellow etc. We can see how 
this relates to McGrath & Frank’s definition – propositions are the ‘sharable objects of the 
attitudes…’. My opinion, belief, judgment, assertion, thought, knowledge etc. of a ball being 
red, or Olivia’s detest for the colour yellow, may differ from yours. For Soames, it is not any of 
the attitudes held that represent p to be a certain way; it is its objects. The things that are 
believed, judged, asserted etc. about a ball being red, or Malvolio’s stockings is what represents 
                                                          
20 My use of the term ‘sign-vehicle’ comes from Albert Atkin’s “Peirce’s Theory of Signs” (2010) in SEP. 
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things being a certain way. They have truth conditions ‘independent’ of agents’ stance towards 
them. Soames uses this as the “basis of a naturalistic epistemology of propositions. […] any 
organism that can perceive or think of things in its environment as being certain ways can bear 
these attitudes to propositions, whether or not it can predicate properties of propositions” 
(2014:481). Propositions are therefore to be considered as the sharable objects of cognitive acts 
and attitudes. We have cautiously arrived at a definition of ‘proposition’, but we need to 
continue cautiously to explain the properties of propositions and the type of propositionality to 
be explored in this thesis.  
 Before moving on, it is worth mentioning the ‘objection’ that Soames outlines to propositions 
being acts: “Propositions can’t be acts because propositions aren’t things we do!” (2014:481) 
(emphasis in original). Soames disputes this objection by explaining how our misunderstanding 
derives from our intuition of propositions: that we take propositions to be ways of thinking of 
things. Soames ‘modifies’ this habitual position so it becomes: propositions are acts of thinking 
of things as being various ways. Soames’ modification of the position of propositions allows 
propositions to be performative.  
There are two types of propositional content when cognizing things: representational content 
and cognitive content. Representational content in theatre “imposes conditions on the world 
necessary for truth”, and cognitive content in theatre “imposes conditions on the mind necessary 
to entertain it” (2014:482). “Every proposition represents the world as being some way, and so 
imposes conditions it must satisfy if the proposition is to be true [or in our case acceptable]. 
Propositions also impose cognitive conditions on agents who entertain them. Because the two 
types of content are partially independent, they generate representationally identical but 
cognitively distinct propositions” (2014:498) (emphasis in original). Both forms of propositional 
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content exist within the fictional world of the theatre despite it being an internal piece of 
information, rather than an utterance. Propositional content can only be understood by an 
audience if it belongs in a specific space and time or space-time. This does not contradict 
Bennett’s tripartite structure – the utterance of propositional content in theatre – as the bipartite 
contents of propositions also occur in theatre. Representational and cognitive content within 
theatre similarly ‘is a part, functions as, or is the event, itself, that the audience is there to 
witness.’ Is this the case? Are the audience witnessing cognitive propositional content? How can 
it be possible to witness cognitive propositions? The conditions imposed on both the theatrical 
world and mind of the participant are caused by the qualities of objects witnessed by the 
audience. It is the quality / qualities of objects which causes cognitive propositions; the 
performance of an act within the mind of a spectator. As previously mentioned, this thesis will 
operate through the lens of Object-Oriented Ontology, however, one must firstly look backwards 
to analytical and continental philosophy to (a) validate Soames’ notion that propositions are acts, 
and (b) understand how propositions occur and exist in other contexts.  
In Russell’s The Principles of Mathematics (1903), he affirmed the existence of propositions and 
viewed them as concrete objects, not as senses per Frege21. Russell states: 
…a proposition, unless it happens to be linguistic, does not itself contain words: it 
contains the entities indicated by words. Thus meaning, in the sense in which words have 
meaning, is irrelevant to logic. But such concepts as a man have meaning in another 
sense: they are, so to speak, symbolic in their own logical nature, because they have the 
property I call denoting. That is to say, when a man occurs in a proposition (e.g. “I met a 
man in the street”), the proposition is not about the concept a man, but about something 
quite different, some actual biped denoted by the concept. Thus concepts of this kind 
have meaning in a non-psychological sense. And in this sense, when we say “this is a 
man,” we are making a proposition in which a concept is in some sense attached to what 
is not a concept. […] The confusion is largely due, I believe to the notion that words 
                                                          
21 Frege meant ‘sense’ as the thought expressed by x, as opposed to a sensation as touch or taste. The ‘sense’ of a 
sign is where the “mode of presentation is contained”. (Frege, 1892, p.37) 
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occur in propositions, which in turn is due to the notion that propositions are essentially 
mental and are to be identified with cognitions. 
Russell, 1903, p.47 
Russell cleverly elucidates two properties of a proposition here. (1) words signify the concept of 
the intended proposition but are not the concept of the proposition. (2) a proposition is the thing 
denoted by the concept. We can better understand point (1) if we think of Saussure’s “Linguistic 
Value from a Conceptual Viewpoint” (pp.114-117), within Course in General Linguistics 
(2011), regarding the ‘signified’ and the ‘signifier’. Russell applies this equation outside of 
linguistics, to propositions. Saussure demonstrates how one, either the signifier or the signified, 
leads to the other. Initially, a concept is ‘empty’, it has no referent; it holds no value without its 
relationship to/with other similar values. Without them, the signification would not exist. 
Similarly, a proposition, cannot exist without the entities it entails to signify, and as Russell 
explains, we use words to indicate the entities of a proposition.  
For topic (2), the thing, which is denoted by the concept, i.e., the proposition, for Russell, is the 
same as what Frege calls the sense. They are both the mode of presentation/information carried 
of the concept/referent or entities, per Saussure. The difference being is that Russell views a 
proposition to be a concrete object, and Frege views a proposition to be the sense of a sentence.  
The other crucial delineation gathered from Russell’s statement is that propositions do not have 
to be linguistic: “…a proposition, unless it happens to be linguistic, does not itself contain 
words…”. This validates Soames’ position that propositions are acts and allows propositions to 
be viewed as performative.   
The comparison to Saussure may unintentionally suggest that propositionality is the same as 
semiotics: it is not. Yet, propositions are connected to semiotics and signs. For me, semiotics is a 
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branch or mode of propositionality. As mentioned earlier, humans do not interpret propositions, 
we interpret signs. What is a ‘sign’ then? This may seem a digression – as we have not arrived at 
the type of ‘propositionality’ referred to – but it is a necessary one to aid our understanding. 
Peirce, within an excerpt of one of his letters to Lady Welby in 1908, defines a sign “as anything 
which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a 
person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is mediately determined by the former” 
(Peirce, 1998, p.478). There are therefore three inter-related parts that make-up a ‘sign’: a sign, 
an object and an interpretant. Confusingly, the overall sign consists of an element which is also 
called a sign. The element of a sign refers to its signifying element. Peirce uses many synonyms 
to refer to the signifying element of a sign but for this research we shall use the term sign-vehicle 
as Atkin (2010) does.22 The sign-vehicle is the element of a sign crucial to its functioning as a 
signifier. The relationship between the sign-vehicle and the object is one of determination; it is 
the object that determines the sign. Atkin states that “Peirce's notion of determination is by no 
means clear and it is open to interpretation, […] it is perhaps best understood as the placing of 
constraints or conditions on successful signification by the object, rather than the 
object causing or generating the sign. The idea is that the object imposes certain parameters that 
a sign must fall within if it is to represent that object [e.g., an actor used to signify a tree on stage 
imposes conditions on their gesture and body to represent a tree – we shall expand on this 
example shortly.] However, only certain characteristics of an object are relevant to this process 
of determination” (2010). What Atkin helps us see here is that when objects determine signs, 
they impose conditions necessary for representation. The object does not generate the sign. If the 
sign is to succeed as a sign it must show the causal connection between it and the object. 
                                                          
22 “Peirce uses numerous terms for the signifying element including “sign”, “representamen”, “representation”, and 
“ground”” (Atkin:2010).  
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Additionally, Pierce suggests that the relationship between the sign-vehicle and the interpretant 
is also one of determination; the sign determines an interpretant. It does so “by focusing our 
understanding on certain features of the signifying relation between sign and object. This enables 
us to understand the object of the sign more fully” (2010). The interpretant then, is the sense 
made of the sign; the sense derived from the relation between sign and object. The overall sign 
therefore addresses the perceiver and is translated or developed within the mind of the agent 
perceiving.  
It would be imprudent to discuss how signs operate within theatre without discussing the Prague 
School of thinkers. We know that for Pierce a sign is anything which is determined by 
something else and that there are three inter-related parts which constitute the overall sign. As 
Rokem points out23, the Prague School’s idea regarding the dynamics of objects and the sign in 
theatre is based on Petr Bogatyrev’s argument that “any item of nature, technology or everyday 
use can become a sign whenever it acquires meaning beyond the bounds of its individual 
existence as a thing in and of itself” (1936a; 1976:14). The ‘anything’ and ‘any item of nature, 
technology…’ in Pierce and Bogatyrev’s depictions of signs, shall here be referred to as objects. 
What both criterion for a sign allow, and this is particularly apparent for the Prague School as 
they tailor their focus into theatre-theory, is that everything on the (theatrical) stage is a sign. 
The aesthetics of objects in theatre then, mean that an object can be treated as a sign of an object 
but also as a sign of a sign.  
Using a theatrical example, one can see how a theatrical sign communicates at least two levels of 
the sign at the same time. Imagine a stage with an actor performing the universal theatrical sign 
                                                          
23 Rokem, F. (1988). “A chair is a Chair is a CHAIR: The Object as Sign in Theatrical Performance” in The Prague 
School and its Legacy (1988) pp.275-288.  
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of a tree i.e., stood with their arms raised above their heads creating a V-shape through the 
gesture. The object [actor] can be treated as a sign of a tree whilst simultaneously as a sign 
which points to one of the signs characterizing the type, style, nature, shape etc., of the tree; a 
sign of a sign. In Pierce’s early account of signs, he deemed signs to have an infinite semiosis: 
“further signs both proceed and precede from any given sign” (2010) and you can see how one 
could think this when an object in theatre can function as a sign of a sign. Bogatyrev and the 
Prague School’s belief is that “no theatrical costume, no piece of theatre scenery, or likewise, 
any other theatrical sign (declamation, gestures, and so on) always have a representational 
function” (1938; 1976:33-4). If theatrical signs do not always have a representational function, 
then there is a limit to the number of signs in theatre which opposes Pierce’s account. The 
Prague School coincides with Pierce that “all theatrical phenomena are signs of signs, or signs of 
material objects” (1938; 1976:47-8) – everything on stage is a sign – but there are not infinite 
signs of signs.  
What is also evident due to the Prague School, and is depicted within the tree example, is that 
the materiality of the object is relevant as the actor is physically present on the stage; the 
material presence of the actor still exists whilst they signify a tree and as they do / do not signify 
specific characteristics pertaining to the tree. The materiality of the object exists and is crucial to 
the relation between sign and object, but the thing itself does not generate the sign. When 
spectators behold real objects, they do so “not as real material objects, but only as a sign of 
signs, or a sign of material objects” (1938; 1976:34).  The consequence of this means that the 
number of permutations and possibilities for a sign is profuse, yet not infinite. This “rich 
semiotic potential is the source of the versatility of the theatrical sign” for Pladott (1988:294).  
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It is clear that signs and semiotics are connected to propositionality in theatre. If everything in 
theatre is a sign, the sign must be active within proposals to spectators. Due to this, it is easy to 
confuse them as one and the same. Semiotic analysis allows audiences to interpret signs for 
meaning and understanding, but it does not propose or proposition anything to them. 
Propositionality is not a form of semiotics, semiotics is a branch of propositionality. As 
explained earlier, the other type of propositionality offers an alternative approach to semiotics; 
that the object does not signify but represents/symbolises/imitates etc. all of which might be 
different forms or attitudes of propositions. Yet, in theatre, specifically immersive theatre, the 




Before explaining how an object is the thing it stands for and arriving at a definition of 
propositionality within immersive theatre that uses the application of OOO, another detour is 
required: a definition for the form of immersive theatre. When defining immersive theatre, the 
obvious place to start is Josephine Machon. There are a few aspects that need to be separated to 
avoid confusion when discussing immersive work. What does immersion mean as a noun and 
verb? What is it to describe something as immersive? What does the term imply when associated 
and conjoined to theatre? What is the difference between immersive experience and immersive 
theatre? All these key semantical distinctions are covered within Chapter One of Machon’s book 
Immersive Theatres: Intimacy and Immediacy in Contemporary Performance (2013). Machon 
paved the way for thinkers to consider how to use the terms ‘immersion’ and ‘immersive’ 
appropriately within the forms of theatre, computer technologies, game studies etc. Therefore, to 
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understand what ‘Immersive Theatre’ is and what the term implies one must first understand 
what it means to ‘be immersed’ in something. Machon states that “to ‘immerse oneself’ or ‘be 
immersed’, means to involve oneself deeply in a particular activity or interest. ‘Immersion’ thus 
defines the action of immersing or the state of being immersed” (Machon, 2013, p.21). Machon 
goes on to say how “these definitions help to highlight how immersive experiences in theatre 
combine the act of immersion – being submerged in an alternative medium where all the senses 
are engaged and manipulated – with a deep involvement in the activity within that medium” 
(Machon, 2013, pp.21-22). These definitions by Machon do not “highlight” however how deeply 
involved one can become in these mediums however which is what Gareth White explores in his 
article On Immersive Theatre. For White, the term “immersion implies access to the inside of the 
performance in some way” (White, 2012, p.221) however he believes that the access available to 
audiences in Immersive Theatre is still limited.  
When discussing the origins of the usage of the term immersive within art, Machon states that “it 
is difficult to ascertain exactly when ‘immersion’ first began to be used as an all-encompassing 
artistic experience and even more so to pinpoint when ‘immersive’ was first applied to theatre 
practice. The term ‘immersive’ was initially assigned to computer technologies and theorised 
around telematic environments in the 1980s.” (Machon, 2013, p.58). Machon goes on to explain 
that the term is also used in game studies and that it is perhaps more useful to look for 
definitions of immersion in game studies to arrive at a definition of immersivity in the theatre. 
Due to the advancements in digital technologies the term ‘immersion’ can be overused to 
describe traditional theatre performances which use digital technologies, as ‘immersive’, “as the 




Reverting to theatre though and searching for the terms first use “in relation to visceral and 
physically inhabited (non-telematic) theatre”, Machon, as previously mentioned, states that there 
“lacks an incontestable source”. (2013:63). Morris and Lingwood of Artangel claim to have been 
using the term as: 
an adjective to describe work since the physical theatre of La Fura Dels Baus at the 
Royal Victoria Docks in 1983, [and, for Robert Wilson’s performance installation H.G. 
in 1995. So,] in this respect shades of the ‘immersive’ have described interdisciplinary, 
sensory and participatory performance work occurring in places outside the traditional 
theatre venues for some while. […] Yet ‘immersive’ is now explicitly used beyond 
digital and live art practices and is more widely applied within a completely different 
performance context; one which arises from the physical and visual theatre of the 1980s, 
and is attributable to a range of companies such as De La Guarda, dreamthinkspeak, 
Punchdrunk, Royale De Lux, Shunt, Sound & Fury or WildWorks etc. These immersive 
practices owe more to landscape as location and architectural inspiration, installation art 
(in visual, sculptural and sonic fields) and festival environments than it does to digital 
practice. 
Machon, 2013, pp.63-65. 
These ‘shades of the immersive’ occurred before the terms ‘site-specific’ and ‘site-sympathetic’, 
along with the (now) less common Sensory or Landscape theatre, were applied to this style of 
work and theatre companies with similar mission statements. For example, the Artistic Director 
of Riptide, Alexander Palmer, who worked with Punchdrunk for The Drowned Man (2013), 
describes Riptide as both ‘immersive’ and ‘site-sympathetic’. Riptide of course was not one of 
the ‘first-wave’ of theatre companies playing with ideas of the immersive during the turn of the 
millennium, but it exemplifies how the definitions of terms surrounding immersive techniques 
have advanced in the short period of the past couple of decades. The description of something as 
being immersive, is still a highly commercial bandwagon trend in cinema and gaming 
experiences, but theatre companies now have a wider vocabulary for describing their work.24 So, 
                                                          
24 For example, Secret Cinema have created ‘immersive’ cinematic worlds of Shakespeare’s Romeo & Juliet (2018), 
Fleming’s Casino Royale (2019), Netflix’s Stranger Things (2020) where audiences are invited to a secret location 
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with all the varying terms surrounding this type of work, what constitutes the form of immersive 
theatre? 
1.4 Immersive Theatre  
 
Machon states that “immersive theatre establishes a special kind of presence – visceral in every 
respect, being both embodied and noetic. In the realm of theatre, it can be understood that [the] 
feeling of ‘being there’ is fact; the audience-participant is actually there, physically inhabiting 
the fantasy world created” (Machon, 2013, p.61) (emphasis in original). The pivotal criterion for 
immersive theatre is its audience. A participant’s physical body responds with the imaginative 
and sensual environment they find themselves in. Machon goes on to state that “in immersive 
theatre the audience-participant-performer-player is anchored and involved in the creative world 
via her or his own imagination, fused with her actual presence, fused with her bodily interaction 
with the physical (and sometimes virtual) environments and other human performers” (Machon, 
2013, p.62). What Machon emphasises is the corporeality of immersive theatre. The ‘audience-
participant-performer-player’ has access to the inside of the performance through a deep 
cognitive and bodily engagement with the art.  
This defers back to White’s point regarding the limitations of the ‘inside’ of a performance. 
Simply because there is a bodily engagement with a piece of art and that the creative world is 
fused with the participants presence, what / how much access is available for the participants? 
White (2012) draws on examples from performances by two pioneering theatre companies 
within the genre of Immersive Theatre – Punchdrunk and Shunt – and defines immersive theatre 
                                                          
to dress up and watch their favourite films come to life. First-person and open-world narrative computer and video 
games such as Battlefield V, Halo 5: Guardians, The Elder Scrolls V: Skyrim etc., describe and market themselves 
as ‘immersive’ gaming.  
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in relation to environment. In 2008, Nield deemed the leading company working within the 
‘idiom’ of ‘immersive theatre’ to be Punchdrunk (Nield, 2008:531) and “by 2011 they could be 
called ‘immersive theatre pioneers Punchdrunk’” (Arnott, 2011 cited in Biggin, 2017). White 
explains, how these leading companies manipulate interior environments and encourage 
audiences to pursue the inside of the desired immersive experience. He uses Heideggerian 
ontology to show what is ‘concealed’ and ‘revealed’ in an immersive experience: “the essence of 
truth is, in itself, the primal strife in which that open centre is won within which beings stand and 
from which they set themselves back into themselves” (Heidegger, 1993, p.180). Heidegger’s 
conception of truth depicts the ‘unconcealment’ of things in their essence and the ‘strife’ 
Heidegger refers to “is more explicitly explained as the conflict between ‘earth’ and ‘world’: 
between the concealed and the revealed” (2012:232). For White, strife occurs in immersive work 
“with the apprehension of the spectator participant in a process that is unlike everyday lived 
experience, but where the material of everyday lived experience – our bodies and our social 
selves – comes forth as world” (2012:233). However, he does not deem this to be the audience 
discovering the inside of the work, but “the inside of what is employed in the work of art as it 
becomes world” (2012.233).  
Like White’s work on immersive theatre, Jarvis’ Immersive Embodiment (2019) allows us to see 
why immersive experience is desirable. He contends that the reason immersive experiences are 
desirable are for participants to “feel more fully with the body of another” (Jarvis, 2019, p.3) 
(emphasis in original). Is this onto-relational desire to feel like / play as / become / be, someone 
or thing other than ourselves our goal or intention when we experience immersive work as a 
participant? If so, then one can see why immersive experiences have become so popular, as, for 
Jarvis, “immersion involves myriad strategies that seek to realize the promise of a position 
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beyond the confines of one’s body, its immediate locale or its finite set of lived experiences” 
(2019:10). It is the implicit promise of feeling more and/or fulfilment that companies and 
creators must deliver on if they are to achieve (what – if one believes Jarvis – could be described 
as) ‘the goal of immersive experience’. Additionally, to White’s work, Jarvis also shows that 
there is a limit to the spectator’s, or audience-participant’s, immersion as he argues that some, 
innovative and boundary-querying hybridized practices which incorporate immersive work in 
theatre, virtual reality, video gaming etc., are simply “giving new and varied expression to the 
unrealizable promise that we might become the other body” (2019:4) (emphasis in original).  
Nield also draws on spatial elements within the form of immersive theatre to suggest “whether a 
piece of work might be defined as immersive or not” (Biggin, 2017, p.3) (emphasis in original). 
She describes the form as one in which “the audience inhabit the space of play alongside the 
actors […] within a tricked-out space” (2008:531). Biggin, explains, how Adam Alston “defines 
immersive to emphasise audience engagement rather than any particular theatrical form or shape, 
but that engagement remains unavoidably framed by spatial boundaries, occurring in reaction to 
the performance space” (2017:177) (emphasis in original); Alston states that immersive “is a 
term that can be applied to a range of practices in a range of contexts, so long as an audience 
engages with an environment that prompts the perception of immersion’s cues” (Alston, 2016, 
p.71). Academics consider environment and site-specificity to be key to the form of immersive 
theatre i.e., Machon (2007; 2013), White (2012), Pearson (2010), Biggin (2017), Alston (2016) 
etc. and Schechner (1994) and Aronson’s (2012) work in the form of Environmental Theatre is 
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applicable to interactivity between space and the attention of the spectator25. Of course, space 
and environment are not the only lenses to view the immersive through. There’s also perceptual 
embodiment, interactivity, emotional stimulation, cognition, game play, digital performance and 
media etc. all of which, are widely researched areas within the genre of immersive theatre and 
immersive experience: Jarvis (2019), Alston (2013), Dixon & Smith (2007), Gardner (2012), 
Gordon (2013), Jenkins (2012), Krasner (2006), Machon (2011), McConachie (2008; 2010; 
2013), Salen & Zimmerman (2004), R. Shaughnessy (2012), N. Shaughnessy (2013), Zaiontz 
(2014) (to name a few). The common theme running through most of the academics’ research 
into the immersive, in both its form and sensation, is the company Punchdrunk. But how do 
Punchdrunk describe their work? 
The “immersive theatre pioneers Punchdrunk” describe their accomplishments and work on their 
website, stating that: 
Since 2000, Punchdrunk has pioneered a game changing form of immersive theatre in 
which roaming audiences experience epic storytelling inside sensory theatrical worlds. 
Blending classic texts, physical performance, award-winning design installation and 
                                                          
25 “Schechner’s “Six Axiom’s for Environmental Theatre” (1967, revised 1987) emphasise a reciprocal relationship 
between the space and the gaze of a spectator: 
1. The theatrical event is a set of related transactions; 
2. All the space is used for the performance; 
3. The theatrical event can take place either in a totally transformed space or in “found space”; 
4. Focus is flexible and variable; 
5. All production elements speak their own language;  
6. The text need be neither the starting point nor the goal of a production. There may be no verbal text at 




unexpected sites, the company's infectious format rejects the passive obedience usually 
expected of audiences. 
Punchdrunk, 2000. 
Despite Arnott calling Punchdrunk “immersive theatre pioneers Punchdrunk” in 2011, 
Punchdrunk are still not calling themselves that. They are only suggesting that they have 
“pioneered a game changing form” of it. They have achieved this by establishing immersive 
theatre as a form in which rejects the “passive obedience” of traditional theatregoing. The form 
of immersive theatre is now associated with the presentational form of promenade theatre and 
environmental theatre, and one could argue that this is due to Punchdrunk’s commercial success 
and reckoning. Punchdrunk are most well known for their performance of Sleep No More which 
is an adaptation of Macbeth. This adaptation, unlike traditional performances of Shakespeare, 
allows the audience to move freely within the theatrical world; they can watch what they want to 
watch and go where they want to go. Erin Sullivan, one of the editors in The Oxford Companion 
to Shakespeare, summarises Punchdrunk’s style here: “Punchdrunk typically applies a multi-
sensory, noir-aesthetic to its interactive retellings of classical drama, dance, music, and film” 
(Sullivan, 2015).   
The company Shunt are also well-known in the form of Immersive Theatre and similarly to 
Punchdrunk adapt classic texts for their performances e.g., Zola’s Money (L’Argent). Shunt like 
to use interior spaces that are usually hidden from the public e.g., underneath London Bridge 
Station (which they inhabited for 6 years) to create specific atmospheres and moods for 
audiences that complement their work. Here is an excerpt from White’s article describing 
Shunt’s first performance at the Station:  
For Tropicana, the first piece shown there, the audience were led in small groups from 
this room into a further space that appeared to be a large lift, thereby creating the illusion 
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of descending further below the station. Thereafter, they were walked along an extensive 
series of dimly lit arches, at the end of which they found a spot to watch the beginning of 
‘the show’. This series of coups de théâtre – the theatre disguised as a storage room, the 
fake lift, the long, long walk into the depths of the normally invisible space under the 
station – was an adventure into the interior of the industrial city, and was key to creating 
the atmospheres of mystery and unease and the contrasts between the airy and the 
subterranean that the piece exploited. 
White, 2012, p.224. 
Shunt and Punchdrunk both use site-specific and site-sympathetic locations. Both companies 
explore the experience between the subject/object divide and performer/audience relationship. 
The difference between the two companies however is that Punchdrunk want their audiences to 
hunt down the immersion and the inside of the performance whereas in Shunt’s work “the 
performance is usually ‘delivered’ to the audience in a more sustained and consistent way: they 
are not required to seek it out or to wander through it unguided” (2012:229).  
Neither company is making claims that they can provide a new realm of experience unlike 
traditional theatre forms however they are creating performances with a much deeper audience 
involvement and impact in the work. An example of this would be that there is not a “new realm 
of experience” created in Punchdrunk’s Sleep No More that was not available in Michael Boyd’s 
2011 RSC production of Macbeth, however the audience can seek out specific moments and 
interactions in Sleep No More but could not in the RSC production. Boyd’s production of 
Macbeth was performed in the then, newly built, Royal Shakespeare Theatre in Stratford-upon-
Avon. The Royal Shakespeare Theatre famously holds a thrust stage auditorium. Thrust stages 
are often used to increase the intimacy between performer and audience, as evident in Boyd’s 
2011 production. Despite this, participation and interactivity are almost non-existent in Boyd’s 
Macbeth, and, in orthodox theatre, (such as thrust staging,) unlike in site-specific work i.e., Sleep 
No More. Schechner states that “although the audience is present at an orthodox theater 
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performance, ‘presence’ is a way of saying ‘as absent as can possibly be arranged.’ Feedback is 
kept to a minimum. […] The orthodox theater is a closed system discouraging feedback. It is 
closed not only because whatever happens on stage is already known by the actors, and nothing 
is supposed to change this prearranged ‘score’” (Schechner, 1994, p.72). In the New York 
production of Sleep No More, the action and design spans over five floors, and the audience-
participants can move freely and leisurely for up to three hours: exploring independently and/or 
collectively the space, environment and performance. The actors and performers enact their 
prearranged ‘scores’, just as the performers in Boyd’s Macbeth do, yet the audience has the 
freedom and opportunity to seek out a specific one-on-one moment with a performer (if they so 
choose or are chosen). This does not mean that Punchdrunk’s presentational form of promenade 
is more engaging than Boyd’s production, or indeed that it offers a ‘new realm of experience’. It 
simply means that the audience’s agency to affect the rhythm of the performance, the theatrical 
world and its impact, is greater than that of the RSC production and traditional theatre forms. 
 An article by Iain Aitch for the Arts and Humanities Research Council stated that Punchdrunk 
“were among the first in theatre to recognise and act upon the fact that younger audiences are as 
used to the narrative arc of a video game as they are that of a play, film or television programme. 
After all, what could be more immersive than a world you have to keep your eyes on, lest your 
character get killed? And what could be more experiential than a world that you can interact act 
with, change and control?” (Aitch, 2015). As Punchdrunk say themselves – they have “pioneered 
a game changing form of immersive theatre.” (Punchdrunk, 2000).  
Punchdrunk and Shunt immerse their audiences in a “very literal way” (2012:225) and have 
become very successful because of it – “with respect to their ability to attract large audiences 
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over long runs; their garnering of critical attention; and their use of large-scale, maze-like found 
spaces as locations for extensive environmental performances” (2012:223).  
Rose Biggin, in her book, Immersive Theatre and Audience Experience: Space, Game and Story 
in the Work of Punchdrunk, again, draws on immersive-style performances by Punchdrunk, and 
guides the reader through the various aspects of immersive experience: “the emotional, the 
physical, the sensation of immersion in place, space and story” (Biggin, 2017, p.5). Biggin 
explains what is actually meant by being ‘immersed’ across different contexts and states that 
“immersive experience is not a felt/non-felt binary but a graded and temporary state, defined 
(somewhat paradoxically) by the existence of its boundaries. By uncoupling ‘immersive 
experience’ the sensation and ‘immersive theatre’ the form, [she] argue[s] for a distinction 
between content, form and effect” (2017:5). This key distinction between immersive experience 
as a sensation, and immersive theatre as a form needs to be made when discussing immersive 
work to avoid blurry definitions and blending terminologies together. Biggin’s nuanced model 
offers a means of understanding immersive experience, and a framework to better analyse 
immersive experience.  
Biggin lists the many theoretical approaches to audience immersion within theatre and 
performance studies, film, television, and cultural studies; in immersive theatre – the form 
(mostly via Punchdrunk, however the approaches to audience interactivity and engagement are 
applicable beyond, just, Punchdrunk) – and immersive experience – the sensation – via 
cognition, philosophy, aesthetics, computer games and game play. Both Biggin’s and White’s 
research into the immersive and aesthetics most coincide with this thesis. White’s interrogation 
of aesthetics through Heideggerian ontology is akin to OOO. Whilst the difference between 
Biggin’s research and this thesis is that her book “is interested in how immersive experience is 
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situated in theatrical production” (2017: 16), and this research is interested in how objects 
propose sharable cognitive acts to its audiences which in turn helps facilitate immersive 
experiences situated in theatrical productions. The process of an immersive experience is 
influenced by propositionality and how the proposition is enacted and agreed. Biggin, herself, 
states that “immersive experience exists as a series of graded states. It is a temporary 
phenomenon rather than a felt/non-felt binary that exists in relation to, and as a result of, the 
overcoming of various barriers” (2017:208). Some of the various barriers that must be overcome 
for an immersive experience to occur are defeated by the acceptance of a proposition caused by 
the qualities of an object.26 It is the aesthetics of objects, both in and out of the form of 
immersive theatre that shall be explored and analysed.  
 
1.5 Proscenium Arch Theatre 
 
As previously stated, semiotics cannot effectively analyse the difference between a sign in a 
proscenium arch theatre and a sign in immersive theatre. This is due to what Ronald Naverson 
calls scenographic distance (2001). Naverson calls upon Daphna Ben Chaim’s concept of 
aesthetic distance which posits this as “the underlying factor that determines theatrical style in 
the 20th Century” (Naverson, 2001, p.3). Ben Chaim’s continuum of the distance specific 
practitioners in 20th Century theatre “strive to create for their audience” (2001:4) along with her 
definitions of aesthetic distance elude to how the fictionality of theatre can be enforced – 
                                                          
26 Barriers to immersion occur in various concepts, not only via proposals from objects. For example: “barriers to 
immersion arise when one way of engaging with the show becomes coded as the ‘better’ or ‘correct’ way.” (Biggin, 
2017, p.81).   
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particularly in proscenium theatre. The proscenium arch frames the action of a play in theatre 
and the application of this to theatre in the late 18th and 19th centuries created the notion of an 
imaginary fourth wall through which audiences could view a narrative as a passive attendee. The 
framing device of the proscenium arch distinctly separates performers from audience and 
facilitates the potential for grand theatres and larger audiences creating a potential for a variety 
of aesthetic distances. Ben Chaim’s continuum suggests that the greater the aesthetic distance, 
the greater the audience’s awareness of fictionality. When experiencing theatre in this style, 
one’s perception of the fictionality of theatre is greater than that of immersive theatre. The 
suspension between the fictionality and non-fictionality of theatre for audience-participants in 
immersive events (even those with large architectural environments) is suspended closer towards 
the real / non-fictionality since the aesthetic distance between space, place, story and performer 
is constantly changing whereas in proscenium these (usually) remain the same throughout the 
performance. The perceived theatrical objects are viewed through a frame in proscenium and are 
analysed semiotically, whereas in immersive theatre and for audiences whom Naverson 
describes as postmodern audiences, the distance and relationships between objects are 
(potentially) constantly shifting; audiences may come into direct contact with sensual objects.  
The aesthetic distance of the proscenium arch is not all so one-sided as it would seem. It does 
not always create a greater awareness of fictionality and aesthetic distance. Naverson states that 
“extending scenery through the proscenium arch – in effect breaking the fictional boundary – 
and decreasing the proximity to the audience, can decrease aesthetic distance” (2001:10). He 
further explains that: 
the trend of mid-20th century American theatres (particularly university theaters) of 
painting these “picture frame” prosceniums dark coloured or building theatres with 
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unadorned prosceniums reveals and attempt to reduce the aesthetic distance. This attempt 
to mitigate the fictionality of the proscenium stage mirrors the rise of actor-centered 
psychologically realistic texts in the mid-century, which still predominates in America 
today.  
Naverson, 2001, p.9. 
This passage is still relevant almost twenty years on since the production of “psychologically 
realistic texts” still dominates American theatres to date as evident with The Ferryman (2019) at 
the Bernard Jacobs Theater in New York, which first premiered at London’s Royal Court 
Theatre in the spring of 2017. Despite the lavish interiors of both theatres, the designer Rob 
Howell frames the action with a stone-grey proscenium which helps to reduce the aesthetic 
distance between audience and production. This design technique would presumably place The 
Ferryman at a ‘normal’ degree of distance on Ben Chaim’s continuum, meaning that director 
Sam Mendes – of the four-time Tony Award winning show – can suspend his audience’s 
perception between a state of non-fictionality and fictionality which is closer towards the real 
than the fictive.  
This thesis is not stipulating that the form of immersive theatre is more real or believable for 
audiences than theatre framed within a proscenium. Belief does not mean, guarantee, or lead to 
reality. Previously, I stated that the implied realism of immersive theatre makes the claim that an 
object is the thing it stands for. There is an implied realism in a multitude of theatrical 
productions, styles, genres, texts, performances etc., and this is also the case for performances 
framed within a proscenium. Yet, semiotics cannot effectively analyse the difference in a sign in 
proscenium arch theatre and immersive theatre. In a proscenium arch theatre, the watched 
performance is a kind of text which can be read and analysed in a similar fashion to printed text, 
even though the audience members do not have it written down. The signs and symbols onstage 
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are representative of a shared reality. Whereas in immersive theatre, signs and symbols are still 
active but due to the bodily presence and corporeality of the audience-participant in the theatrical 
world and environment, the signs within the qualities of the shared objects are tangible, material 
and actual.  
 
1.6 The Actuality of Propositions 
 
Now the styles of performances that are to be analysed are explained, the type of propositionality 
of which will be analysed can finally be defined. Since this type of propositionality makes a 
claim that an object is the thing it represents, let’s call it ‘The Actuality of Propositions’. This 
term is flawed since actuality refers to the state of existing in reality, yet the world of theatre is 
fictional, but, in immersive theatre, the audience exists within the created fictional reality. There 
is a corporeality or embodiment for the spectator in immersive theatre which is not the case for 
proscenium arch theatre. In the fictional world of the proscenium arch theatre, the spectator may 
be present cognitively or emotionally in the fictive world, but they are not bodily present in the 
way a participant is when they are immersed. In immersive theatre, the audience are present, 
they have a being, and the propositions and claims offered for acceptance are ones of actuality. 
Therefore, the term - the actuality of propositions - suits the requirements for this research. 
Within the separate forms of theatre then, there are different but overlapping sets of propositions. 
These shall be interrogated in depth during the analysis of the chosen performances, but first 
examples ought to be offered. 
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Consider again the theatrical tree example from earlier: imagine a stage with an actor performing 
the universal theatrical sign of a tree. The shape and gesture of the actor’s body are the 
‘signifier(s)’ and the object tree is the ‘signified’. Semiotically, the actor is signifying a tree. The 
type of propositionality being explored is an extension of this. The proposition that is being 
offered to the audience is ‘this is a tree’; ‘this’ being the shape and gesture of the actor; the 
actor’s whole body. A performative proposal exists then, via the actor’s shape and gesture. This 
type of propositionality makes the claim that an object is the thing it represents. It is up to the 
audience whether to accept or reject the proposition. To accept the proposition, the spectator 
must perform the act of thinking of the actor’s shape and gesture as representing the tree; the 
spectator predicates that the actor is a tree. If we remove the question of truth / falsity from 
Soames’ definition of propositions and replace it with acceptable / unacceptable, one can see that 
the representational content of the proposition – ‘this is a tree’ – has imposed conditions which 
are necessary for acceptance.  
The spectator can either accept the proposition or reject it, yet both have consequences. It is also 
worth mentioning that if one neither accepts nor rejects the proposition ‘this is a tree’, one can 
still follow the narrative and understand the dramatic action. This is because the sign still exists 
through the branch of propositionality we know as semiotics. Firstly, the sign still exists in the 
scene because the object [actor] is still graphically depicting that it signifies a tree regardless of 
whether the spectator has accepted ‘this is a tree’. Secondly, the sign still exists in the scene 
regardless of whether the spectator has read or understood the sign because the object [actor] 
still functions as a tree for the performers and within the performance. The sign therefore only 
needs to be read/understood if the spectator is to follow the narrative and dramatic action. If one 
has understood the dramatic action, they have read the signification of the material object [actor] 
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as the material object [tree].  
So, what are the consequences of either accepting or rejecting the proposition ‘this is a tree’? 
That depends on the relationship between the art and the spectator. Is the relationship purely 
cognitive, bodily, or both? In the proscenium arch theatre, the addressee of ‘this is a tree’, is the 
spectator. Whether the spectator accepts or rejects the proposition, there are no consequences for 
the scene itself, as it will presumably continue as rehearsed whether an audience is there to view 
it or not. The consequences lay with the spectator. Let’s start with rejecting and then oppose it. A 
rejection of the proposition does not necessarily mean a rejection of one’s interpretation of the 
sign, but most likely does. When rejecting a proposition, you are unable to, or you are choosing 
not to accept the proposition: one cannot accept ‘this is a tree’. The consequence is that you do 
not engage with the work to the same level of vivacity as someone who does accept ‘this is a 
tree’. There is a lack of belief, or perhaps a lack of suspension of disbelief, that the object before 
you is a tree. This consequence lays with the spectator’s cognitive interactivity with the art.  
In forms of participatory theatre, such as immersive theatre, the addressee of the proposition 
‘this is a tree’ is not (only) the spectator but (also) the character signified and proposed by the 
fictional world and stage figures. The consequence of rejecting the proposition in this world is 
not only cognitive, but also bodily. There is a corporeal consequence which occurs for the 
participant which could affect and diminish their presence, involvement, engagement, immersion 
etc., in the fictive world. Conversely, when we accept the proposition ‘this is a tree’ in 
immersive theatre or in an event where our relationship with the art is not only cognitive, the 
consequence could be one of an increased sense of presence, involvement and so on; it helps to 
facilitate an immersive experience and sensation in the participant.   
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The next step is to consider how propositions of this type are made. How do spectators 
distinguish them? Audiences can interpret the signs of a theatrical performance, production or 
event yet not be immersed in it. This is where the actuality of propositions differs to semiotics. 
As we know, propositions are the acts of cognizing things i.e., the information carried and the 
interpretations we give. This thesis argues that the interpretation(s) given are not our 
understanding(s) of signs but our translation(s) of objects and their qualities. As seen from 
examples, other than utterances it is objects that propose things to audiences in theatre. In 
chapter two, there are five sub-chapters which investigate the translation of objects via six 
performances / case studies. Each case study – other than Forget Me Not (2016) since this 
explains my practice which led to the idea of propositionality and is not an examination of 
propositionality – will be sustained by the application of Object-Oriented Ontology (as defined 
in chapter 1.1). Embedding this ontology within the case studies works as a thread that links the 
chapters of the thesis together. For example, the ‘Quadruple Object’ theory will be referred to 
throughout these case studies to stipulate how the qualities of objects propose things to be 
considered. Exploring how the actualities of propositions functions and the effects these have on 
the participant(s) will provide us with an alternative perspective for viewing objects and 





Chapter 2 – Exploring Propositionality 
2.1 Forget Me Not  
 
The catalyst that started my investigation into propositionality within immersive style-
performance was the production Forget Me Not (2016). Forget Me Not is an immersive styled 
devised piece created by Sean Sewell, David Field, and myself (James Sharpe). For a synopsis of 
Forget Me Not, please revisit the ‘Preface’ section of this thesis.  
It was the audience’s first interaction(s) within the theatrical space of Forget Me Not (2016) that 
sparked my interest in propositionality. When the audience-participants enter the Forget Me Not 
performance space, the ‘nurse’ says to them: “Please sign the visitor’s book”. The nurse is stood 
next to a table on which is a book and pen. Accepting the nurse as being a nurse, is the first 
proposition to be enacted. In accepting that, the rest follows too i.e., in signing the visitor’s book, 
the proposition is that this book is a visitor’s book, and the participant, in signing it, accepts that 
proposition. Furthermore, they also then accept the related proposition that they are both visitor, 
and spectator. This opens the analysis to include the vital distinctions about what is being 
proposed, and how it is being proposed, and how the proposition is enacted / agreed. There is 
also the question of whether this remains both at the same time i.e., is the book both a prop and a 
real visitor’s book? Does the spectator remain a spectator while accepting they are also a visitor? 
The participant views a SO and signs the RO thus accepting the actuality of the proposition that 
the object before them is a visitor’s book; by signing it they affirm it is a visitor’s book and 
become both visitor and spectator/participant in the space-time of this fictional world. Though, 
one cannot rule out the possibility that some audience-participants only signed the book because 
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they saw other audience-participants sign it, or, because they thought their participation in that 
act was part of the show, or even because they thought they would not be allowed in otherwise, 
and so on. If this were the case, then that affirmation would not be given by those particular 
audience-participants. The participants would however still be viewed as both visitor and 
spectator within the theatrical narrative by the performers and audience-participants that had 
assented to that proposition. And if we view (immersive) theatre as object-oriented, then the 
objects within (immersive) theatre cause the actuality of propositions to be accepted or rejected.  
As previously mentioned, the purpose for creating Forget Me Not was not bound to this line of 
inquiry. It was simply to explore the telling of stories through different performance languages 
in an immersive environment. Propositionality was the not the first consideration to develop out 
the production. My initial thoughts surrounded belief. During my master’s degree, I created a 
questionnaire for audience members to fill in after experiencing the performances of the Forget 
Me Not show on the 11th and 12th November 2016. I used the show as a tool; I placed the 
audience into a fictional world and then explored their beliefs of what they deemed to be real. I 
then compared my research alongside the results, quotes, and statistics of the audiences’ own 
phenomenological experience to try and answer the question: what do we believe when we are 
immersed in a theatrical world? The questionnaire consisted of nine questions all requiring 
personal responses and reflections to the piece of theatre they experienced. The questions 
surrounded the topics of belief/immersion and reality. Sixty-six questionnaires were filled in by 
individuals who experienced one of the three performances of the Forget Me Not show.27 
                                                          





I will not go through all the responses and statistics from this original line of questioning since 
they are mostly irrelevant to this present study. What is relevant, is that immersion and belief 
were developed and achieved by audience members participating in Forget Me Not (2016) by 
assenting to the network of (sub-)propositions laid before them, and that they made decisions 
pertaining to their reality and existence in the fictional world via probable and demonstrative 
reasoning. These notions are how my practice led to propositionality. I shall now explain how. 
The main proposition of Forget Me Not is that the theatrical world you (as audience) are in is a 
nursing home. In entertaining that proposition, you knowingly or unknowingly disregard 
anything that does not signify a nursing home. The aim of this proposition that Sean, David and I 
created, was to blur the quotidian and theatrical world via immersive-styled performance and to 
provide a theatrical experience of a nursing home, not an authentic one. The three of us did not 
define Forget Me Not as being immersive theatre, or at least a performance that is part of the 
form of immersive theatre, since the production did not contain all the qualities within Machon’s 
scale of immersivity (2013, pp.93-102). Whilst the performance did have the ‘in-its-own-
worldness’ that immersive theatre requires, we did not try to remove all the objects and signs 
that suggested the location and setting was not a nursing home. We did not perform the show in 
a functional nursing home, make the exterior of the building appear like a nursing home, or even 
transform the theatre studio into wholly looking like a nursing home. Whilst we manipulated the 
audience’s arrangement within the space to appear like a day room, and poured liquid 
trichlorophenylmethyliodosalicyl, aka TCP antiseptic liquid, inside vases which contained 
flowers and placed them on each table to make the studio smell of antiseptic – a smell the three 
of us associated with nursing homes – the studio still looked like and resembled a studio. In the 
post-show interviews to the Forget Me Not performances in 2018, some participants said that 
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they did not ‘buy’ that they were in a detailed reconstruction of a nursing home. And this was 
not our intention. We only meant to blur the boundaries between the worlds implicitly asking the 
audience during the performance to disregard those elements which did not align with the main 
proposition. For some immersive performances complete immersive experiences are necessary, 
but not all, like Forget Me Not. Therefore, all the gaps between worlds do not have to be filled 
for immersion to occur. For performances such as the pervasive theatre shows of The Lucky 
Ones: Lucy and The Lucky Ones: Lailah, the reduction of those gaps is important, and it was this 
realisation that allowed me to understand what I deem ‘the goal’ of immersive performance / 
theatre to be.  
The post-show data gathered also showed how the audience-participants’ specific thoughts, 
feelings, state and quality of immersion etc., differed. Question three of the post-show 
questionnaires to Forget Me Not (2016) asked ‘did you experience any kind of change when…’; 
the participants could then select from a selection of multiple-choice responses related to 
moments and scenarios within the performance. Here are those options with a percentage of how 
many of the sixty-six individuals who completed a questionnaire felt that they experienced a 
form of change at these moments:  
1 – As you signed the visitors’ book? = 34.84% 
2 – As you were deciding where to sit? = 28.78% 
3 – When you decided whether to have tea/biscuits? = 25.75% 
4 – When the actors started speaking? = 27.27% 
5 – When the stories began? = 45.45% 
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6 – Other/No Shift Change? = 6.06% 
This question had the most variation in its responses as individuals experienced change and 
began to be immersed or believe in a proposition under different circumstances, theories, and 
evidence. It is worth noting that two of the four individuals who chose option six, also chose 
other options too meaning that they were circling ‘Other’, not, ‘No change’. The other two out of 
four individuals only circled option six and therefore I have assumed they were suggesting ‘No 
change’. Thus, meaning that 3% of people chose ‘Other’ and 3% of people chose ‘No change’. 
This was an extremely interesting range of responses and it strongly suggested that people did or 
did not assent to certain propositions and either believed or did not believe in an aspect of the 
performance. Whatever the change may be after the audience members signed the visitors’ book, 
one can deduce that twenty-three-people decided on whether they believed in the proposition of 
having to sign their name. They either assented to the notion, and that assenting became a belief 
in the concept and reality of the nursing home, or they did not assent to this act and signing their 
name simply was the action of signing their name with no assent to immersion and belief.  
A change and decision were made by 94% of the audience members after specific moments in 
the performance. This strongly suggested that there was no immediate belief; immersion 
does/does not occur through assenting/not assenting to the propositions laid in front of you.   
Regarding the 3% of people who experienced no change at any of the moments listed in the 
questionnaire, perhaps they didn’t experience a change in their beliefs as they were immediately 
immersed and believed in the reality of the performance as soon as they entered the space – 
meaning that Locke and I would be incorrect i.e., that immediate belief and immersion is 
possible. Or maybe they did not form any decisions or lively impressions from any of the 
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propositions displayed before them. What is interesting is that the two people who experienced 
no change were also part of the four people who experienced no change when crossing the 
threshold between the foyer and performance space in Question two of the questionnaire. This 
leads me to believe that on viewing, hearing, smelling, touching, tasting, and overall 
experiencing the propositions before them there still was not enough reasoning or evidence for 
the individuals to assent to those propositions and commit to believing in them. However, the 
two people who marked ‘No change’ on both questions, two and three, also both stated that they 
had ‘complete conviction/highest possible degree of belief’ in what was happening during the 
performance in response to question one, which asked: ‘did you at any point in the performance 
believe in what was happening?’ These two individuals therefore had complete conviction in the 
reality of the performance, or part(s) of the performance, yet did not register any form of change 
upon entering the performance space, nor, through cognitive, utilitarian, and explicit 
participation with the components of the theatrical world itself. If one goes by these two people’s 
responses, the quality and state of one’s immersion in a theatrical world does not differ 
dependent on the entertainment of possibilities – the acceptance of propositions and their lures.  
Yet, if one follows the 97% majority of responses to these questions, then this aligns with the 
idea that an individual’s state of immersion and belief is developed by assenting to the network 
of (sub-)propositions laid before them, and that they made decisions pertaining to their reality 
and existence in the fictional world via probable and demonstrative reasoning. 
As one can see in the responses to question three, the highest percentage of experienced change 
was when the narrative began. Every audience-participant can hear the characters speaking 
within the performance, and the theatrical action is what audience members pay the most 
attention to in theatre productions. Whereas in Forget Me Not, not every single audience-
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participant would have drunk the tea, eaten a biscuit, signed the visitors’ book, and decided 
where to sit – that decision may have been made for them by their friend, or perhaps it was the 
only seat available. It is therefore possible and reasonable to suggest that those percentages are 
lower than when the narrative commenced, because those possibilities were not always 
entertained. Noticing this pattern in the questionnaire responses made me think that the state and 
quality of immersion could be affected by the entertainment and acceptance of propositional 
lures and propositions. The importance of my practice, Forget Me Not, and the initial data 
gathered, cannot be understated in arriving at the completion of this thesis, and in the 
development of a theory of propositionality as a means of analysis in theatre.  
Not only was this how my practice led to propositionality, but how my research method was 
chosen too. Unfortunately, as I alluded to in the methodology section of this thesis’s introduction 
chapter, sub-propositions are not empirically testable by their very nature. Even if quantitative 
data were gathered on sub-propositions within theatre performances, the data would not identify 
the qualities and effects of an agreed proposition. Quantitative tests would only show something 
about people’s experiences and not the possibilities that propositionality offers. That is why I 
decided to explore my direct experiences within the differing theatrical environments, so that I 
can suggest further proposals for viewing theatre. 
In the next chapter, the first case-study for exploring and analysing propositionality in theatre 





2.2 The Lucky Ones 
 
On the 29th of August 2019 I interviewed Alexander Palmer, the artistic director of Riptide, 
regarding how they used objects to propose things to their audiences within their productions of 
The Lucky Ones: Lucy (2018) and The Lucky Ones: Lailah (2018).28 Riptide is a site-
sympathetic and immersive theatre company based in Leeds. Palmer states that: 
[Riptide’s] mission statement is to make extraordinary experiences for audience members 
and [that their] work tends to fall under two brackets. The first is large immersive 
performances that take over one venue and invite [around] two hundred audience 
members at the same time into the space - in those spaces [they] create worlds, and this is 
like a Punchdrunk or Shunt performance. The other strand of [Riptide’s] work is more 
intimate; it’s one and one based. […Riptide] like to think of [them]selves as dealing with 
the intimate and epic at the same time. Fundamentally, [they] put the audience at the 
heart of every experience [they] make, and that goes through making the work to how it 
feels; you should feel like you are at the center of the piece. 
Palmer, 2019. 
The Lucky Ones is one of Riptide’s more intimate experiences for its audience participants as 
most interactions are one-on-one based. It is a month-long experience for individual audience 
members who do not see or converse with other participants, only with performers. Yet, The 
Lucky Ones is also epic. Not epic in Brecht’s sense of the term, but epic in scale and duration. 
Riptide tailors the performance to and around a specific audience member. There are “a series of 
individual, bespoke performances which take place over a few weeks, across a city. These 
durational experiences are pervasive and take place alongside the audience members lives. In 
this way [the] city becomes the backdrop, the members of public become extras to your 
                                                          
28 When referring to both The Lucky Ones: Lucy and The Lucky Ones: Lailah, it shall read as The Lucky Ones.  
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personalised narrative” (Riptide, 2018). The Lucky Ones utilises the city of Leeds as its canvas to 
immerse participants into their own private world, game, story, performance and production.  
Whilst Riptide define themselves as a site-sympathetic and immersive theatre company, do both 
The Lucky Ones productions belong within the form and genre of immersive theatre? Riptide’s 
website states: 
Game-changing theatre company, Riptide, have created a groundbreaking new form of 
theatrical experience. 
Step into an immersive adventure that augments your surroundings for a month. The 
Lucky Ones is a new form of experience for one audience member at a time. 
This experience is part theatre, part video game, part escape room. 
It starts with something being delivered to your home, and from there the narrative 
unfolds. 
Riptide, 2018. 
Did Riptide create a ‘new form of theatrical experience’? That is debatable. Incorporating game 
play into theatrical experiences is not a new thing. It is my contention that The Lucky Ones 
productions are ‘pervasive experiences’ or ‘pervasive performances’. Whilst Riptide (claim to) 
create immersive theatre, The Lucky Ones does not classify as part of that specific genre because 
it loses the ‘in-its-own-worldness’ associated with the form (Machon, 2013). It is not “its own 
unique environment” (2013:93) as it takes place in the people of Leeds’s quotidian world. It is 
more analogous with pervasive theatre as it instils a sense of play in its participants. What 
Riptide are doing here is stretching the concept of the Magic Circle. Developed from Huizinga 
(1938) and Caillois (1958), Salen & Zimmermann’s Rules of Play (2004) defines the concept of 
the magic circle as its understood in game theory today; that “idea of a special place in time and 
space created by a game” (2004:95). Stenros states that the magic circle is: 
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useful in describing the difference between play and non-play; a handy metaphor that acts 
as intellectual shorthand for a more complex set of social relations. Yet when taken too 
literally, it can cloud our understanding of how play is bounded. The metaphor of magic 
circle stands for a border between play and non-play. 
Stenros, 2012, p.1. 
The border between play and non-play is constantly shifting in The Lucky Ones and it is never 
clear whether one is in or out of the narrative which makes it porous rather than rigid. The three 
criterion of a tripartite system which composes the magic circle metaphor are all stretched. 
Riptide stretch the space of the gamed experience to the geographical location of Leeds, West 
Yorkshire; they stretch the time of the game to a month-long experience; and they stretch the 
social relationships of the participants within the gamed experience since any one / thing could 
be part of the performance. It certainly has gaming elements then, but it is still theatre as it has 
performative elements too – this shall become clear throughout the discussion of the 
performances. I am therefore not going to define The Lucky Ones as immersive theatre, nor an 
‘immersive adventure’, but a pervasive experience which is constantly “keyed” and “unkeyed” 
(Goffman, 1974).  
 
Riptide’s aim with The Lucky Ones was to “see what theatre could be”. When asking Palmer for 
a summary of The Lucky Ones, he did so by describing the common format of theatre. “The 
theatre is traditionally a two-hour experience in one building where it’s very formulated and you 
know what happens. [They] wanted to experiment with what happens when that two-hour 
experience is stretched over the course of a month and what happens when you’re not asked to 
go to one location, you’re asked to go to many, and actually, you are the location; wherever you 
are, the performance comes to you.” (2019). One can see the appeal for adventurers and thrill 
seekers, but how does one pitch a month-long performance to its audiences? Riptide 
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“propositioned [The Lucky Ones] as an experience made by a theatre company. [They] found 
that proposition difficult because [they] couldn’t reveal what [The Lucky Ones] was about 
without spoiling it. Part of the experience is that you’re going into the unknown; that you’re 
signing up for something that you don’t really know what it is and only through doing it do you 
find out more. […] And by doing that, you’re rewarded for your bravery.” (2019).  
To sell the month-long mystery of The Lucky Ones to audiences, Riptide did so by selling “a 
feeling”: 
The Lucky Ones is the feeling you get when queuing for a rollercoaster, it is that gripping 
series you devour in a week, and that podcast you tell all your friends about. It is 
surprising. It is magical. It is unexpected.  
Where your city becomes the backdrop and your choices directly influence your story. You 
become the hero in your own narrative as your decisions blur the boundaries of reality and 
fiction. 
Riptide, 2018. 
The focus and analysis will be of The Lucky Ones: Lucy which was Riptide’s first attempt of 
creating a month-long experience in March 2018, yet aspects of The Lucky Ones: Lailah shall 
also be discussed.29 Facets of these storylines will unfold and become clearer as the analysis of 
the use of objects within The Lucky Ones continues, but Palmer explains the process of The 
Lucky Ones: Lucy as “a month-long personal experience that you get a letter on day one to say 
that ‘this is day one and that anyone you meet from now could be part of the performance’. You 
then get drip-fed clues and objects and you’re asked to go certain places that will extend the 
narrative in some way or give you choices that might change the narrative or invite new 
happenings to come into your life.” (2019). Palmer was reluctant to provide a synopsis of the 
                                                          
29 The Lucky Ones: Lailah was a lot shorter. “It was only two weeks and Lailah was an AI. There was much more 
focus on moral tests and she is there to learn from you and you’re basically her human teacher, [that is the] concept 
of it. And through your moral choices in the experience does she learn right from wrong.” (Palmer, 2019). 
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productions’ plot due to the “no spoilers” world that fans of these types of experiences adhere to, 
even though The Lucky Ones shows are not scheduled to be performed again. Reviews of the 
shows similarly, and intentionally, do not divulge too much information of the narrative itself 
but rather the shows process and format as Palmer did in my interview with him. Ladley (2018) 
appears to be the only reviewer who is happy to share detailed descriptions of their own 
experiences. Ladley’s blog shall be discussed in detail shortly. Firstly though, I shall turn to 
Thorpe’s review of The Lucky Ones on The State of the Arts online, for her synopsis of the 
performance:  
Before you know it, you find yourself playing the lead through an espionage-themed 
series of events: participants allow ‘Capital Experience’, a company within the roleplay 
that has a dystopian, Orwellian, 1984 feel to it, to manage your happiness. They contact 
you via text, email and mail. They arrange to meet you for clandestine parcel swaps 
whilst surreptitiously taking photographs of you. The images are pinned to a notice board 
in a city centre flat that you’re ordered to ransack for clues about a wayward ‘Capital’ 
employee. And all this is prefaced with the ominous phrase: “Your happiness is our 
primary concern”. Very creepy. But also, very thrilling. 
Thorpe, 2018. 
Whilst this synopsis describes The Lucky Ones: Lucy, there are many similarities between the 
plot of The Lucy Ones: Lucy and The Lucky Ones: Lailah. The fundamental difference between 
them being, in The Lucky Ones: Lucy, one must ultimately decide whether to put one’s faith in 
the fictional company, ‘Capital Experience’, or in Lucy, a scorned ex-employee of the fictional 
company and one’s relationship manager with which one communicates. And in The Lucky 
Ones: Lailah, the character ‘Lailah’ is an AI rather than a human, and one must teach her right 
from wrong. As Palmer says, one gets “drip-fed clues and objects” throughout the experiences 
which culminates in a final decision that shapes the ending of the performances’ narratives.   
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The analysis of Riptide’s employment of objects allows for the consideration of how 
propositions are enacted and agreed by both performer and audience. This analysis opens the 
discussion of what / who is enacting the proposal, and who is accepting it, as well as how the 
performing object – be it human or non-human – expresses the claim to be accepted. For 
immersive work such as this, I will show that the ‘how’ is indicative, that is, claimed as actually 
being; fact. Turner states that “propositions flourish best in the indicative mood of the cultural 
process. They depend upon conventions of codification, verbal or nonverbal, most of which lie 
below the threshold of conscious awareness of members of a given group, on tacit agreements 
between speakers that they be true.” (Turner, 1988, p.102). The actuality of the propositional 
claim enables this discussion to transcend beyond pure identification of the sign and referent. 
The actuality of the claims that the production creates and makes lead to further sub-
propositions which help make up aspects of the greater proposition.30 These claims also allow 
for an interesting discussion of the roles that objects perform in both theatrical and quotidian 
worlds.  
Before moving on to the analysis of specific objects, it is useful to understand how the 
productions of The Lucky Ones operated. During the interview with Palmer, he stipulates that 
there were seventy-five audience-participants taking part in The Lucky Ones: Lucy experience. 
Riptide used four company members and assigned around twenty participants each to a team 
member. That team member was then responsible for “any direct conversation via SMS 
messaging [and] a wider team was put in place for larger spectacle elements […] or any package 
drops which required a larger team” (2019). Each four team members had the same script for 
their interaction with the participants as Lucy. The conversations could and did veer off from the 
                                                          
30 See pp.88-93 for the discussion on sub-propositions.  
84 
 
script depending on the participant’s level of engagement; they could ask questions and talk 
about things that they wanted to talk about. Yet, there was a framework for the interaction and at 
certain dates and times, all the participants for all team members would need to know a specific 
piece of information, or a package would need sending out to the participants etc. Palmer 
explains that the decision of when to release the relevant information to the participants was 
entirely up to the team member and where their conversation is with the participant. If the 
relationship between Lucy (team member) and participant has developed quite quickly, and the 
conversations have become personal, then the required information may be divulged earlier than 
to a participant that has not interacted as often or in as much depth with their team member 
(Lucy).  
Since Lucy was portrayed by four different team members, each participant’s experience could 
differ – and not only because they responded differently – since the team members may respond 
to certain lines of enquiry or questioning differently to another. Palmer reveals that: 
The initial week is getting to know each other and as a Lucy you can kind of 
manipulate what you pick out from the audience members, based on your own 
experience. For example, one of our artists Joe knew a lot about the rise in technology, 
the history of AI and all that kind of thing. So as soon as anyone touched up on that, 
he was straight in with those kinds of information. [Another one of the artists,] Lily, 
was a lot more human and light touch – Lucy was supposed to be human. Although, 
there was a question mark over whether she was because of how robotic her lines 
were. 
Palmer, 2019. 
If the audience-participants accept the proposal that the individual they are texting and 
communicating with is Lucy, then all audience-participants who take part in a ‘Lucky Ones’ 
experience and discuss their experience with another participant once the production has 
finished, would (presumably) believe that they communicated with the same Lucy as the other 
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participant. Yet, each interaction with an individual participant is its own performance and each 
performance is by default different and bespoke. Reverting to Bennett for a moment: “outside of 
the world of the play—to the audience—the utterances of the propositions contained in 
theatrical statements function as, and are, the theatrical event, itself” (2018:149). The theatrical 
statements received as a personal sensual object in the form of a direct text message retroactively 
become / are the theatrical event itself. In The Lucky Ones, as Palmer outlines above, the topic 
of conversation and the responses to the topic of conversation could differ depending on which 
artist within Riptide has been allocated to each participant. The audience-participant (Real-
Object) perceives an image of ‘Lucy’s’ message to their personal phone. Each image or sensual 
object (SO) received and perceived will differ to other participants since the interacting agents 
i.e., performer and audience-participant, differ in each performance. This throws light upon the 
network between objects and acting agents and how objects perform and propose things to their 
perceiver. If an object is changed then the theatrical journey and experience of the audience is 
changed.  
 
Connoted Propositions via Objects  
The Questionnaire 
Due to the disposition of The Lucky Ones taking place alongside the audience participants’ day-
to-day lives, the purchasing of a ticket differed in style than typical theatre productions. The 
format is still the same with contemporary performances – bought online via a website – but the 
procedure is not only a transaction but an application. For both productions of The Lucky Ones, 
audience members are applying to be a participant that receives a unique and individual 
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experience; applying to be one of ‘the lucky ones’. The application process is probably the 
aspect that differs the most between The Lucky Ones: Lucy and The Lucky Ones: Lailah – this 
difference shall be expanded on in due course. In both productions, it is within the application 
process when the participants are confronted with their first object.  
Palmer explains that for The Lucky Ones: Lucy, “as soon as you’ve booked your tickets, you’re 
sent a questionnaire. As soon as we know you’re a part of it we send you over thirty questions to 
determine [certain things, such as] house-keeping stuff [for example] your phone number, email 
address, postal address so that we can contact you, and also more specific questions. It started 
quite easy such as ‘where do you go on a Friday night?’ those kinds of low-level questions and 
ended with ‘what’s your relationship with your mother?’, ‘are you scared of death?’, ‘what’s 
your biggest fear?’ all those kind of things, so that we can tailor the experience to you. So that 
you and your best friend would have completely different experiences.” (2019). This initial 
object is perhaps one of the most influential acting agents throughout the entirety of The Lucky 
Ones: Lucy. Although, this is not entirely due to the object acting in and as itself, but as a 
human-oriented placeholder. The questionnaire (q) is an object whose qualities propose many 
ideas to be considered within the mind of the participant. How the participant responds to the 
sensuous qualities of the object shapes the experience they shall receive from Riptide and shapes 
their life throughout the month of March 2018.31 By applying real qualities, which are personal 
to the participant, to the object q, the participant adds meaning to the object within our human 
investment. For example, Riptide sent “people to restaurants [in their] area based on their food 
tastes” (2019), the knowledge of which arose from the questionnaire. This gave the participant a 
                                                          
31 In some cases, Palmer suggests that the show could have affected the personal lives of the participants once the 
experience was over. For example, one participant ended a long-term relationship, and another quit their job.  
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new place to eat in their neighbourhood. The volume and quality of human investment that is 
given by the participant to this initial object does shape the level of experience provided by 
Riptide and the participant’s life throughout the month. 
The questionnaire is not only impactful through a human-oriented perspective, but from an 
object-oriented one too. Taking a step back to before a participant adds their own ideas, 
qualities, experiences etc. to the object, the sensuous qualities the object holds are proposing 
things to be considered, even if one does not know what those things are yet. When you’re asked 
to complete a questionnaire for back-ground information pertaining to yourself from Riptide, 
which includes personal and intimate questions, one can assume that they will be using this 
information to tailor the experience to you; your likes and dislikes etc. Yet, one does not exactly 
know the significance of the object. How great or small a role this object and information will 
play within your experience. Simultaneously then, the qualities of the object are propositioning 
two things to the participant. The first thing proposed is mystery and the second is a soon-to-be 
discovered mystery or puzzle; the real untouchable object32. Riptide calls these proposals 
‘locked doors’, and Palmer suggests that the entire ‘Lucky Ones’ experience is a locked door 
“because tomorrow you know that something is going to happen, you just don’t know what it 
is.” (2019). Riptide’s notion of ‘locked doors’ is fused to causality within the story, i.e. the story 
that is revealed as the narrative moves forward. For Biggin, causality can have either a positive 
or negative affect on the audience in immersive theatre contexts depending on how the offerings 
of meaning and discovery are proposed and interpreted. Causality can “provide a means for 
                                                          
32 The object will eventually become known to the participant throughout the performance, but only as a sensual 
object. The real object is always unreachable. 
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immersive experience (as one discovery or encounter leads seamlessly to another) or raise 
barriers to immersion” (Biggin, 2017, p.123).  
The proposition that the questionnaire is a locked door is a sub-proposition not the main 
proposition and is produced in the perceiver because of the qualities of the object. Sub-
propositions are propositions which make up part of the greater proposition. The enactment of 
this proposition by the object and its qualities is twofold; it both proposes and is used as a sign 
(representatively) of mystery. The qualities of the object propose x to the audience participant = 
the questionnaire proposes mystery to the audience participant, and similarly, the qualities of the 
object denote x = the questionnaire denotes mystery. These are not the only sub-propositions 
expressed by the questionnaire though. Riptide use the questionnaire to create multiple sub-
propositions generating cognitive acts in the mind of the participant. As defined earlier, 
propositions are sharable objects of cognitive acts and attitudes. Some of the sub-propositions 
that are proposed and denoted by the object are to complete the questionnaire, questioning what 
the significance and consequence of completing the questionnaire is, and so on.   
The main proposition and the actuality of that propositional claim is that the questionnaire (SO) 
is a questionnaire; this is a questionnaire regarding the participant’s personality, likes, dislikes, 
history, relationships etc. It does not only represent and function as a questionnaire within the 
realm of a theatrical space or environment, it actually is the thing it claims to be. The interaction 
between the participant (RO) and the qualities of the questionnaire (SQ) is what makes the claim 
to the RO.  
This can also be seen in The Lucky Ones: Lailah. As previously stated, the application process 
differs between the two separate productions of The Lucky Ones. During The Lucky Ones: 
Lailah, the booking process still involves a questionnaire, but the format of this isn’t a personal 
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email. Palmer explains that “you [must] do a kind of exam. You go into this exam hall and you 
complete a questionnaire. It was specifically designed like an A-level exam. You had to write 
your name on the front…it looked like an exam paper. It was done in silence, there were 
invigilators there, there was a big clock at the front, and that was more like an aptitude test. You 
were given some scenarios and you said how strongly you agree from 1-5” (2019).    
During this application process – which is already a part of the performance (there are actors 
playing the roles of invigilators and participants) despite it being pitched as the thing that allows 
participation in the experience – all applicants had to take part in a sort of ‘aptitude test’ and they 
gathered together in an exam hall to take part. This was proposed as an exam; there were exam 
conditions relative to the exam. The test did not simply represent a test as it would if the 
narrative of a proscenium arch performance signified that a prop / theatrical object stands for the 
test in that world. The sensual object (the test) actually is the thing its qualities and the qualities 
of other sensual objects are proposing it to be.  
“[The] results [of the exam] went into our systems to personalize the experience, but some 
audience members were told they had been ‘unsuccessful’, and they were shipped out in front of 
everyone.” The applicants discovered that they were either successful or unsuccessful there and 
then, and “there were also plants in [the exam that were told they were unsuccessful] so it 
seem[ed] that about half [the applicants did not pass].” (2019).  In this moment, a participant’s 
interaction with an object and the objects qualities has led to a direct consequence affecting them 
and the trajectory of their theatrical experience. Even if they have accepted the conditions that 
the object proposes, the manner in which they accept those conditions and respond to the 
questions posed creates different consequences both in and outside of the theatrical world 
Riptide have created. For example, a participant that accepts the proposition that the object 
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before them is an exam, and that the outcome of their exam results will affect whether they can 
take part in Riptide’s experience, can have a differing consequence to another participant that 
accepts the same proposition if they grade their answers differently on the 1-5 scale. Both have 
accepted the actuality of the proposition, yet the consequence can still differ depending on the 
qualities of the proposal and the audience-participants response to it. Ignoring for a moment the 
participants that were chosen to be either successful or unsuccessful randomly – since none of 
the participants know that this is the case – a multitude of sub-propositions arise from the 
knowledge and acceptance that you are successful or unsuccessful. Palmer explains that the 
reason for creating successful and unsuccessful participants is because they want the audience to 
know what it feels like to go through those sensations. “For successful applicants what it feels 
like is that ‘you’ve passed a test’, so you’re immediately winning. Whatever this game is, I’m 
winning, so I feel a sense of gratification. The ‘unsuccessful applicants’ go home with 
disappointment and then they are told they had been accepted and that was all part of the test 
how you deal with failure. So, you go through a bit of an emotional rollercoaster, but you feel 
vindicated at the end, or you have new knowledge.” 
In discovering one’s result of the aptitude test you are forced to accept that you are either a 
‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’ participant, which leads to further sub-propositions. The Lucky 
Ones, like all theatre, consists of a big / main proposition and little / sub propositions. The main 
proposition that The Lucky Ones asserts to its participants is ‘that your world is now (part of) a 
performance’. One’s mind and body are inserted inside the theatrical world of The Lucky Ones 
over the course of several weeks. The main proposition is asserted indicatively; the proposition 
expresses itself as a statement of fact. The main proposition of immersive (theatre) work tends to 
be enacted in the indicative-mood. Whether it be an escape room, smart-phone treasure hunt, 
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Punchdrunk show, Shunt etc. For example, Coney’s A Small Town Anywhere (2009) indicatively 
claimed that the players participating in the experience lived and were a part of the history and 
landscape of the town. IOU’s Rear View (2017) indicatively claimed that any individuals or 
objects that were visible from the mobile converted double-decker bus along the streets of 
Blackpool were a part of the performance. This claim is similar to that of The Lucky Ones (in 
that the anything or anyone in the centre of Leeds could be part of the experience) and The 
Goldbug (2007-8) – which emerged out of Punchdrunk’s The Masque of the Red Death – where 
any location both physically and virtually (online) could be part of the six-month adventure / 
treasure-hunt experience if suggested by clues existing in the qualities of objects. Nimble Fish’s 
The Container (2007) indicatively claimed that the location the performance took place not only 
represented a lorry used for human-trafficking but was a real-world-object lorry that was used 
for human-trafficking. Yet, if a participant agrees to any of these offered propositions, or any 
other, in immersive, site-sympathetic and/or specific, or a form of participatory installation, one 
accepts it in the subjunctive-mood as we do with all theatre. For The Lucky Ones: Lucy then, 
audience-participants accept that their world is now (part of) a performance as if it were true, and 
not that it is true. Immersive theatre’s main proposition is enacted in the indicative and agreed in 
the subjunctive.  
Sub-propositions on the other hand are enacted and agreed in various moods. The enactment and 
agreement of little / sub-propositions are what help facilitate immersive sensations and 
experiences. The acceptance of these sub-propositions aids the acceptance of the main 
proposition. For example, wilson+wilson’s House (1998) used sub-propositions alongside the 
main proposition via theatrical objects. The main proposition was that the performance space 
(two terraced houses in Huddersfield) was connected to individuals from the nineteenth century. 
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wilson+wilson employed theatrical objects within the performance space creating sub-
propositions which gradually revealed the story and aided the proposal of the main proposition 
within the plot of the narrative. Audience-participants examined the qualities of the objects 
which proposed elements to the story that were pieced together for meaning to be derived. These 
sub-propositions not only aided narrative but aided the possibility of total immersion through 
absorption and transportation.33 In The Lucky Ones: Lucy, the questionnaire alone has a vast 
number of sub-propositions which arise from the qualities of its object. The offering of the 
questionnaire proposes to the participant that they must / ought to / should etc. complete it; it 
may lead to them wondering in the interrogative mood ‘what is the significance of (completing) 
the questionnaire?’ Likewise, a sub-proposition is enacted in The Lucky Ones: Lailah via the 
actuality of the claim that ‘this is an exam’ and then agreed by the completion of the exam by the 
participant. Considering and accepting these sub-propositions may lead to immersion through 
absorption. Following completion, the discovery and acceptance that you (the participant) are a 
‘successful’ applicant leads to further sub-propositions. The knowledge that you are a 
‘successful’ applicant proposes further things to be considered such as ‘there are stakes to this 
test’, ‘what / how did a participant answer which led to them being unsuccessful?’, ‘what 
happens now?’ etc. In this regard, sub-propositions are like the notion of infinite semiosis in 
semiotics since they propose further things to be considered, yet sub-propositions are not 
necessarily signs. As explained earlier, for Pierce, signs “must determine an interpretant in order 
to count as a sign, and [since] interpretants are themselves signs, infinite chains of signs seem to 
be conceptually necessary” (Atkin:2010). Yet the Prague School explain how theatrical signs do 
                                                          
33 Machon posits that “all immersive performance events exist at some point between three criteria, [ - immersion as 
absorption, immersion as transportation and total immersion -] total immersion being the most intense state 
experienced.” (2013:63).  
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not always have a representational function and so there is a limit to the number of signs in 
theatre. If everything on stage is a sign, then every object in immersive theatre creates sub-
propositions.  
The application processes for both The Lucky Ones: Lucy and The Lucky Ones: Lailah are vital 
for the facilitation of immersion since those sensual objects are the first sub-propositions offered 
to the audience-participants for acceptance. The acceptance of those particular sub-propositions 
helps “break down the barrier” to immersion (Biggin: 2017) making it easier for the audience-
participants to accept the main proposition of the productions. The intricacies of the qualities 
pertaining to the questionnaire and the exam could be analysed to what seems an infinite degree. 
The number of questions and possible individual bespoke responses to those questions seems 
countless. Due to the almost limitless number of potential conceptual sub-propositions, 
analyzation of its qualities shall be curtailed, and other theatrical objects shall be analysed in 
finite detail. What is interesting though is that when asked if ‘unsuccessful’ applicants receive a 
‘better experience’ than the ‘successful’ applicants – since they know something that the 
‘successful’ applicants do not – Palmer replied that he “would probably want to get an 
‘unsuccessful’ and go on the inside of something. [However,] there is also a sense of winning 
with the ‘successful’ ones because you think ‘oh, there’s stakes here’. You also feel exclusive 
because you’re in a club now” (2019). This implies that the consequence of one’s relationship to 
an object could mean that the quality of your experience is enhanced or diminished within The 





Deliveries and Packages 
After the application process for The Lucky Ones: Lucy (2018) ended and participants were 
aware that they ultimately had been ‘successful’ in becoming ‘one of the lucky ones’, the 
experience officially began on March 1st, 2018. Now, as the participants know from applying to 
the experience, the whole premise of the production is that for the course of the next month, 
everything they experience could be part of the performance and theatrical world created by 
Riptide. The first thing that the audience-participants were presented with were flowers. The 
participants received an unmarked parcel in the post to their home address which had within it 
red carnations and a message attached stating: “Dear [participant], Hope you have a lovely day. 
L x.” On the back of the card were the letters ‘CE’. (Ladley, 2018) The receiver of the parcel 
does not know for certain that this parcel is an aspect within The Lucky Ones: Lucy yet can and 
would presumably assume so; the participant is being invited to lower the first barrier to their 
immersion in the experience by accepting that their world is now part of ‘the lucky ones’ 
experience. This initial object proposes the commencement of the month-long experience, it 
proposes locked doors and mysteries to be considered: ‘what is CE?’, ‘who is Lucy?’, ‘when 
will I find out more?’ ‘Will I meet her?’ etc., but along with these sub-propositions that the 
objects qualities force to be considered, the actuality of the propositional claim that the theatrical 
objects make is that this parcel of flowers and attached card / message, actually is a gift from 
‘Lucy’. It not only functions as a gift and represents this and the start of your developing 
relationship and communication with the character, but this parcel is a gift from Lucy. The 
actuality of such a claim in this genre of theatre can have real world implications. Palmer 
provided me with an example from one of the audience-participants that took part – his father: 
“[The flowers are] kind of symbolic – you’re getting flowers from a stranger – it’s a gift from 
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someone. A lot of men had never received flowers full stop. […] My dad did the experience and 
was questioned by my mum heavily about ‘who is Lucy?’ and he had to explain. And I like that 
real-world / fiction blurred line.” Receiving such an object to one’s personal home and not 
simply witnessing the object used as a prop on stage to signify a gift from the character Lucy, 
does suggest that the individual has received a gift from a woman called Lucy. So, to an outside 
observer like the participant’s partner in Palmer’s example, the materiality of the object is 
translated as reality; their partner has received a real object from an unknown woman named 
Lucy. It therefore requires the participant to explain the context of the object as a theatrical 
device to the outside observer for them to perceive it as a theatrical object. Without the perceiver 
being aware of this context, the proposition is not enacted nor agreed since the object only exists 
as a real object in the quotidian world and is not functioning as the thing it claims to be within 
the theatrical world of The Lucky Ones: Lucy.  
The next interaction comes the next day when the audience-participants receive a text message 
from ‘Lucy’. Before speaking about text messages, it is worth noting how participants know if / 
that a letter, parcel, message etc. is a part of the theatrical experience. Obviously the first parcel 
they receive containing the flowers is unmarked and the attached card states ‘CE”]’ on the back. 
At that point in the experience, the participant is unaware of what CE is and stands for within the 
production and so has no supporting evidence to confirm that the parcel is a part of ‘the lucky 
ones’ experience. However, after the first ‘package drop’ – which is how Palmer refers to the 
deliveries and interactions etc. – the participants should be able to pick up on the signs of the 
production. Riptide uses specific signs as indexes and icons which signify and represent contact 
from either the character Lucy or the company Capital Experience. Palmer explains: 
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Everything from [Capital Experience] (CE) came in a black envelope with a very 
distinct draw-string-closing and everything that was in an A5 black envelope was 
from Lucy, and that was kind of contraband. A brown envelope is CE, unmarked. That 
envelope was handed to you by a CE worker who was wearing a badge – so you knew 
that was part of the performance. Any black envelope was kind of a signifier, and we 
wanted that to be the case. It’s [like] Harry Potter when he gets that letter through the 
door, you know it’s a special thing. We played around with the seal too, but we 
thought that was maybe a bit too close [to Harry Potter]. But something that signifies 
it so that the next time you get it, you can spot it a mile off. 
Palmer, 2019. 
This example within Riptide’s work demonstrates exactly what I am proposing. They created 
their own icon as a representative symbol for contact from the fictional company Capital 
Experience. They used colour to signify either formal or informal contact from the company, 
plus, if the envelope they received was sized A5 without the draw-string-closing then the object 
was sent to you illegitimately by Lucy against the will of Capital Experience. Once a participant 
has received a few of these objects then they can start to decode the symbolism attached to the 
qualities of the objects and ‘unlock the doors’ or ‘break the barriers’ to immersion. Palmer goes 
on to explain how they used logos and specific materials to signify and represent Capital 
Experience: 
 
Everything that was obviously from CE had a [CE logo] headed letter, it was very 
formulated, even to the quality of paper. It was a higher quality than normal paper and 
even the type of font we used was the same which symbolized [CE]. Then contraband 
items were handwritten, black envelopes, they were a lot smaller, code was used too, 
you were given code but not the cipher to break it. 
Palmer, 2019. 
These different coloured and sized envelopes which represented contact from Capital Experience 
and Lucy within the fictional world were the means to enacting the proposition. The proposition 
was enacted through the qualities of the objects that proposed, for example, ‘this is a secret 
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message from Lucy’, and the participants knowledge and acceptance of that was the agreement. 
Here, the proposition is not about truth / falsity as explained in the definition of the term earlier, 
it is about acceptance / unacceptance of the claim. The actuality of the proposition is that the 
black envelope with the ‘draw-string-closing’, for example, is from Capital Experience.  
 
 
Messages as Objects 
As previously mentioned, the next object that the audience-participants received was a text 
message. Emails and text messages are (still) objects despite them not being material and only 
existing technologically on a phone or device – unless printed onto paper. Remember, “an object 
is anything that cannot be entirely reduced either to the components of which it is made or to the 
effects that it has on other things” (Harman, 2018, p.43).  The mystery of emails and text 
messages does not need decoding in the same way that physical objects and letters do. Once an 
audience-participant has received a message from an individual claiming to be ‘Lucy’ the 
participant has that individual’s contact number / email address saved in their phone and address 
book. There is no need for Riptide to allocate an element to the object which aids in signifying 
contact from Lucy or Capital Experience since the contact number already does this. The 
difference between physical correspondence and SMS messaging / email is not only one of 
convenience but it could be argued that text messages can be more intimate. Palmer insinuates 
this whilst being interviewed: 
[The text messages were] very personal. The notes we gave to the [participants] is that 
you should respond to it as if you were responding to an old friend. Initially that’s 
very weird, having someone that’s so familiar with you, remember they know lot 
about you already from the information you volunteered up, and we also went digging 
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into their online profiles and things that are in public domain which gave us more to 
play with. You as an audience member, you are the heart of it. We went with whatever 
you wanted to talk about; if you didn’t want to talk, we were silent. If you wanted to 
talk about current affairs, we spoke about current affairs. It was like having a friend 
that would always respond. You know, we have those friends who you message, and 
you won’t hear from for a few days. This was a person who would respond 
immediately and positively and would always agree with you, and if they didn’t, then 
challenge you. That perfect friend. 
Palmer, 2019. 
The immediacy of the responses by the team members playing the role of Lucy is what quickly 
helps to create a personal relationship between performer and audience-participant. The text 
messages are functioning as theatrical objects and so they constantly propose new things to be 
considered depending on the topic of conversation. This generates the creation of a potentially 
vast number of sub-propositions whilst reinforcing the main proposition that your world is a part 
of a performance. The proposition is enacted and agreed through the almost call and response 
like nature of the text messages. The images of the messages received allow for the 
consideration and act of thinking of things as being various ways. In responding to ‘Lucy’, the 
participant has accepted the terms of the proposal in the subjunctive-mood. They have accepted 
the proposal as if the individual they are corresponding with is Lucy. Text messaging offers a 
clear and coherent example of how this genre of theatre makes a claim in the indicative mood 
i.e. ‘I am Lucy, I am your Relationship Manager’ and the audience member accepts this in the 
subjunctive. Since the participant accepts the proposition as if the individual is Lucy, then the 
production of intimacy could be accelerated through the speed and regularity of the messaging. 
This can lead to a shift in the dynamic of a participant’s relationship with ‘Lucy’. Initially, 
Lucy’s relationship to the participant is pitched as their relationship manager – “so at that point 
she’s only trying to make your life better”. After that, she begins to invite you to “try new 
restaurants in your area, try different things, [become] more mindful, [watch] interesting 
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YouTube videos, all to make you happier. […] Later, when she breaks away from the company 
she turns into that friend.” (2019). These invitations are what Biggin (2017) describes as 
attempts to facilitate immersive experiences and sensations in audience members and 
participants. Responding and accepting these invitations / offerings is what helps to lower 
barriers to immersion.  
 
Premium Members 
Before a participant meets ‘Lucy’ or any character and performer within The Lucky Ones, they 
are informed about a concept referred to as ‘premium membership’. A similar concept was 
introduced in Punchdrunk’s The Drowned Man (2013-14) which have audience members the 
option to either be Standard ticket holders or Premium ticket holders. Premium ticket holders 
received extra benefits which Standard ticket holders did not. For example, the audience-
participants who could display a Premium ID card were allowed access to a space on the 
basement floor of the performance space within the old post office which was decorated as the 
fictional theatrical world of Temple Studios. The basement space “contained a diagram outlining 
where the characters were at any time, their looped actions spelled out across a grid” (Biggin, 
2017, p.85). Premium ticket holders did not have to hunt and seek out intimate one-on-one 
experiences but were handed these experiences ‘on-a-plate’, as it were. So, paying more for a 
ticket means that you are rewarded by having easy access to what is deemed as ‘a better’ 
experience.34  
                                                          
34 This highlights an issue of large-scale immersive work where theatre companies may ‘sell out’ due to commercial 
interest. Adam Alston illuminates these issues, specifically Punchdrunk’s issues with commerciality, in 
Punchdrunk’s The Black Diamond and proposes that audiences should “assume partial responsibility or recognizing 
and responding to the control of art production at the institutional level.” (Alston, 2012, p.193).  
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Riptide’s premium membership concept was not the same as Punchdrunk’s usage in The 
Drowned Man. For Riptide, Palmer explains that “premium membership was a kind of carrot at 
the end of a stick [that] we gave to audience members to try and go against Lucy. They were 
physical cards, business cards that had a website on the back of it which was a link to a website 
that was a kind of credits scene. It had a bit of ending narrative, you know, welcome to the 
future, Capital Experience copy, and then followed by [the] Riptide program to signify the end 
of the experience.” (2019). Premium membership was something that all participants could 
receive then, not by paying more of their personal money, but by their decisions within the 
experience. If one chose to side with Capital Experience over Lucy, you became a premium 
member.35 Audience-participants were informed about these memberships on multiple occasions 
through their text conversations with Lucy and letters from Capital Experience etc. The common 
phrase that was repeated to ‘clients’ via text message was that “more privileges are given to 
premium members”. Capital Experience told clients that premium members were selected based 
on behaviour. Riptide are trying to manipulate the audience-participants into thinking and acting 
in a particular way and use the idea of a better-quality experience to do so. Here the qualities of 
an object are making other objects desirable. The qualities of the text message (SQ-SO) are 
adding significance to the real and sensual object i.e., the premium membership card. And it is 
not only the text messages that make these memberships desirable to the audience-participants. 
Other objects are used to propose mystery and intrigue too. Riptide created a Capital Experience 
website for audience-participants to research the company and discover further information. The 
website had a ‘premium members’ page that asked for a login which insinuated that these cards 
and membership were real and existed. The website (SO) was not only claiming that this (the 
                                                          
35 See pp.124-128 for the discussion regarding the decision that audience-participants had to make.  
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website) is Capital Experience’s website but also that one can become a premium member and 
one needs to be given a login to discover more etc. Here, the qualities of the website 
communicate with the qualities of premium membership via a mediator – the audience 
participant. It is the sensual qualities of the website and the unknown real qualities of the 
premium membership card which proposes mystery and creates desire. This is how Riptide 
operate, creating these ‘locked doors’ for players to ‘find the key’ as it were, to the inside of the 
world and performance.  
Digressing slightly away from propositionality, it is worth re-noting how objects interact. If an 
audience-participant physically receives a premium membership card, not only has the audience-
participant gained access to the ‘locked door’, but according to OOO, vicarious causation has 
occurred. This is OOO’s concept for how one entity influences another. In this scenario, objects 
interact with other objects via a mediator generating sub-propositions and performing theatrical 
claims. Harman states that “according to this theory, two real objects in the world make contact 
not through direct impact, but only by way of the fictional images they present to each other” 
(Harman, 2018, p.163). The audience-participant (RO) ‘meets’ the membership card (RO) 
through their image of the card (SO). Vicarious causation is the mechanism behind the influence 
of objects on-one-another. When referring to material / physical / tangible objects that are 
attainable and accessible by touch I do not deem it necessary to definitively state that audience-
participants in immersive theatre only encounter them via vicarious causation. According to this 
theory then, whilst I am typing these words, I as a real object am not coming in to contact with 
the real object keyboard through direct impact, but by way of the images I and it present to one 
another. When Kenneth Branagh and David Tennant held a skull as a prop in the delivery of the 
famous ‘to be or not be’ line in productions of Hamlet (1988 & 2008 respectively), they did not 
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touch the real object skull, but made contact through the sensual object skull. Whether one 
believes or accepts what may seem a strange concept, (especially since philosophy’s view of 
causality in the past has been dominated by a special entity – be it God or the human mind,) 
using the flat ontological lens of OOO supports the performative claim that objects propose in 
theatre via their qualities, particularly participatory and interactive theatre forms such as 
immersive theatre.  
 
The Meet 
One audience-participant who experienced The Lucky Ones: Lucy blogged and documented their 
experience online. On 6th March 2018, the audience-participant had their first physical meeting 
with a performer within The Lucky Ones. Having arranged to meet Lucy at Leeds Art Gallery at 
11am on The Headrow, Leeds, they arrived at the rendezvous and a man presented them with a 
box and quickly walked away. Without time to discuss the contents of the box or anything with 
the man, objects have once again proposed and created mystery. The audience-participant 
retrospectively blogged their thoughts at this moment – “there could be anything in here. My 
mind immediately goes to the worst-case scenario. What if there’s a bomb or drugs or 
something? It’s ridiculous, but I can’t help it.” (Ladley, 2018). Since the conventions of theatre 
are not at play, nor have the conventions been established and then broken, the man and the box 
could be anyone and anything. Conventionally, Ladley would have been waiting expectantly 
within an auditorium for the house lights to go down and the action to begin, but in this scenario, 
the man did not even introduce themselves as a character within the production. The participant 
had arranged to meet the character known as Lucy at this date, time and location, but the 
participant is not aware of whom the character is, what they look like etc. The actuality of the 
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proposition then is ‘this is a package’, but questions such as ‘what is in the box?’, ‘who was that 
man?’, ‘is this part of the experience?’ dominate one’s thoughts.  
Ladley’s description of their thoughts when receiving the package directly support the notion 
that objects perform a theatrical claim within the indicative mood. Edward Bullough’s article 
“Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and Aesthetic Principle” in the British Journal of 
Psychology (1912) “emphasizes the art-character of Art: “artistic” is synonymous with “anti-
realistic”; it explains even sometimes a very marked degree of artificiality.” (Bullough, 1912, 
p.99). Riptide’s use of “real objects [and] real people within actual space” blurred Ladley’s 
awareness of the art-character of the event – its artificiality. Due to the circumstances of the 
scenario i.e. its ‘real life’ setting on The Headrow, the man and the package as real objects, etc., 
the aesthetic and psychical distance between the work and the audience is reduced to an almost 
delusional state of “no distance”; what Ben-Chaim (1984) refers to as an unawareness of 
fictionality. Yet, Ladley is aware that this exchange between them and the man is a performative 
exchange; Ladley is aware of the “anti-realistic nature” of the art: “calming myself, I decide to 
retreat to the Tiled Cafe in the Art Gallery for a cup of coffee and some warmth.” (Ladley, 
2018). Ladley still accepts the indicative claim that this is a package, and due to the particulars 
of the claim, accepts that this is a package for them personally. Yet, Ladley accepts the claim as 
if it were true, i.e., in the subjunctive-mood.  
The Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin stressed the importance of the particular utterances of 
signifying systems rather than synchronically analysing sign systems (1986). How something 
was used in the moment (within its “situated utterance”) was more interesting to Bakhtin than 
how all the linguistical signs operated together as a complementary system. Applying Bakhtin’s 
concept of a situated utterance to non-linguistic forms of communication, for example, to the 
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stage signs of theatre and art, then, Ladley’s experience of receiving the package from an 
unknown man in the moment changes her subsequent understanding of those signs and to the 
realities of which they refer. A verbal and cultural exchange took place between performer and 
receiver via theatrical utterances and object. Analysing this exchange semiotically opens 
opportunities for considering the signs used and the interpretations that can be drawn out. Yet 
semiotics cannot effectively analyse the difference between this exchange in this particular 
scenario and theatrical form, with the same exchange (between performer and receiver) being 
performed on stage for a passive audience who are gazing inside the frame of the performance.36 
This is because semiotics can go no further than the analysis of signs and symbols and the 
resulting interpretants. Contrarily, analysing the exchange through the larger frame of 
propositionality, and the specific branch I refer to as the actuality of propositions, not only 
allows for the analysis of signs and interpretants, but also considers the difference in a sign 
between the two forms. Ladley’s experience of the sign, in Riptide’s situated utterance of the 
package exchange, denotes a propositional claim, a claim of actuality. The sign actually claims 
that the package is itself a package. In proscenium theatre, the exchange would propose that the 
sign of the prop / theatrical object only represents a package.  
Ladley’s experience of The Lucky Ones: Lucy, and every other audience-participant that engaged 
with the production, did so on a one-on-one basis – that is, as an audience of one. This one-on-
                                                          
36 It is worth noting that the exchange is not the same in each theatrical form. The situated utterance of the exchange 
is different. Despite the performer, receiver and theatrical object being the same, how these real objects / actors were 
used differs. Even if Ladley was invited up on to the stage from the auditorium to receive the package in a 
proscenium arch theatre, their bodily presence is not what shifts the propositional claim from one of representation 
to actuality. The situated utterance of the exchange is different on account of the way in which the other objects are 
present. These include the theatrical objects within the particular moment of the art itself and their interaction with 
one another, as well as the relationship between the real human-objects which create differences in aesthetic 
distance between performer and audience. Here the synchronic relationship of objects meets the particularity of a 
theatrical situated utterance.  
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one method is how Riptide like to create theatre and immersive worlds for their audiences. Due 
to the audience-of-one-nature of The Lucky Ones, it could be argued that it is perhaps more 
appropriate to look to Audience Reception theory for determining meaning and analysing signs. 
This theory contends that meaning is not received and accepted passively by the reader, but that 
it is actively derived regardless of the intent of the author/ creator / playwright / director / 
producer etc. The American literary theorist Stanley Fish – though not strictly a semiotician – 
introduced the notion of interpretive communities: different groupings of readers or audiences 
whom assign different values to different texts.37 For Fish, the value and meaning of the art is 
entirely dependent on the response of the receiver to it. Despite Fish speaking outside of a 
strictly theatrical framework, his notion forces the question of how we assign meaning to 
performance texts. There is a sense of this applying for each individual participant who 
experienced The Lucky Ones despite them not being faced with a performance text but with 
performing agents and objects. Perhaps it is possible to debate the extremes of where the 
meaning is coming from, the performer or the receiver, even though the exchange is theatrical. I 
oppose this stance since in theatre, the artists have intentions when making the work and they 
manipulate the audience – no matter the size – by forcing them to look at the things they want 
them to see. As Palmer explains in his interview, Riptide had aims and intentions for their 
productions of The Lucky Ones and one can see how they used the audiences understanding of 
signs and symbols to communicate meaning and propose things to be considered. Each 
participant from The Lucky Ones will have had a unique and personal experience, but Riptide 
created multiple layers of signification that all pointed towards the same ideas. Whether it be a 
large-scale performance or an intimate one-on-one, audience reception theory removes too much 
                                                          
37 Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities (1980).  
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agency from the artists. Analysing how the proposition is enacted and agreed via this lens does 
not work since it places both the enactment and agreement inside the spectator through 
interpretation. Theatre, and not specifically immersive or proscenium theatre but all theatre, 
makes a claim within a specific mood (usually the subjunctive-mood) and audiences understand 
and accept these claims because the artists have limited the possible meanings.  
 
The Package 
The package that Ladley and other participants received included a multitude of theatrical 
objects whose qualities proposed different things to be considered. I shall momentarily concede 
to the demeaning spoiler culture of today - that in my opinion hides the beauty of art - by not 
listing and describing every object and detail that arose from the first package drop and other 
moments within The Lucky Ones: Lucy.38 Nevertheless, focus shall be paid to one particular item 
within that package which was a sealed and stamped envelope addressed to a ‘Max Westbrook’ 
which was to be to interpreted as a letter. The letter had a real address inscribed on it for a street 
within Leeds city centre. On the back of the letter was a message that stated ‘DO NOT OPEN. 
SEND THIS NOW.’ Palmer explains that the envelope “was a bit of a challenge [to the 
receiver.] In the letter there was a message addressed to them [personally] which said, ‘Well 
done, we know you’re not a sheep’ and it gave them additional information based on being a 
leader.” (2019). Objects have the capability of becoming fused to, or associated with, something 
other than the thing itself. There are many examples in theatre where objects have become fused 
                                                          
38 This is not because Riptide have asked me to avoid spoiling the plot for future participants either, but that 
describing and analysing every element within a month-long experience would require more attention than one 
analysed production in a thesis of five analysed productions.  
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to texts, characters, history, events, locations, people, performances and so on. For example, The 
Immersive Ensemble’s Gatsby (2019) use a business card to fuse their production with the real-
world; this shall be explored in greater detail later in the thesis. Another example is charmingly 
demonstrated by Benjamin Gillespie as he describes how Margolin of the lesbian-feminist 
theatre collective Split Britches, reflected on her characterization of the character Emma in the 
group’s first production The True Story (1980). “[Margolin] told us how the action of smoking 
the pipe was a vital kinetic gesture that had inspired her characterization of Emma” (Gillespie, 
2014, p.157). When Margolin then discovers the pipe in the jacket pocket of her character’s 
original costume, the pipe fuses to her characterization of the long-forgotten character. Gillespie 
states that in this moment, “physical objects were able to mediate the collision of the historical 
and theatrical pasts, opening up the possibility of actually touching history.” (2014:158).  
The properties of Riptide’s theatrical and real-life object, the letter, are interestingly blurred and 
fused together in a similar fashion. Firstly, considering the qualities of the object as a theatrical 
object, the letter represents, functions as, and actually is a letter for the fictional character Max 
Westbrook. Yet, the letter within the envelope is really intended for the particular participant 
who receives the envelope in the package drop with the mystery character at either The 
Headrow, Leeds train station, or Leeds Art Gallery. So, the statement ‘send this now’ goes 
against the message inside and the artist’s intention since the situated utterance of the object and 
its qualities invite the receiver to respond by posting the envelope to the suggested recipient. 
Ladley depicts their decision not to post the letter within their blog:  
…the addressed envelope? I posted it…Nearly. I was literally stood next to the post-
box, with it in my hand, and not a doubt that I would post it. I guessed that it might be 
intended for another participant in the game, and that I’d receive my own in a few 
days’ time. Images flashed in my head of the Black Mirror Episode “Shut Up and 
Dance”, and I half wondered what terrible thing I was sending on… As I reached 
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towards the post-box, I glanced towards Sainsburys. It would be so easy to open the 
envelope, nip in, buy some pritt stick, glue it back down… no one would ever have to 
know. So I opened it. And I was so relieved I hadn’t sent it. It contained a note 
addressed to me, and complimented me on being “a leader, not a follower”. It was also 
from Lucy. 
Ladley, 2018. 
Ladley’s blog entry displays that they understood and accepted what the signs pointed towards, 
that is, they understood and interpreted the meaning of the signs and what those signs propose 
they do, but they didn’t follow them. Ladley chose to act against the request of the signs, yet in 
doing so, discovered that they followed the intention of the artist. Riptide wanted their 
participants to break into the character Max’s mail to receive a reward and personal message 
from ‘Lucy’. Here, the signs are operating against the hidden proposal. Furthermore, this 
proposes things to be considered about The Lucky Ones experience, how Riptide operate, and 
aspects of the form. The contents of the envelope i.e. the personal message for the audience-
participant, suggests that by trying to seek out further information or hidden clues and delving 
deeper beyond what the signs simply present on the surface, you discover more. It is almost as if 
Riptide have created rules of engagement that they want you to break to have a more enjoyable 
experience and derive further meaning. Riptide use the qualities of objects to express and 
propose to the receivers how they like work as a company.  
Secondly, the qualities of the object can be analysed as a real-life object too. If a participant 
decides to post the stamped envelope via a postbox then the letter would be delivered to the 
address stated on the front. The correct ‘real-world’ postage had been paid for and so Royal Mail 
delivery service would, and did in some instances, post the real-world letter to the real-world 
address inscribed. This is because in a quotidian world context, viewing the object as a sensual 
object through the lens of a Royal Mail worker, the object represents, function as, and actually is 
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a letter for an individual named Max Westbrook who resides at the address stated. The quotidian 
and fictional worlds conceptually blend together when this occurs meaning that the phrase 
should read: Royal Mail delivery service post the letter as a real-world object and as a theatrical 
object to the real-world location and to the theatrical set. Royal Mail will not be aware of the 
theatrical properties associated with the object, but that does not mean the object loses its 
performing quality, nor its theatrical function and meaning. The objects perform multiple roles 
at the same time.39 
 
The Recording 
If a participant did open the letter, as Ladley did, then they are informed by ‘Lucy’ that she will 
be in touch soon. When they receive an email later that day from her, the narrative is extended 
and a sense of trust or faith in Lucy may start to develop in the participant through her 
communications and one’s own decoding of her hidden clues and ciphers. The artists intention 
behind this email though is to provide the audience-participant with an mp3 file which was 
symbolic of the story’s narrative. So, Riptide do not only use material and real-world objects to 
create propositional content but recorded sounds as sensual objects. In fact, Riptide’s next 
project Sonder which is to be released in 2020 is a binaural sound walk through the city of 
Leeds. Audio-instruction as a means of immersion is very common in immersive work and has 
been used to engage and interact with audience’s way before Riptide’s era. There is Artangel’s 
work, such as The Missing Voice (Case Study B) (1999) and even more prominently in the works 
                                                          




of Lundhal & Seitl: New Originals (2017); Rotating in a Room of Moving Images (2011); 
Symphony of a Missing Room (2011) etc.  
During our interview, Palmer introduced the notion of bespoke objects. That is, depending on the 
environment that the participant listens to the recording in, the material objects surrounding them 
become part of their experience of processing the information. Palmer discloses that Riptide: 
…gave [participants] mp3 files to listen to which were mindful exercises to go 
through. I guess in that scenario, any object in their room, in their house, that they 
kept going back to was part of the experience, whether they’ve decided to take a bath 
and listen to it, listen to it on [their] sofa or in bed, that becomes part of the 
experience. I don’t know how you’d describe that, sort of bespoke objects. […] That 
mp3 was linked to the narrative, it was symbolic of the narrative. It was about being a 
leader and trusting people; planting all those seeds for later on. 
Palmer, 2019. 
In a similar way that when one considers a theatrical event that you experienced in the past, you 
recall the story, the set, the performers, the costume, the dialogue, the lighting etc., when 
recalling ones experience of a recording you remember where you were when you heard it, what 
time it was, what you were doing, what you were surrounded by and looking at, and so on. 
Therefore, if a participant does listen to the recording in their own home, as Palmer implies, then 
one’s personal possessions and objects become intrinsically united with the theatrical event, just 
as a prop mediated the collision in history and theatre at the 33 x 3 Festival: A Split Britches 
Reunion (2012) that Gillespie attended. The mp3 recording includes propositional utterances 
which force the listener to introspectively consider specific things. 40 These utterances interact 
                                                          
40 The mp3 recording stated: “You are here because there is something about life which doesn’t sit quite right for 
you. Something you can’t quite put your finger on. Something… wrong. You want to dive beneath the surface level 
of life, and really experience it to its fullest. […] You have been chosen. You are one of the Lucky Ones…. […] 
Right now, your life is about to change. You are the hero in your own story. Whatever happened before this moment 
does not define who you are. You have learnt lessons from your past, but you are not your past. You are the person 
in this moment listening to this. Your story begins right now. […] What would the hero of your story do if this was 
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with the listeners surroundings – so if they do listen at home, perhaps a sense of comfortability 
coalesces with the speaker – and are used by Riptide as a means of conditioning the listener. 
They are manipulating the participant into thinking a certain way. Palmer says that this 
conditions the participant since they are “already thinking of trusting someone before they ask 
for your trust.” (2019). One can see this process working in Ladley’s blog. After listening to the 
mp3 recording of the man from Capital Experience, Ladley states “honestly. I’m moved.” (2018) 
and you can understand how her trust and comfort with Capital Experience and the production 
grows.  
What is interesting about the recording is that the art form within which it is used can still make 
a quasi-indicative claim about it despite it not being a physical object, but a technological and 
sensual one. This concept was raised earlier when discussing email and text correspondence and 
now OOO’s flat ontology comes ever present again. The recording can be both a real or sensual 
object despite it not being tangible.41 When the email is sent to participants with the mp3 file 
attached, it is claiming that ‘this is an email from Lucy’ and ‘this is a recording from Capital 
Experience’ – which of course they are in the theatrical world and almost are in the quotidian 
world. That is, that they are emails and recordings in both worlds, but the sender differs from 
character to performer. The participants agreeing to the proposition still accept it as if it were 
true i.e. in the subjunctive-mood.  
 
                                                          
the opening chapter? […] Do that. Go on from this moment and live your life how your hero would. We will be 
with you every step of the way. We will be in touch again soon.” (Ladley, 2018). 
41 The recording is accessible through other material objects such as a computer, CD, USB stick etc, but the 
recording as an object can only be heard through the aid of technology. The technological object still as an 
executant “I” and an inwardness of which cannot be perceived or touched, and also an exterior image which can be 




Skipping ahead in the plotline by a week the participants are confronted with ‘Lucy’s flat’. In 
this scenario, participants have to ‘break-in’ to a flat in Leeds city centre. Palmer explains that: 
In the story Lucy went into hiding [and up] until that point, she’d contacted [the 
participant] everyday so there had been a three-day absence. At the end of which her 
friend [(Max)] gets in contact saying ‘I’m a friend of Lucy’s, you might be aware she 
has disappeared, you’re one of the last people she contacted’, so [the participant] kind 
of get[s] an ‘in’ from another person who explains that there’s a thing she’s left 
behind and we need to go to her flat and see whether it’s still there. So that’s the 
proposition ‘we need to go this flat’. […] This friend says that they’ll keep watch 
while you go into the flat and then [the participant] then get[s] instructions from him, 
he kind of says ‘I forgot to say, this is what Lucy told me’ and texts [the clues 
through]. 
Palmer, 2019. 
Riptide constructs this theatrical world where the fictional character Lucy has a home within the 
quotidian world, in the centre of Leeds. The inside of the flat confronts the participant with many 
interacting agents and objects, but before analysis of this begins the scene before entering the flat 
builds a thrilling proposition. Ladley lays out their arrival at the flat step-by-step: 
I made it to the address at three minutes to five. Cue nervous waiting on the street, 
scanning the faces of everyone around me. My phone buzzes, and it’s Max telling 
me the code to the door. I hesitate a moment – going into a flat with a strange man 
seems a dangerous choice. But my curiosity overpowers me, and I punch in the 
code. 
The lobby is empty, but all of a sudden Max appears. He ushers me into the lift. 
He’s frantic – no wait, he’s scared. His hands shake as he keys in the code for the 
lift. It doesn’t work. He tries again, and again it fails. Cursing, he heads to the 
stairs, with me in close pursuit. 
One floor up, he hands me the key and tells me the flat number. Then he disappears 





Ladley was confronted by a frightened individual that they had never met before, claiming to be 
the friend of Lucy whom they had had correspondence with. The individual gave Ladley a key to 
Lucy’s flat and instructed them to go in. The actuality of this proposition is three-fold - a) the 
performer is Max, b) the flat belongs to Lucy, c) the key is a key to Lucy’s flat. If one accepts 
these sub-propositions, trusts the individual, and believes that this part of The Lucky Ones: Lucy 
theatrical experience, then letting yourself into an unknown flat may not be that much of an issue 
– as was the case for Ladley. Yet this proposition requires more faith on the participant’s part 
than others. They must believe or take the risk that there will not be any repercussions. If the 
participant is deluded, may they think it possible to be arrested for breaking and entering? They 
might believe this because one’s “aesthetic consciousness” towards the experience was overtly 
personal.42 The perceiver may not be able to separate the flat from its relation to themselves. For 
Bullough, distance “is obtained by separating the object and its appeal from one’s own self, by 
putting it out of gear with practical needs and ends. Thereby the ‘contemplation’ of the object 
becomes alone possible.” (1912:91). If the perceiver does not sever the object from its relation to 
themselves meaning that no distance is created and experienced, then an unawareness of 
fictionality could come ever present.  
Palmer explains in our interview that one participant initially refused to enter the flat and 
therefore could not and did not accept the proposition. The audience-participant threatened to 
call the police because the individual (actor performing Max) wanted them to ‘break-in’ to a 
property. The implicit realism of the theatrical form along with the real-world setting outside of 
a conventional theatre blinded all elements of artificiality for the participant. Not wanting to 
                                                          
42 Bullough describes the aesthetic consciousness as “that special mental attitude towards, and outlook upon, 
experience” (Bullough, 1912, p.90).   
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‘break-world’, Riptide were faced with a dilemma and so had to find another way to restore the 
participant’s faith in Lucy and Max’s characters. The performer convinced the participant that 
they were not committing a crime because ‘they were sent here by Lucy’. This statement 
enlarges the distance between the participant and the production again reinforcing the 
artificiality of the experience. The propositional claim is still quasi-indicative, but the performer 
cleverly improvised a dialogue which reminded the participant of the theatricality of the 
interaction that they were engrossed in and enabled them to accept the proposition as if it were 
true. The problem arose because the participant accepted the enacted proposition in the 
indicative mood; as fact. How much the participant bought in to the scenes theatricality and 
artificiality is debatable because they still refused to enter the flat. Nevertheless, it was enough to 
convince the participant that calling the police was not necessary.  
Riptide’s mission of creating theatre where the audience are the heart of the experience; where 
they ‘are the location’ became so successful in this instance that consequences to the narrative 
were inflicted unknowingly by the participant. If the participant is the location of the experience 
– “wherever you are the performance comes to you” (2019) – then arguably all agency lays with 
the audience member. Riptide attempt to manipulate where participants go through the 
signifying functions of objects. But if a sign fails to communicate the artists intention, or the 
participant rejects a sign, or even that they refuse to follow where the artist is leading them, then 
they can in theory guide the performance in a different direction. This is what occurred during 
the experience of the participant who refused to enter the flat.  
The purpose of guiding audience members to Lucy’s flat within the narrative was so that 
participants found a specific coin – a shilling. Riptide created an escape room within Lucy’s flat 
in which participants had to complete around five challenges to locate the shilling. Once this was 
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located, they could leave the flat before they were spotted by the dangerous company Capital 
Experience. The coin was essential to the narrative because it was used as “a symbol for those on 
Lucy’s side” (2019), which proved to a later character in the story that one was trustworthy. One 
then exchanges the coin for a USB stick which leads to the key decision that players must make. 
This decision affects the outcome and narrative of their experience.43  
Since the participant who refused to enter the flat did not complete these challenges and 
therefore did not locate the shilling, this caused a knock-on effect to their experience and to the 
production’s narrative. When the actuality of propositions is rejected, consequences occur. In 
this instance, there were consequences for both performer and audience. The participant had not 
experienced key aspects of the storyline, nor had they witnessed specific signs which were 
intentionally used to make participants doubt Lucy’s character. Unknowingly, they also affected 
their journey to the ending of the experience. Riptide were forced to make an improvised 
theatrically-in-world reason why the shilling appeared in the participant’s life. The company had 
to find another way and reason that the participant could arrive at the key decision within the 
experience. Instead of the participant locating the shilling through their own detective skills, an 
anonymous person dropped the shilling off to the participant’s desk at work.  
Unfortunately, neither semiotic analysis nor propositionality can be used to analyse the 
consequences of this scenario since the repercussions are not purely down to the failure of a 
sign, but to unseen signs and proposals. The objects of the sign failed to wholly theatrically 
signify that the real-world flat was a set within the performance of The Lucky Ones: Lucy. The 
objects of the sign partially succeeded in their signifying function since the participant did not 
                                                          
43 Consideration and analysis of the USB stick and key decision occurs on pp.124-128. 
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call the police, but there was still uncertainty since they refused to enter the flat. The meaning 
derived by the participant in this scene – whatever that was – ends outside of the flats setting. 
They are of course still inside the performance space, since the entirety of Leeds could be 
considered part of this space, but not inside the artists intended setting. The performative 
propositions that Riptide created with specific theatrical objects on the other side of the flat’s 
door were not witnessed and so the participant was unable to interpret them. Be that as it may, 
the conclusion that propositionality uncovered which semiotics could not quite reach was why. 
Within the frame of semiotics, the flat simply did not signify a theatrical flat, but a real-world 
one. Within the larger frame of propositionality, the proposal made regarding the flat could not 
be accepted because the qualities of the objects and the claim they made were indicative of the 
quotidian world when perceived by this participant, and not indicative of the theatrical world.  
Re-focusing the attention to the inside of the flat opens a wide range of opportunities for analysis 
of how objects facilitate with the enactment and agreement of propositions. Lucy’s city centre 
flat was “mocked up so that it looked like it had been ransacked”. Palmer depicts the flat below: 
There were clothes everywhere, broken boxes, but it also looked like it was someone’s 
home that had been lived in. There were takeout boxes, washing up that hadn’t been 
done. It was obviously a female space, it smelt of perfume, it had contraceptive pills 
on the side, a diary open, those kinds of things. It also had – [and] we changed it every 
time – the audience members photo on the notice board. […] It was of them doing the 
package drop the week before. [So, we had taken] a hidden photo that they didn’t 
know was taken. A surveillance thing that reappeared in their journey. And there were 
some squiggled notes of them which had come out of their personality tests, kind of a 
summary of their personality etc. So, it was like you had been watched by this person 
and [we made that evident for the participant] to make [them] doubt this person, doubt 
Lucy.  
Palmer, 2019. 
The real-world flat becomes a theatrical set and the props / objects within it – along with 
the performer-as-object (playing the character of Max) – propose things to be considered. 
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The specific details of the set gives / suggests / proposes / signifies to the audience-
participant – who have placed themselves inside of the theatrical location and world – 
information regarding the character and narrative. One could make a semiotic analysis of 
the key elements within the flat analysing the different ways in which the theatrical 
elements could be interpreted. The semiotic approach and the Prague School of thought 
insists that everything on stage has a signifying function and affects our reading / 
understanding of the performance. Signs can thus be viewed as working systematically to 
create meaning within ‘Lucy’s flat’ The Lucky Ones: Lucy. Yet, semiotics cannot go far 
enough to analyse the actively reciprocal relationship between the elements and audience 
in this form of theatre. This does not mean that semiotics is not reciprocal. After all, a 
semiotic analysis can only be achieved if the signs and symbols of the work have been 
experienced; something must be given up for consideration and then returned. Semiotic 
analyses are vicarious and aid analysing from the perspective of the passive. However, the 
actively involved receiver of signs and symbols can go further than a semiotic analysis 
because they have an implicit extra layer of reciprocity on top, or as well as, the traditional 
contract of participation in theatre. A participant who is inside of the theatrical world / set / 
performance not only vicariously, but corporeally processes this information due to the 
branch of propositionality known as semiotics. Furthermore though, the proposals are 
enacted between active interacting objects (both non-human and human) making them 
actual propositions within the theatrical world and not simply signifying functions. The 
enactments of proposals in the forms of proscenium and participatory theatre differ from 
the subjunctive to the (quasi-)indicative respectively. These differences gauge different 
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limits to the receiver’s acceptance in the subjunctive-mood. This is a point that will be 
iterated again and again so that the limits to the denoted propositions are clearly framed. 
Getting back on track, it is the qualities of the objects within the flat that signify 
information regarding the character of Lucy and the narrative; everything in theatre is a 
sign. When inside the flat, the participants were asked to describe its appearance to Max 
over the phone who was waiting outside ‘keeping watch’, and he stated that “it seems 
Capital Experience have been here before” (2019). This theatrical utterance along with the 
qualities of the set, proposed that Lucy’s flat had been “ransacked”. Palmer explains that 
there is a “bin that’s been turned over, old bills and receipts, a smashed plate, there has 
been some sort of violence, someone hasn’t just gone through [the stuff] they’ve turned the 
place upside down; unmade bed, drawers out of the wardrobe, very untidy.” (2019). 
Combined with this was the suggestion that “life had been there” but not for a few days to 
align with Lucy’s absence in the narrative; there was half-drunk milk in the fridge, used 
tea bags on the side etc.  
The main propositional claims that are denoted by the objects here are a) ‘this flat has been 
ransacked’, and b) ‘this is Lucy’s flat’. Interwoven into these claims are an abundance of sub-
propositions performatively acting via the sharable objects. Ladley’s description of the 
appearance of that flat depicts their thoughts and interpreted ideas. “The radio spits out static. 
The bin is overturned. Salt is spilled across the counter. A half-packed bag is on the bed, full of 
clothes and towels. Did Lucy really get away? Has someone else been here?” (Ladley, 2018). 
One can picture from Ladley’s description what it would look like and be like to walk over the 
threshold into the flat. How one would swiftly but gradually scan the scenery analysing the 
different objects and qualities laid before you to arrive at thoughts such as theirs. An audience-
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participant would not be immediately immersed in this environment, it would take them time to 
perceive and assess the propositions before them. Once the actuality of the propositions had been 
accepted, then immersion and possibly belief could occur. A reminder of Biggin’s key notion 
that immersion is not binary (2017) is ever relevant. Ladley continues: 
As I search the room, I quickly come across a letter addressed to me. I open it to find 
part of a puzzle. I spot more pieces on the noticeboard, and quickly deduce that it’s a 
map of Lucy’s flat. Finding all the pieces will lead to the “buried treasure”, or 
whatever I’m in here for. […] There are clues scattered all over the place. A calendar 
with “Dinner with Max” and “Send Flowers” on circled dates. A stack of photographs, 
seemingly taken without the subjects’ knowledge. I leaf through them anxiously, but I 
don’t find one of me. There’s a woman, standing up, giving a speech. I wonder if it 
may be Lucy. […] The next clue leads to a bottle of apple juice in the fridge. I find a 
key, and quickly a keyhole. Two more pieces of the puzzle. […] As I search further, I 
spot some photos on the door of the wardrobe. Still none of me, but I see notes about 
the people in the photographs. One is the woman I thought might be Lucy, but from 
the note it’s clear it’s not. […] I turn, knowing that sooner or later I’ll find the photo 
of me. […] And I do. I’m stunned I didn’t notice it earlier – I must have been blinded 
by my adrenaline. An entire wall is covered in a montage of photos. My post-it-note 
has lots of comments on. […] I don’t understand. I knew that part of Lucy’s work at 
Capital Experience involved watching me, working out how to make me happy. But 
why would this be at her flat. Was she taking her work a little too personally? Could I 
really trust her? […] The remainder of the puzzle pieces – one in her pillow and one in 
the [cut-out] pages of a book – lead me to realise [the] shilling was the object of my 
search. I’ve barely scratched the surface on Lucy’s flat, but Max bangs at the door and 
tells me we have to leave. 
Ladley, 2018. 
Ladley is quoted in length here to demonstrate the gradual reading of the signs and proposals 
being offered for consideration and interpretation. Ladley wavers over the sharable objects of 
their cognitive acts / attitudes, oscillating different sub-propositions. The proposals force the 
player into oscillating different targets of intention such as - finding pieces to the puzzle will 
lead to a form of ‘buried treasure’, is that a picture of Lucy? Why would Lucy have intimate 
information about ‘me’ in her flat? Can Lucy be trusted? Etc. The denoted propositions 
generated by the qualities of the objects within the flat do not only lead to the shilling but extend 
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into the players personal relationship with the character of Lucy. Is Lucy really the ‘perfect 
friend’ that Palmer describes her as and as she may first appear in correspondence? The actuality 
of the sub-proposition that ‘a photo of me – which I did not know was taken – is on Lucy’s wall’ 
affects one’s perception and relationship with Lucy.44 The main proposition of the escape-room-
style flat is to find the thing that will help Max and Lucy, but the sub-proposition has the 
potential to overwhelm that main proposition due to a subject’s aesthetic consciousness. The 
object that you have been set the task of finding is not known. It is a ‘locked door’ and remains a 
‘locked door’ even when discovered; the participant does not know the meaning / purpose / 
symbolism / relevance of the thing which turns out to be a shilling until later in the narrative. 
Encountering the shilling only proposes more mystery and wonder to the participant. Whereas 
the sub-proposition involves you. One may still not know the meaning of the thing when found, 
which in this instance is an image of you, but you are intimately connected with the referent of 
the sign in a way that you are not with the tangible shilling. Whatever the meaning behind 
Lucy’s use of one’s image is, one knows that it directly affects them personally, but one does not 
know if the meaning behind the shilling will directly affect them at all. There is a difference of 
vivacity in the audience-participant’s aesthetic consciousness between the main / sub 
propositions. The qualities or conditions of the object affect the variability of distance. Bullough 
states that “there exist[s] two different sets of conditions affecting the degree of Distance in any 
given case: those offered by the object and those realised by the subject. […] In short, Distance 
may be said to be variable both according to the distancing-power of the individual, and 
according to the character of the object.” (1912:94) (emphasis in original).  
                                                          
44 It certainly did for Ladley. This was the turning point in altering their perception of Lucy. Ladley admits that they 
do not entirely trust Lucy and that they really wanted to become a premium member and so ended up siding with 
Capital Experience (Ladley, 2018). 
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It is also worth noting that the enactment of what I am calling an actual proposition can still fail 
to be understood and accepted in the same way that a signifier fails to signify the intended 
signified and referent in semiotics, because the way we process information and derive meaning 
remains the same, through the propositional branch of semiotics. For example, Palmer says that 
for some audience-participants “the flat wasn’t an intuitive puzzle; it wasn’t obvious why 
something would be there.” (2019). Analysing theatre practices through propositionality then 
does not offer a better way to derive meaning but unveils the differences in the enactment and 
agreement of a sign and proposal. These differences subsist in the roles that objects take-on, 
perform and claim. For example, dreamthinkspeak’s production Before I Sleep (2010) made use 
of a disused Co-operative building in Brighton to reconstruct Chekhov’s The Cherry Orchard 
house. Tristan Sharps (dreamthinkspeak’s artistic director) in an interview with Josephine 
Machon (2013) explains that the basement of the building was created to be the world of The 
Cherry Orchard house, but the ground floor was set as a department store in which you could 
“buy anything you want”. The items of furniture here are both props within the theatrical world 
of Before I Sleep (2010), and real items of furniture. An audience-participant immersed in this 
theatrical world can purchase an in-world theatrical object e.g. a sofa, as a real-world sofa which 
they can take home and possess as their own. Theatrical objects perform both theatrical and 
quotidian roles in site-responsive and immersive works such as this, through the enactment and 
acceptance of a proposition. It is agreed by the spectator that the object is both signifying a sofa 
and is representative of that referent within the production, but it also accepted as being a sofa in 






After audience-participants located the shilling during the escape-room styled experience in 
Lucy’s flat, other interactions, messages, emails, deliveries and so on go back and forth between 
the audience members and their new relationship manager called Adam. Adam was presented as 
Lucy’s replacement in the storyline since Capital Experience suggested that Lucy could not be 
trusted. About a week after participants located the shilling, Max texted the participants with 
instructions. Participants were told to go to the Everyman Cinema in Leeds city centre bringing 
the shilling along with them. They then had to ask the front of house representative for two 
tickets to the classic film Brief Encounter. Ladley states that the representative replied to them 
saying “that will be one shilling please” (Ladley, 2018). Participants hand over the shilling and 
in exchange are given a USB stick.  
It is not until this moment that the meaning of the shilling – which was used as a “locked door”, 
proposing mystery to audience-participants – comes to fruition and is derived. As mentioned 
earlier, Riptide used the coin as a symbol of trust for those individuals on Lucy’s side rather than 
Capital Experience’s. This is because ‘Lucy’ fed the participants signs via theatrical objects 
which led to the shilling, to Max, to the cinema, to the front of house representative etc., so that 
eventually, ‘Lucy’ trusted the player enough to give them the USB stick. The main proposition 
when individuals located the shilling was that this is a shilling, but the sub-propositions that 
shilling denoted were not yet known. The signification of the object had not been made; the only 
referent at that point was mystery.  
When the exchange takes place, a proposition is enacted and agreed within both parties of the 
exchange. It is not only the performer enacting a proposal which in turn is agreed by the 
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audience member, but the audience member becomes an active performer by enacting a proposal 
back to the character for consideration. For example, when the front of house character informed 
Ladley that two tickets to Brief Encounter would be “one shilling please”, the actor/character 
enacted a proposal and Ladley agreed to the terms of the proposition by presenting the character 
with the shilling they located at Lucy’s flat. Ladley’s agreement and handing over the shilling to 
the character, enacted a proposal to the character that they were to be trusted, and the real object 
shilling denoted the actuality of the propositional claim that this is the shilling within that 
agreement. The character then responded to Ladley’s indicative proposal by taking the shilling 
from them, and in exchange giving them a USB stick. The actuality of this exchange was that 
this is a USB stick for you. The USB stick, like the shilling, is at first presented as another 
locked door. Only by accessing the contents of the USB would the audience-participant discover 
more…and how much more is yet to be known. The chain of sub-propositions that make up the 
greater main proposition continue to develop and multiply as the narrative unfolds. The ongoing 
introduction of new objects and new interactions between the qualities of these many objects to 
the theatrical world create and denote further cognitive acts to be considered.  
There are numerous other sub-propositions that become active during this theatrical and real-
world exchange. The most interesting of which demonstrates another example of the roles that 
theatrical objects perform: the front of house representative at the Everyman cinema in Leeds 
becomes both character within the theatrical world of The Lucky Ones: Lucy, and employee in 
the quotidian world. This is not the same as occupying the role of an actor and a character 
simultaneously when performing for an audience. This actor works at the Everyman cinema in 
their quotidian life. The real-object (human) is an actor performing a specific character within 
The Lucky Ones: Lucy production whilst simultaneously is executing the demands of their job-
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role as a staff member at the Everyman cinema. That is to say, the employee becomes active in 
the theatrical world once asked for two tickets to Brief Encounter. If no one poses this question 
to the individual, then they remain in their quotidian environment and serve customers who are 
going about their day-to-day lives. As an audience-participant to this experience then, the front 
of house representative denotes many more sub-propositions for consideration. When attending 
to one’s aesthetic consciousness, the proposition that the front of house representative a) is a 
performer, b) knows Lucy, c) knows Max, d) is against Capital Experience etc., are all denoted 
by the qualities of the actor-as-object. As an audience-participant, one accepts the actuality of 
the proposal that the front of house representative is a front of house representative, both in and 
out of the theatrical experience. This, however, does not affect how the claim is accepted within 
the theatrical world. The proposition is still accepted as if it were true (in the subjunctive-mood) 
within The Lucky Ones: Lucy production, yet the proposition can be accepted as being true 
(indicatively) within the real-world.  
 
The USB 
The final analysis of an object within The Lucky Ones: Lucy is to be the USB stick. The USB 
was at the heart of the key decision that audience-participants had to make in the experience. 
This key decision was about trust. Does one trust Lucy? A stranger that you’ve never met. Or, 
does one trust the authoritarian company Capital Experience? Palmer attests that this key 
decision was loosely based around the controversial figure Edward Snowden: imagine that “you 
had a USB stick with information on that you’d been trusted with – from this Edward Snowden 
figure – from Lucy, do you give it back to her? And by consequence threaten to leak the issues 
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of this company, or do you give it back to [Capital Experience] who are offering you premium 
membership, a reward of some sort, trying to buy you out.” (2019).  
During the exchange, the USB stick (as a theatrical object) was proposed as not only 
representing but being a USB stick for the individual audience-participant. On accessing the 
contents of the USB stick via the mediator of another object i.e. a computer, laptop, tablet etc. 
the actuality of the proposition is aided and extended via sub-propositions such as this is a USB 
stick ‘with personal data and information on it pertaining to other people’, ‘do these people work 
for Capital Experience?’ ‘Are the individuals other audience-participants that are also 
experiencing The Lucky Ones: Lucy?’ and so on. In the theatrical world, the USB stick functions, 
represents and is a USB stick with information on it relevant to the narrative. In the real-world, 
the USB also functions as, represents and is a USB stick with documents on it. When these 
documents are accessed on a participant’s personal computer, the audience-participant could 
choose to use the USB stick for its real-world purpose and upload their own information on to 
the stick, or wipe the contents of the USB etc. These actions would have both real-world 
implications and theatrical consequences to the narrative of The Lucky Ones: Lucy.  
What the contents of the USB stick are offering for consideration, are whether the fictional 
company Capital Experience can be trusted. This forces the audience-participant into a decision, 
whether to return the USB to Lucy or to Capital Experience. The proposed in-world 
consequences and outcomes to this decision are either that if one gives the USB to Lucy, you 
have this “kind of authoritarian company, who are a little bit dangerous, [and whom you know 
have] made people ‘disappear’” (2019), or if ones gives the USB to Capital Experience you are 
(probably) putting Lucy in danger. However, since Riptide have arguably handed-over all 
agency to the audience members – by making them the location of the experience and – allowing 
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them to decide whom to give the USB stick to generating one of two planned endings by 
Riptide, what happens if a participant refuses to make this decision? Or they take the narrative in 
a different direction by changing the conditions of the decision?  
Palmer states that he did witness audience members who tried to play both sides of the decision: 
“they tried to copy whatever was on the USB stick and give two USB sticks. We [also] had 
audience members say [they were] going to do the Lucy ending and say ‘yes, I’ll be there’ but 
then turn up at Capital Experience headquarters and vice versa.” (2019). Participants are actively 
attempting to take charge of the situation and narrative by using real-world objects and 
proposing them to the performers as theatrical objects in the theatrical world created which was 
created by the performers and company. The audience members develop their own gameplay in 
these moments. If a participant hands in two USB sticks, they are creating a performative 
proposition themselves using a real object and the real and sensuous qualities it possesses to do 
so. They are making a quasi-indicative claim that this USB stick is the USB stick that you have 
requested, and this is the USB stick I received during the theatrical experience. Now, the shoe is 
on the other foot as it were; the roles that performer and audience play have briefly been 
reversed. The participant is forcing the performer to accept their proposition. In this instance, the 
participant in question initially was permitted entry to the Pinnacle building in Leeds which was 
propositioned as Capital Experience’s headquarters in the theatrical world. However, Palmer 
clarifies that the participant initially got in and then “it was revealed that [the USB] was a fake 
so [the participant received] an improvised ending that we didn’t even anticipate happening. It 
was a completely improvised scene from that actor and turned more into an interrogation room 
scenario…which only they got.” (2019). The performer accepted the audience-participant’s 
proposal that the USB they handed over was the USB stick required to gain access to the next 
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part in the narrative. Accepting the proposition indicatively in this manner meant that the 
performer, once realisation of being duped had kicked in, had to improvise their own enactment 
of a proposal.  
The participants that text Lucy telling her they would go to the rendezvous point to meet her, but 
then turn up at the Pinnacle building to see out the different ending of the narrative also used 
objects to propose things for consideration and denote propositions to the performers. The 
degree of the claim expressed through the text messages is perhaps not as explicitly animated as 
bringing a new object into the fold of the theatrical world, but its assertiveness is the same. The 
participants are expressing through the mediation of a text message that they will meet Lucy; the 
proposition is quasi-indicative once again. If the performer goes to rendezvous point at the 
agreed location, time and date to meet the participant, then it is because they accepted the 
players proposition which was expressed through the sensual object of text. What becomes 
evident here, and through all the examples discussed within The Lucky Ones: Lucy, is that 
objects denote propositions in theatre.  
Through the interview process with Riptide’s Alexander Palmer, I was provided an insight into 
his intentions as an artist, and how Riptide manipulated their audiences of The Lucky Ones 
through signifying theatrical objects. Our discussion illuminates Palmer’s thirst of being 
sympathetic to real-world spaces and objects. This sympathy to specific sites and spaces, be it 
Leeds, Miami etc., can be seen in all the work Riptide creates whether it be The Lucky Ones 
(2018), You Are Here (2015), Estate (2017) and so on. There is an emphasis on real-world 
spaces and places in Riptide’s work: “it always had to be in the real-world for us. It is hard 
enough for us to know whether the chair is just a real-world chair or if it’s a Lucky Ones chair. 
So, for us it was a signifier between performance and real-world rather than changing it to 
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something else. Is the café that you’re invited into just a café or is it a set?” (2019). This very 
question is why analysing their use of real-world objects for theatrical purposes is so intriguing. 
What this interview, research into the production, Ladley’s blog, and consideration of aesthetic 
distance analysed through the lens of object-oriented ontology opens up, are the opportunities of 
analysing how a proposition is enacted and agreed through – to use the title of Schweitzer and 
Zerdy’s book – Performing Objects and Theatrical Things.45 The roles that the objects perform 
are interwoven but can be philosophically distinguished between the separate worlds and shared 
realities in-play. The dynamism of these roles exists in the claims performed and expressed by 
the qualities of the object(s). Since the receivers of these claims have a presence and being in the 
world and can physically and mentally interact and encounter these objects, those claims become 









                                                          
45 Schweitzer, M. & J Zerdy. (2014). Performing Objects and Theatrical Things. London: Palgrave Macmillan.  
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2.3 The Great Gatsby 
 
Introduction 
On Thursday 18th April 2019, I experienced The Great Gatsby performed by The Immersive 
Ensemble. This immersive theatre adaptation of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s classic novel was originally 
produced by The Guild of Misrule, which was performed in York 2016, and created by Holly 
Beasley-Garrigan, Amie Burns Walker, Hannah Davies, Phil Grainger, Michael Lambourne, 
Thomas Maller and Oliver Tilney. Still, the show is running in London, housed by the Colab 
Factory at ‘Gatsby’s Drugstore’ on Long Lane. The Immersive Ensemble creatives Alexander 
Wright and Brian Hook are directing and producing this current run respectively.  
 
What is the Immersive Ensemble? 
The Immersive Ensemble describe themselves as a “leading immersive theatre company” who 
boast “creating some of the most popular immersive shows in recent years” (The Immersive 
Ensemble, 2016). Whilst The Immersive Ensemble did not create the immersive Gatsby 
experience, it is hard to refute their statement. They have indeed created and delivered a 
multitude of commercially popular shows in recent years. Shows such as the immersive musical 
Fagin (2018), which invites its audience to participate in a theatrical world which is set before 
the events of Dickens’ novel Oliver Twist. The company’s first show in 2016 – The Drop Off – 
tasked its participants with ninety minutes to find the location of a man somewhere within the 
city of London. Similarly, their show Who Done It follows the popular, and continuously 
growing trend of mystery and detection in immersive work such as Les Enfants Terribles’ The 
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Game’s Afoot (2020) and Swamp Motel’s online detective thriller Plymouth Point (2020) and 
requires its participants to solve a murder mystery. Whether their immersive work be a mystery, 
a musical, an adaptation on a novel etc., it always places a focus on the audience and their 
entertainment. A night experiencing an Immersive Ensemble production, usually means you are 
invited to eat and drink during the performance itself. For example, The Club (2017) is a theatre 
performance which immerses its audience into a ‘secret’ club with a very particular guestlist in 
which the appeal for its audience-participants is to eat, drink and “party into the early hours” 
(The Immersive Ensemble, 2016). 
The Immersive Ensemble’s performance of The Great Gatsby incorporates many specific 
moments from the novel and stays true to the narrative, yet takes its own direction with 
Fitzgerald’s text creating an immersive theatrical experience which invites its audience to be 
guests at an extravagant Jay Gatsby party. The Colab Factory (who house the event) describe the 
production on their website: 
 
It’s the roaring twenties – an era of bootleg liquor, red hot jazz and hedonistic 
pleasures. Jay Gatsby has invited you to one of his infamous parties and that's not 
an invite you want to turn down. 
  
Step into a heart-racing immersive adaptation of F Scott Fitzgerald’s seminal jazz-age 
novel which puts you in the heart of the action. Slip on your dancing shoes and watch the 
story unfold around you in this unique theatrical performance. The cocktails are flowing, 
the music is playing, the party is in full swing and there's the chance of more than a little 
scandal. 
  
Immerse yourself in one of the greatest stories of the 20th Century. 
Colab Factory, 2019. Emphasis in 
original. 
 
This description does not exaggerate nor under-play the experience but does concisely prepare 
you for aspects of what is in-store. The production takes place across a myriad of spaces 
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including balconies, drugstores, jazz bars, and small intimate spaces with lavish furniture etc., 
and the audience are enveloped by the world of Fitzgerald’s characters and the 1920s era. This 
section will not be reviewing the specific production viewed in April 2019 but using it to analyse 
how the actuality of propositions occurs in immersive theatre. Additionally – as was the case 
with The Lucky Ones case study – OOO will be sustained throughout the analysis of The Great 
Gatsby to show how they occur.  
The production’s aim is to immerse its participants in the story and world of The Great Gatsby: 
The Colab Factory instruct the reader / participant to “immerse yourself” in the plot of the novel. 
The types of immersion that exist within a theatrical performance such as this, are immersion as 
absorption and immersion as transportation.46 Immersion as absorption occurs when the 
theatrical event fully engages the participant’s concentration and imagination, i.e., total 
engagement. Immersion as transportation occurs when an audience-participant is “imaginatively 
and scenographically reoriented in another place” (Machon, 2013, p.63). To immerse oneself 
into this story then, the artist is suggesting that one must allow oneself to be imaginatively 
engaged and transported by their offerings. So, what was being offered in the Immersive 
Ensemble’s The Great Gatsby?  
The performance presented a plethora of theatrical objects to be considered and interacted with. 
In this next section I shall discuss and analyse the interactivity of the site’s scenography, props, 
performers, participants and so on, which I shall generalise as objects. Analysing what these 
objects denoted and/or connoted to me – the propositional lure – enables me to decipher what is 
being actuated within the specific and overarching propositional claims. There are two 
                                                          
46 Machon (2013) pp.62-63. A combination of these two modes of immersion can result in the third and final mode: 
total immersion.  
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interwoven intentions existing within the modes of immersion as transportation and absorption 
which permeate the topic of the actuality of propositions here: locations and scenes. The 
locations to be explored here are the venue of the theatrical event, as well as the 
scenographically created fictive worlds of Gatsby’s drugstore and mansion which are rooms 
within the venue itself. I shall offer a descriptive walk-through of these performance spaces as I 
recall experiencing them to show how The Immersive Ensemble used theatrical objects to blur 
the lines between the quotidian and the theatrical. Then, I will explore individual scenes from 
within the performance which were adapted and/or inspired from the storyline of the original 
novel, such as Gatsby’s business meeting, the tea scene at Nick Carraway’s between Daisy and 
Gatsby, and Myrtle’s death, to show what was being actuated within specific fragments and 
lures. The locale and scene discussions will be interested in how the theatrical objects 
transported, lured and immersed me into accepting the actuality of the propositional claim(s). 
These discussions will also illuminate what the ‘goal’ of immersive theatre is and how blurring 
of boundaries between worlds can be achieved.   
Before the discussion of location and scene can begin, it is worth mentioning an aspect of the 
relationship between myself and the work which came prior to my arrival at the theatrical event, 
on the 18th April 2019, since this was a key fragment which lured me into a different way of 
feeling. As is the case with most immersive theatre productions, how I heard about the 
production and purchased a ticket, was not through the box office of a theatre in advance or on 
the door. I had heard about the production a couple of years ago through word of mouth and had 
since seen reviews and recommendations via several online sources. I decided to purchase a 
ticket through the booking procedure online and I received an email confirmation with the 
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‘tickets’ attached. The tickets were not only proof of purchase for me and the venue but served 
as a written invitation to me as guest. The invitation stated: 
My Dear Friend, 
The honor would be entirely mine, if you could attend my little party. 
You shall find all the details you require below. 
Yours Sincerely, 
J. Gatsby47 
In attempting to achieve their aim of immersing their participants in the story and world of the 
novel, the production’s main proposition is declared before the live event commences; that ‘we 
(the audience) are invited guests to Gatsby’s party at his mansion.’ The propositional content in 
the email statement is two-fold. Firstly, the statement consists of representational content which 
imposes that the tickets, or proof of purchase, also represent an invitation to a party hosted by 
Jay Gatsby. Secondly, the invitation imposes conditions on our mind that need to be entertained. 
Despite me having heard and read about The Great Gatsby as a theatrical event – as well as 
having read the original novel by Fitzgerald – and then spending my own money to attend the 
show in April, the phrasing of the ‘invitation’ proposes to me that Jay Gatsby has personally 
invited me to “attend [his] little party”. This proposes that I am not (only) a spectator to a piece 
of theatre, but a guest, and friend, of Mr. Gatsby at his party. Before I have attended the 
performance, I am already aware of how I shall be viewed by the characters during the 
performance. My role and relationship to the characters is as a guest. This is the overarching 
main proposition which The Immersive Ensemble and The Colab Factory assert from the 
moment one receives one’s invitation, to the termination of the theatrical event.  
                                                          
47 Please see Appendix 5 for an image of the documented ticket invitation and details.  
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In this instance, it was language that operates as a lure for feeling. Studies of pragmatics and 
linguistics have shown how propositional language imposes truth conditions i.e., Sperber & 
Wilson (1986); Wilson & Sperber (2002); Carston (2010); Nuchelmans (1973); Golding (2016). 
The language within the invitation imposes the condition that I am to be treated as a guest of Mr. 
Gatsby at this event. This condition is a fragment; a lure for feeling. Immersive theatre and 
immersive-styled performances tend to assign a character or role to the participants who 
experience their work. This may not be as crucial to the main-proposition as IE’s The Great 
Gatsby is, and it need not always be as explicit as a guest or visitor etc., it could simply be what 
Sophie Nield calls the ‘character named Spectator’ – a ‘limited role’ where the audience either 
becomes “the black hole into which theatre pours itself anxiously, or [they become theatre] in 
the guise of Spectator. [… They] are either in it, or absent” (Nield, 2008, p.534). For example, in 
The Murdér Express one is a passenger on a train, in a Gingerline production one is a diner, in 
Forget Me Not one is a visitor to a nursing home, and so on. Yet, the “pioneers” of immersive 
theatre, Punchdrunk, like to offer a role of anonymity in their work via the use of masks. White 
and Machon see their use of masks as “emancipatory innovation”, whereas Gordon and Maples 
believe the masks “to make the strict, non-negotiable rules of engagement with the performers 
more obvious” (Biggin, 2017, pp. 24-25). 
Correspondingly, Fruit for the Apocalypse, who are not an immersive theatre company, but do 
create experimental work that is site-responsive, assign the role of passenger to their participants 
within The Surrealist Taxi. In The Surrealist Taxi, a ‘customer’ simply calls the telephone 
number, and the driver answers the phone and accepts your fare – like all taxi services. The 
journey is determined by drawing playing cards and determining direction of travel and distance 
by suit and card value. In The Surrealist Taxi, the assigned role of passenger goes beyond the 
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representational content proposed by an invitation to a party, or one’s bodily presence at a party. 
In The Great Gatsby for example, the audience are physically present and may have dressed up 
for the occasion to fit in with the in-its-own-worldliness of the 1920s jazz bar era, but you are 
both guest / co-conspirator in the frivolities of the party, and spectator of the event. Whereas, 
The Surrealist Taxi has a further layer. Here, the spectator is assigned both the role of passenger 
and participant / spectator of the performance / journey. Yet, the role that has been assigned to 
the participant by the conditions of the production is already the role of the participant. The 
participant is a passenger in a moving vehicle during both the fictional world of the narrative and 
in the literal world of reality.  
Earlier, I mentioned that Jarvis’ “core hypothesis [within] Immersive Embodiment (2019) [was] 
that immersion involves myriad strategies that seek to realize the promise of a position beyond 
the confines of one’s body, its immediate locale or its finite set of lived experiences” (2019:10). 
From this, one could interpret that the ‘goal of immersive experience’ (from a perceptual 
embodiment stance) for its creators, – if there is indeed a goal – is to deliver on the implied 
promise of fulfilment in immersion. But is this the only ‘goal of immersive experiences’? 
Considering immersion as a form of theatre, and not purely as an experience or sensation, the 
fundamental goal or aim for the creators of the art is surely to immerse one’s audience. Now, in 
a truly immersive theatre piece – like the location of the flat in The Lucky Ones: Lucy – in order 
to immerse one’s audience, the place / location / set has to approach reality in as much detail as 
possible to adhere to the main proposition that the participant’s quotidian world has become part 
of a performance.48 This does not mean that the goal of Riptide’s immersive theatre is the 
                                                          




closure of all gaps between the quotidian and theatrical worlds, but that Riptide’s goal for their 
immersive theatre is to actuate the illusion of the reduction of the gaps between the quotidian 
world and the theatrical world. The objects Riptide used simultaneously performed theatrically 
and (could perform) their normal and usual purpose(s); they had both theatrical and quotidian 
functions. The qualities of the theatrical objects were working together to present a sensual 
object containing the illusion of reality. Nevertheless, it is not the aim of immersion for every 
sign and object to become one and the same as all the gaps do not have to be filled for 
immersive experiences to occur. For Riptide, the reduction of those gaps is important as that is 
what they are trying to achieve: theatrical immersion in one’s daily life. Yet, for Forget Me Not, 
The Guild of Misrule and The Immersive Ensemble, and The Murdér Express (which will be 
discussed in the following chapter), the line between the quotidian and the theatrical is not as 
rigid, since they are dealing with a much narrower geographical radius and shorter temporality.  
The Immersive Ensemble’s The Great Gatsby (2019) is not a truly immersive theatre piece. The 
main proposition is that the audience are guests inside the fictional world of Fitzgerald’s novel, 
rather than the fictional world is the quotidian world. However, there is an implicit realism that 
is presented and reinforced by the production’s theatrical objects and network of sub-
propositions – as is the case with all immersive theatre work. There is therefore still a blurring of 
lines that must take place for immersion as transportation to take place. For The Great Gatsby, 
this blurring of lines is between the physical venue and the created theatrical world. 
Location 
Immersive theatre companies and productions have become renowned for transforming the 
space and place of their performances so that the story aligns with the locations natural and 
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manmade environments. In this sense, some immersive work identifies itself as site-specific or 
site-sympathetic as the theatre companies Riptide, Grid Iron, Burn the Curtains and Talking 
Birds – to name a few – do. These companies all share commonalities and encourage active 
audience participation with theatre and the theatrical environment, yet do not necessarily define 
themselves as ‘immersive theatre’ companies. Without getting too distracted from the issue at 
hand, site-specific and sympathetic work does not always have to be immersive in nature. The 
reason some companies may not define themselves solely as working within the form of 
immersive theatre is because it limits what they can make. Site-specific performance can work in 
most forms of theatre if it remains specific or sympathetic to its environment. For example, in 
BoxedIn Theatre’s The Greenhouse (2019), the audience are passively spectating the action 
whilst sat on cushioned chairs in-the-round, but this takes place inside of a greenhouse.  
Punchdrunk's Barrett admits that he's not a fan of the term "immersive theatre". 
"We would never use it ourselves, although I'm delighted if our audiences are totally 
immersed," he says. "We used to call it 'site sympathetic' - because it's all about the 
building." 
Masters, 2013, n.p. 
If immersive work is ‘all about the building’ per Barrett, it is worth discussing the location and 
building of The Great Gatsby (2019). The building used was The Colab Factory’s residency at 
74 Long Lane in London. The Colab Factory transformed an old rug company’s factory floor 
into a venue where audiences can experience live theatre. Audiences are invited to this specific 
location for many different types and styles of events and under varying pretenses. In my case, 
the invitation to the venue dropped into my email inbox as an invitation as previously 
mentioned. Now, the material being of a building has what Gillespie refers to as its own ‘life-
form’, in that it has a being or ‘life’ outside of its relation to a human or conscious thinker 
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(2014). The building itself does not have a conscious mind i.e., it is not living, but the internal 
and external environment of it – in this case of 74 Long Lane – exists and communicates with 
other objects and humans (which OOO refers to as objects too).  
Upon my arrival to ‘Gatsby’s Drugstore’ on 74 Long Lane, I saw that the outside of the building 
was covered in a banner which read “The Colab Factory”. Due to this, I knew that I was in the 
right place, but the external appearance of the building did not look like a drugstore, nor 
Gatsby’s mansion. The sensual object I perceived did not align with the main proposition, nor 
did it suggest to me that the interior of this building would be grandeur in nature. Now, I did not 
expect this immersive performance of The Great Gatsby to take place inside a multi-million-
pound mansion – The Immersive Ensemble’s budget for rent may not stretch that far! – but the 
location’s exterior appearance did not suggest to me that this is where the fictional character Jay 
Gatsby would host one of his parties. The geographical location and the exterior architecture of 
the building did not act as a fragment or sub-proposition which assisted the main proposition. It 
was not until I entered the building that I started to gradually lower my barriers to immersion. As 
the performance began and developed, I accepted a multitude of propositional lures that the in-
its-own worldliness of the theatrical world became apparent to me; the appearance of the 
building’s exterior was simply a hurdle I had overcome, and now a distant ignored memory. The 
storyworld and space-world began once one had crossed the threshold from the quotidian world 
to the specific space-world of the performance and the performers’ narrative commenced. 
Arguably, this was not the case here, nor in other immersive works. Did the process of 
immersion begin once the live event commenced, or was it when audience-participants were first 
propositioned by real and sensual objects? I.e., was it once one crossed the threshold or once one 
received that liminal ticket?   
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Entrance and The Eyes of Dr T.J Eckleburg 
The first aspects to be discussed and analysed are entering the building and perceiving the initial 
proposals. This discussion explains how detailed fragments / sub-propositions which one 
immediately perceives on entering a space are offered to lower barriers to immersion and 
transport us into the theatrical world; the world of The Great Gatsby.  
There is a liminality when entering a performance space i.e., “a betwixt-and-between-condition” 
(Turner, 1988, 101).  I have experienced that transitional feeling from the perspective of 
performer and audience. As a spectator / perceiver / audience-participant, something changes 
within us when one crosses a threshold to a new realm. This feeling is not exclusive to spectators 
of immersive theatre but is potentially heightened depending on what it is one is entering. I have 
experienced a transitional feeling when entering both a theatre auditorium and a warehouse 
where theatre is being performed. Due to the possibilities that are created when one perceives the 
objects presented on the inside of these environments, that liminal feeling could last longer, be 
more immediate, be more jarring etc., in an auditorium than a warehouse, and vice versa. Also, 
the vastness of the possibilities is always shifting dependent on one’s relation to the space itself. 
In this sense, the relation of theatrical objects still contains a human-oriented dimension. In 
Bachelard’s The Poetics of Space (2014), he states that: 
outside and inside are both intimate – they are always ready to be reversed, to exchange 
their hostility. If there exists a border-line surface between such an inside and outside, 
this surface is painful on both sides [..] The center of “being-there” wavers and trembles. 
Intimate space loses its clarity, while exterior space loses its void, void being the raw 
material of possibility of being. We are banished from the realm of possibility. 
Bachelard, 2014, p.233. 
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This change that one experiences on crossing a threshold was evident in the responses to my 
post-show questionnaire to Forget Me Not. When asked if they experienced any kind of change 
as they crossed the threshold between the foyer and the performance space of Forget Me Not, 
ninety percent of participants said they did. And Bachelard’s philosophical poetics of space here 
can help explain how one could experience no noticeable changes when crossing a physical 
threshold between two separate worlds. There was a physical boundary between the performance 
space and the foyer in Forget Me Not. This boundary separated the theatrical world from the 
outside world. If in the conscious mind/brain of the audience-participants, outside the 
performance space and inside the space conceptually contained possibility and the potential for 
further existence, then it is reasonable to assume that one may not notice a shift in the vivacity of 
one’s immersion and beliefs. 
The crossing of the threshold between outside and inside the performance space of The Great 
Gatsby (2019) was through a street side door of the warehouse. A doorman / bouncer opened the 
door of the warehouse and conversed with you as you were queuing to enter the building and 
present your ticket / invitation. The bouncer stamped all our hands in ink. It read ‘JG’. This was 
a sign to say that you had paid for the event and were freely allowed to enter in and out of the 
show. Once I had climbed the stairs to the first floor, I entered a small room which led to 
‘Gatsby’s Drugstore’. The performer playing the role of Rosie Rosenthal welcomed me and 
walked myself and a few others through all the ‘guidelines’ of what we could and could not do. 
This was the contract of participation we explicitly assented to; she even said “you can’t use 
phones as they haven’t been invented yet. We will allow you to use your phone and card to pay 
for drinks at the bar and we’ll turn a blind eye to that, but if we see you use them at any other 
point, we will crush them. You can take photos once the show is over.” Once Rosie finished 
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explaining the rules of play, we could enter ‘Gatsby’s Drugstore’. As you left the small foyer 




But above the gray land and the spasms of bleak dust which drift endlessly over it, you 
perceive, after a moment, the eyes of Doctor T.J. Eckleburg. The eyes of Doctor T.J. 
Eckleburg are blue and gigantic – their irises are one yard high. […] But his eyes, 
dimmed a little by many paintless days under the sun and rain, brood on over the solemn 
dumping ground. 
Fitzgerald, 1925, p.20. 
This excerpt from Fitzgerald’s novel is the first description the reader receives of the 
advertising board over ‘the valley of ashes.’ These eyes can be viewed as a symbol to 
represent the abstract concept that Doctor T.J Eckleburg is God judging American society.  
The Great Gatsby (2019) makes use of Eckleburg’s eyes in their scenery as one enters the 
second room of the performance space – Gatsby’s Drugstore. The gigantic blue eyes are 
displayed on a plasterboard set over the doorway as you enter the room. There are also two 
large, round metal rings which are suspended from the ceiling in front of the eyes to serve as 
the frames of a pair of glasses. The rings are joint together by a silver taped bar which serves 
as the bridge connecting the frames together. The image of the eyes displayed on the 
plasterboard (Real Object) and the suspended metal rings (Real Object) create the three-
dimensional image of Doctor T.J Eckleburg’s eyes on the advertising board (Sensual Object) 
from the original novel.49 
                                                          
49 See Appendix 6 for an image of the eyes.  
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The interaction of these objects created the overall sensual object that I perceived – Eckleburg’s 
eyes. This was a network of sub-propositions; a sign of a sign of a sign of a sign. 
Propositionally, the object connotes a lure. It lures us into the world of Fitzgerald’s novel. The 
actualization of the lure modifies the proposal that in this space that I have entered, exists the 
fictional world and narrative of an adaptation of The Great Gatsby novel.  
It is worth emphasising that what makes this created theatrical object of Eckleburg’s eyes 
different from the scenography of a set depicting Eckleburg’s eyes on a proscenium arch stage, 
is my bodily presence. I did not interpret this image as a symbol whilst sitting passively in an 
auditorium. I interpreted this image as a symbol whilst moving through the performance space. 
So, the theatrical object does not only function as the set to inform the spectator that, a), this 
object represents Eckleburg’s eyes, and b), this object informs us the onstage representation 
takes place in location x, but it goes beyond both a) and b) by actuating those claims. My 
presence inside the performance space meant that that object was the advertising board of Dr T.J 
Eckleburg’s eyes. The space was situated at the ‘valley of ashes’; I had placed myself between 
West Egg and New York. Therefore, the theatrical object of the eyes was a sub-proposition; a 
fragment which aided the main proposition that we (as audience) are inside the fictional world of 
Gatsby.  
Networks of sub-propositions, such as this one, lead to further sub-propositions and things to be 
considered.50 This sub-proposition made me consider things such as ‘where is Gatsby’s house 
from here?’, ‘is Gatsby’s house not a mansion in this narrative?’, ‘is his home a drugstore?’ and 
so on. The inclusion of the eyes above the doorway informed me where I was. I was not entering 
                                                          
50 As discussed in The Lucky Ones chapter pp.88-93. 
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a fancy party as I presumed from the invite I received. Instead, I was entering the ‘solemn 
dumping ground’ and ‘valley of ashes’; the place where George Wilson’s garage is located 
within the original novel.  
Prior to witnessing the interacting objects which make up Eckleburg’s eyes, I witnessed the 
invite, the bouncer, the stamp and Rosie Rosenthal, all of which operated as invitations / 
offerings / proposals for engagement with the work. Biggin (2017) incorporates into her work 
Salen and Zimmerman’s multivalent model for interactivity in computer gaming.51 The four-
mode system includes cognitive interactivity (the psychological participation between things), 
functional interactivity (structural interactions with material things / objects), explicit 
interactivity (overt participation), and beyond-the-object interactivity (social and cultural 
participation). Biggin uses the model to show how each mode can lower barriers to immersion 
through performances and moments from Punchdrunk shows. For example, the “invitations for 
imaginative engagement (cognitive interactivity [MODE 1]) can be seen as lowering barriers to 
immersion, by gradually taking the audience members away from the real world in which they 
put the masks on and bringing them into (the world of) Temple Studios” within The Drowned 
Man (Biggin, 2017, p.83). In The Great Gatsby (2019), the invitations offered (the invite, 
bouncer etc.) are attempting to do the same thing. Lower those barriers and lure and transport us 
into the world of Gatsby. I mention this because those offerings were gradually allowing me 
time to become accustomed to my new environment away from reality, and once I saw and 
walked under Dr T.J. Eckleburg’s eyes, I remember accepting and assenting to the idea that ‘I 
am now entering a Gatsby narrative’. This was the first theatrical object to start the process of 
                                                          





transporting me into that mindset and world. I would not state that this network of sub-
propositions alone achieved what Machon (2013) calls the state of immersion as transportation, 
but it started the process of wavering through those graded states.  
 
The Drugstore 
As one passes through the doorway underneath the eyes of Eckleburg, one enters a room which 
has a chalk board hung on the wall directly before one’s eyes which reads ‘Drugstore’. On the 
left, there is a small bar right-angled off in the corner where one can purchase refreshments such 
as whiskeys, gins, wines etc. Along the wall connected to the bar on the left side of the room, 
there is a boundary one cannot seemingly cross as a red curtain is drawn segregating the 
room(s?). On the right, the space is confined by a shutter which is lowered and closed. There is a 
raised platform right-angled off in the corner opposite the bar which serves as a seating area. In 
this area, there are old and worn items of furniture and decor: wooden chairs, wingback chairs, 
old and dusty lamps, whiskey bottles and so on. There is also a piano on the platform which is 
being played by the character whom we are soon told is George Wilson. He is playing nineteen-
twenties-style background jazz whilst the audience / participants / guests enter.  
Entering this room was perhaps the most puzzling experience of the night as what I perceived 
did not align with my expectations of what Gatsby’s mansion and party would look like, and the 
only mention of a drugstore within the original novel I could recall was the one Nick purchases 
some cigarettes from in chapter two. I was still entertaining propositions such as ‘where is 
Gatsby’s mansion?’, ‘does George Wilson run a drugstore in this narrative rather than a 
garage?’, ‘is this even a drugstore?’ and so on. I had only just started to perceive and experience 
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the inside of the performance space and the theatrical objects and props that were being 
proposed. As I continued, I gradually relaxed into my new environment after taking the time to 
perceive all the immediate areas that were accessible to me. I was still assenting to the idea that I 
was entering a Gatsby narrative, and that that narrative had already begun, but I was not too sure 
what was occurring and being actuated. The chalk board sign on the wall informed me that I was 
in a drugstore, but the objects, location, atmosphere and people who were in the ‘drugstore’ did 
not align with my notion and understanding of a drugstore in the quotidian world. The space felt 
more like a speakeasy; an illicit establishment (illicit within the performance’s narrative) that 
was being fictionally portrayed as Gatsby’s drugstore business.  
Once the door we had all entered through, walking underneath the eye of Doctor T.J. Eckleburg, 
had been closed, and the performer playing the role of Myrtle stood on top of the piano and 
began singing along with the music that George Wilson’s performer was playing, the audience 
filled the space. We stood in the middle of the space, crammed next to one another like a busy 
London tube. Some sat on chairs on the raised platform next to the piano, some sat on bar stools, 
suitcases etc., others leaning against walls, bars, and whichever spaces we could squeeze in to. 
The performer playing the role of Nick Carraway unbeknownst to me was stood within the 
audience watching Myrtle sing too. When she finished singing, he began his opening monologue 
and worked his way through the crowd of guests onto the raised platform. The story had begun.  
This preamble within the space declared as a ‘Drugstore’ also served as a means of gradually 
taking audience members away from the real world. Similarly, to how Shunt in Tropicana led 
small groups of audiences down long corridors and into a fake lift to create the illusion of 
descending beneath the station and city, and how Punchdrunk use masks, removing their 
audience from the real world and bringing them in to their created theatrical one. Once Nick 
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Carraway had finished his opening monologue, the performer playing the role of Jordan Baker 
swung open the shutter and doors from the drugstore to Gatsby’s grand house on the other side. 
 
Gatsby’s Mansion 
We as an audience all flooded into the room exploring its objects and grandeur. There was a 
dance floor in the middle of the space with two seated areas either side. On the right as you 
entered the space, the seating was flamboyantly decorated with golden sparkly tablecloths, and 
there was a bar full of champagne. On the left-hand side there were a few tables to relax on. 
There was a piano and microphone on the left as you entered too. Gatsby’s bar was directly 
opposite the entrance to the space. There were balconies above the seated areas wrapped in fairy-
lights which contained more seating for the guests; there were steps for performers and audience 
to climb up to the balconies if they desired. There were other rooms hidden from view, and as 
the narrative developed, groups of audience members were invited into them by the performers 
to witness subplots and intimate one-to-one scenes. We were not however invited to wander 
aimlessly to our own devices like in Punchdrunk’s The Drowned Man. Instead, we were led to 
specific rooms and scenes at certain moments.  
The real and sensual qualities of the objects mentioned above – as well as other unmentioned 
objects and qualities – were working together to propose that the audience had entered Gatsby’s 
mansion. The individual fragments, such as the piano, the bar, the fairy lights and so on, once 
entertained, hooked me in further to the theatrical world and narrative. Yet, there were other 
objects that did not align with the main proposition or the conditions of the fictional world. 
Objects such as CCTV cameras, audience-participants’ bank cards, fire alarms, exposed brick, 
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digital speakers producing contemporary music from the post-Gatsby eras, and so on. Other than 
the speakers, these objects had no theatrical functions, only real-world ones. This is where mode 
two of Salen and Zimmermann’s model (2004) – functional interactivity or utilitarian 
participation – becomes applicable to this analysis. These objects created physical barriers to my 
immersion. For example, how can one be imaginatively and physically transported to a nineteen-
twenties era which makes use of twenty-first century technologies? I had to become accustomed 
to the objects that did not coincide with the conditions of the theatrical world before I could 
suspend my disbelief, and imaginative engagement with the world could take place. I ignored 
everything that was not part of the proposal ‘you’re in a Gatsby narrative’. This meant ignoring 
the exposed bricks of the warehouse building, to assent to the proposition that the building and 
space was Gatsby’s mansion, not a warehouse.  
As I mentioned earlier regarding Riptide’s The Lucky Ones, the illusion of the reduction of the 
gaps between reality and fiction were important for immersion to occur, but this was not as 
important here. The Immersive Ensemble were not trying to have its building and set approach 
reality in as much detail as possible. They were simply creating fictive storyworlds 
encompassing aspects from The Great Gatsby novel. I could (and did) choose to ignore those 
objects which did not align with the storyworld.  
Like Riptide’s work, Punchdrunk’s The Masque of the Red Death (2007) and The Drowned Man 
(2013), also aimed at achieving and sustaining an intense level of engagement with the fictional 
world of the show. In Biggin’s work (2017) she says that Felix Barrett stated The Masque of the 
Red Death “failed”’ if a participant “suddenly remember[ed] they [were] in London 2007” (in 
Gardner 2007, n.p.). To try and facilitate “total immersion at all times” (2017:84), Punchdrunk 
‘opened up [Battersea Arts Centre’s] 16 chimneys, tore down partitions and created new 
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connections’ (Wainwright, 2018, n.p.) so that they could reduce the gaps between the quotidian 
and theatrical worlds. Having total cognitive interactivity with the fictional world of The Great 
Gatsby (2019) was not attainable for me due to the previously mentioned objects with solely 
real-world functions. Yet, this did not hinder my immersive experience, only interrupt it. Biggin 
(2017) refers to Jennett, Cox and Cairn’s Real World Dissociation concept (RWD) (2008) which 
surrounds the experience of immersion in video games. Biggin states: 
In the context of immersive performance and narrative, RWD explains how an audience 
member might retain awareness of real-world events and continue to experience a sense 
of immersion in a fictional landscape, atmosphere or story. An audience member may 
negotiate with their immediate surroundings to retain engagement in the storyworld 
(narrative immersion) and the atmosphere (sensory immersion), or move between both.  
Biggin, 2017, p.145. 
I negotiated with the non-theatrical objects and chose to ignore them so that I could retain my 
engagement in the storyworld of The Great Gatsby. Like Biggin does in relation to The Masque 
of the Red Death and The Drowned Man, one could go a step further by suggesting that by 
becoming aware or remembering aspects of the quotidian world, but then choosing to be 
attentive to the fictional world that I was experiencing, that “might demonstrate a more thorough 
experience of immersion than if this thought never occur[ed]” (2017:84).  
Conversely, there was a point where an interruption was prolonged so much that the sensation of 
immersion was broken, and so the gradual layering process of my immersion in the narrative and 
world had to commence again. The warehouse building’s fire alarm went off whilst we were 
inside Gatsby’s mansion during a later scene; this was not part of the performance. A business 
that The Colab Factory share the warehouse space with on a higher floor had accidentally set off 
the fire alarm mid-performance meaning that the show had to be paused and all audience 
members evacuated. The performers had to break character and open aspects of the building that 
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were not part of the performance. The red curtain that served as a boundary along the side of the 
bar in Gatsby’s drugstore was drawn open to lead to the building’s nearest fire exit. It was a side 
door leading on to a small back street along the side of Long Lane. We as an audience all had to 
stand on the other side of the pavement and wait until it was declared safe for us to go back 
inside. After around ten minutes we were led back through the side-door into the performance 
space by a few performers, and they then had to shift from their quotidian self, back to their 
character within the theatrical world.  
Finally, the most direct means by which The Immersive Ensemble blurred the lines between the 
quotidian warehouse building, and the theatrical storyworld of Gatsby’s mansion was via 
explicit interactivity / participation with designed choices and procedures i.e., mode three of 
Salen and Zimmerman’s model (2004). As I entered the space declared to be Gatsby’s mansion, 
the performer playing the role of Gatsby was stood overlooking us all as an audience / his guests 
on a balcony above the bar. Whilst my friend and I, along with other guests bought drinks and 
were talking, individual audience-participants were invited to dance the Charleston. Nick 
Carraway headed over to my friend and I and started speaking to me. He complemented me on 
my suit and enquired whom my tailor was. He asked me if I had met Tom Buchanan. He 
introduced me to Tom. George Wilson came over and taught me the steps for the Charleston. 
These explicit interactions with the characters – or objects as OOO would say since a democracy 
of objects “does not entail the exclusion of the human” per Bryant (2011:20) (emphasis in 
original) – helped blur the boundaries between the two worlds.  
Obviously, my agency is still limited in these interactions. The performers are in control and are 
guiding me down their narrative path. The performer playing Nick Carraway will start up a 
conversation with some of the guests in each of his performances of The Great Gatsby. He may 
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even use the same line from time-to-time complementing the individual on their suit or attire. 
Likewise, the performer playing the role of George Wilson will show guests the steps for the 
Charleston in each of his performances. And whilst there is cause for me, or any audience-
participant to respond to their interactions, our “input does not determine the outcome and the 
performer remains in control at all times” (2017:90). 
immersive experience can exist in that movement between passive and active 
engagement: between freedom and following the rules; making choices within given pre-
designed constraints. When considering immersion and interactivity within the walls of 
an immersive theatre production, what matters is less how interactive a production 
actually is at any given moment, and more the question of how it manipulates various 
modes of interactivity to allow for the experience(s) of its audience.  
Biggin, 2017, 94. 
Elaborating on Biggin’s quotation – within that question of ‘how [x] manipulates’ is what is 
actuated i.e. the actuality of the proposition. So, whilst boundaries are in fact only blurring 
between the real and the theatrical, the interactivity of objects creates a realm where those 
boundaries merge; a realm where it is claimed that an object is the thing it stands for. This realm 
indicatively claims that ‘the bar I am standing at is Gatsby’s bar’, ‘the human object before me is 
George Wilson’, and so on.  
This discussion of location shows how the performance venue’s building, and the objects which 
made up each rooms scenography and set invited a lure for feeling. How they blurred the lines 
between the quotidian and the theatrical. One could argue that the scenography of a proscenium 
arch performance requires the same level of imaginative engagement and cognitive immersion as 
immersive theatre sets do. For example, West End productions such as Wicked and The Lion 
King have such elaborate sets, puppetry and costumes to imaginatively engage and become 
immersed. Yet, there is a definite boundary between the everyday and the theatrical. Between 
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performer and audience. Between on stage and off stage. To take this analysis a step further so 
that one can see the distinct difference between propositionality and semiotics, I shall turn to 
individual scenes within The Great Gatsby (2019) and discuss how specific objects were 
actuated. How these objects not only served as a successful sign for what they were, but what 
affect they had. And how that effect influences immersive experience.  
 
Scenes 
I will now discuss and analyse three scenes from The Great Gatsby (2019) which used theatrical 
objects to lure me further into the theatrical world of the production. The three scenes that will 
be considered are Gatsby’s business meeting, the tea scene, and Myrtle’s death. The latter two 
are adaptations of specific moments from the novel itself, and the former is a created adaptation 
from aspects of the novel and Gatsby’s character. I have chosen these three scenes as they each 
made use of specific objects aimed at luring the audience into entertaining them to try and 
facilitate an immersive experience through absorption and/or transportation.  
The technique of using objects to immerse participants is not wholly distinct from previous 
examples I have described in The Lucky Ones productions and Forget Me Not and so it may 
appear repetitive, but it is necessary to look to different examples of how propositions are 
enacted and agreed. For example, in Forget Me Not, a participant is drinking their tea as if they 
are in a nursing home. But they are not really drinking their tea as if they are in a nursing home, 
because, they would (presumably) not act like that in the quotidian world / reality. The drinking 
of one’s tea is a fragment of a possibility that compliments / supplements / facilitates their 
engagement in the theatrical world. They have a fragment of the fictional world. They are 
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immersed in the object / the stuff / the sub-proposition. It is a detail of the performance that 
immerses them. And by expressing what it was that immersed me – as a participant – in separate 
immersive performances, it opens the endless possibilities for considering what is happening 
within experiences of theatrical performance. By examining these objects, I am offering further 
proposals to the questions within the processes of experiencing and making theatre which 
continually need to be asked.  
 
Gatsby’s business meeting 
Shortly after Nick Carraway met Jay Gatsby for the first time at Gatsby’s party, the performer 
playing the role of George Wilson asked a group of audience-participants, including my friend 
and I, “if we wanted to be involved in some of Gatsby’s business?”, and sneak away from the 
frivolities of the party. Intrigued, my friend and I, as well as roughly a dozen other participants, 
were all guided into a hidden room out of sight from the rest of the performers and participants. 
It was dimly lit, lavish, and filled with alcohol and chesterfield sofas. I could still hear the party 
going on in the main room. Rosie and Gatsby gave all of his new ‘business associates’ a glass of 
gin on entry. Rosie came over to each participant one-by-one and gave us a business card. On 
the front, it read ‘Jay Gatsby’, on the back, ‘for the attention of Rosie Rosenthal’. We were told 
by Rosie that we must place a bet on for them using their money which they “knew would win”. 
We were then informed that, once the meeting was over and we had returned to the main room, 
we must individually approach Rosie when we “had a chance” and ask her for the betting tip. If 
we were to approach her with lots of other people, then we were not to be trusted.  
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Side-tracking from the description of the business meeting for a moment, later in the evening I 
managed to catch Rosie on her own whilst she was carrying some drinks. I asked her for the 
betting tip, and my business card was exchanged for a different card which had a mobile number 
on it. Rosie told me to call the number the next morning and “place fifteen-hundred on the 
Cincinnati Red Socks”. After participating in mode three of Salen and Zimmermann’s model – 
explicit interactivity – with the performance and Rosie earlier on, I was presented with a 
business card which lured me into a different way of feeling. I felt my role as an audience 
participant, and as a guest within the fictional narrative, had just been broadened to ‘business 
associate of Jay Gatsby’. By entertaining that possibility, and assenting to that proposition, I 
became more imaginatively engaged and immersed in the performance’s narrative. Later, this 
was further enhanced when I sought out a one-to-one interaction with Rosie so that I could find 
out more about my role as a business associate, and what this bet entailed. The real and sensual 
object (business card) that I had been given / witnessed had hooked me in. As Riptide’s Palmer 
would say, I had been presented a ‘locked door’ and I had the hunger to find out where it led. 
The initial business card was not the only real and sensual object affecting my immersion here, 
there was also Rosie and the new business card that I would soon be given in an exchange. Each 
detailed fragment was threading me along to the next, deepening my engagement and interaction 
with the world. When I sought out that one-to-one moment with Rosie and received my new card 
and betting tip, I felt a sense of accomplishment. That card was mine. I was not simply an 
audience member who had been offered a possibility. I had entertained the propositional lure and 
been rewarded. I had been rewarded in two-ways. Primarily and less importantly, I discovered 
another layer of the narrative which other participants perhaps missed. This type of ‘reward’ is 
discussed in detail within Biggin (2017) and can be seen in pretty much every immersive theatre 
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companies work regularly i.e. Punchdrunk, Shunt, You Me Bum Bum Train, Riptide, 
dreamthinkspeak etc. But secondly and more relevantly, my reward was that specific fragment. 
Interacting with those objects and being given my own card hooked me into the theatrical world 
further. That object lured me into a “different way of feeling [my] world” (2014:6). The 
exchange of the business card exemplifies how a sub-proposition can be enacted and agreed. 
Similarly, to Riptide’s premium membership cards, this exchanged business card led to real-
world implications which was otherwise not a trait of The Great Gatsby. The next day, once the 
scheduled theatrical event had finished, I called the mobile number on my business card via my 
personal phone. The call went straight to an answering machine where I heard a voice state 
“hello, this is Meyer Wolfsheim. I am not currently taking any bets as I am still mourning Mr. 
Gatsby’s death. The funeral has yet to be arranged.” This type of interactivity is both explicit and 
beyond-the-object, and therefore toys with both mode three and four of Salen and 
Zimmermann’s four-mode taxonomy. Whilst the business card (RO) is ‘the object’ that 
immersed me and part of the wider theatrical event itself, it has a further theatrical function and 
narrative beyond-the-object of the theatrical event itself. I was offered another propositional lure 
via the utterance-type within the recorded message (SO). This lure, like drinking the tea in 
Forget Me Not, is a detailed fragment which personally immerses the receiver in that detail. The 
connection between the business card’s sensual qualities, and the qualities of the utterance-type I 
heard via my phone, fused the theatrical event with my personal real-world possessions. It 
allowed me to imaginatively connect with the performance via my memory. And now, I can 
decide to listen to that voicemail to take my mind back to that place. In this regard, by fusing 
objects with one’s quotidian world, one can see how an immersive experience “lingers as the 
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memory of a dream” (2017:111) and can generate further beyond-the-object empowerment with 
its audiences as can be seen in Gillespie (2014), Nield (2008) and Freshwater (2009).   
Reverting to the scene of the business meeting; roughly a dozen of us were sat on different 
chesterfield sofas. I was sat in between a stranger and my friend that accompanied me to the 
event. Gatsby asked who in the room had experience with finance. My friend then entered a 
direct conversation with the performer by stating that he was good with numbers. Gatsby asked 
him what he did, the participant said that “he’d rather not say”. Gatsby asked him what he’d do 
if he were rich, and he replied that “he would buy his parents a house and go on holiday”. 
Gatsby then challenged all the participants in the room to work out a math question: “how many 
glasses of two-ounce gin can one pour out of an eighteen-ounce bottle?” We had three seconds 
to guess and the fastest would win a prize. My friend answered the fastest and won. According 
to Gatsby he “talked the talk and walked the walk”. He was given a full glass of Gatsby’s 
“strongest gin”. As we were leaving the room, I asked him if it was nice and he said, “it was 
very strong!”  
I mention this interaction because I knew the ‘spect-actor’ in the exchange. I knew that the 
participant was not a performer posing as a spectator. He was a spectator. So, when I saw him 
drink the liquid in the glass that Gatsby gave him – who made the claim that this was his 
“strongest gin” – and asked him if it was nice; his response that “it was very strong” validated 
Gatsby’s claim. My friend provided confirmation to me that this was not simply a case of a 
performer making an indicative claim about a theatrical object and the receiver accepting it in 
the subjunctive mood as if it were true. Rather, once he drank the gin, he accepted the 
proposition in the indicative mood as true. Unlike the usual format of immersive performance 
where boundaries are only blurring (and not actually merging) between the real and the 
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theatrical, and the interactivity of objects creates a realm where those boundaries can merge, – in 
this instance the real and sensual qualities of the performer being Gatsby (RO) interact with the 
qualities of the glass of gin (RO) creating the claim that this glass of gin is not only a glass of 
gin, but it is his “strongest gin” to the participant (RO) – here, the proposition that was enacted 
and agreed by the performer and my friend was proposed indicatively and accepted indicatively. 
For me, and perhaps all other participants, it was proposed indicatively and accepted in the 
subjunctive. My agreement of the proposition shifted from the subjunctive to the indicative once 
I received extra information from the receiver of the interaction who validated the indicative 
claim. In experiences such as this where only one participant’s senses are manipulated, be it via 
drinking a liquid, smelling smoke, tasting food etc., unless we are the one that is experiencing 
the interaction or change, how do we as spectators know what is being actuated? To an outsider 
we can accept the claim that the object is the thing it stands for, but only in the subjunctive 
mood. This is no different from when one sits passively watching a performance as you can only 
read if the sign was affective, and not what the quality of the sign was.  
 
Tea Scene 
The famous tea scene in which Gatsby’s long-awaited dream of meeting Daisy face-to-face for 
the first time in years, now as a successful and wealthy man is adapted within The Immersive 
Ensemble’s The Great Gatsby too. In the original novel, Gatsby asks Jordan Baker to ask Nick 
to invite Daisy over to his house for tea and he dresses up Nick’s home with extravagant and 
beautiful flowers: ‘"He wants to know," continued Jordan, "if you'll invite Daisy to your house 
some afternoon and then let him come over."’ (Fitzgerald, 1925, p.61). In The Great Gatsby 
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(2019), The Immersive Ensemble demonstrated how Gatsby prepared Nick’s home for Daisy’s 
visit by building, creating and setting the scene before the audience’s eyes. Inanimate objects 
were of course used to set the scene such as chairs, tables, teacups, teapot, flowers etc., but the 
main topic of this scene will be how the performers invited audience-participants to assist in this 
pre-scripted scene. Following the thread from Gatsby’s business meeting, this discussion focuses 
on humans as performing objects and how inanimate objects such as an item of costume or prop 
can turn a spectator into a ‘spect-actor’ and actuating them as the thing they are standing for.  
To construct this tea scene, Gatsby chose three audience-participants – whom were clearly not 
affiliated with another outside this production – and named them ‘the Johnson’ family.52 ‘The 
Johnsons’ were invited into the centre of the performance space within the main room whilst all 
other audience members not involved in the scene stood or sat around them observing. George 
Wilson then placed an apron over the head of each of the three participants formulating the 
proposition that ‘the Johnson’ family worked for Gatsby and signifying that the participants had 
been allocated additional roles to rest of the audience. They were now characters as well as 
playing the role of Gatsby’s guests and participants. There are many examples in theatre history 
as well as popular culture, literature, films and so forth, where objects, props, costume etc., have 
called “attention to themselves as actors” by shifting the dynamics of a character or allowing a 
performer to become a new character.53 What was interesting about this apron, was that it paved 
the way for audience-participants to be viewed as part of the performance. Gillespie states that: 
While it may seem odd to imagine that “inanimate” objects might feel or (re)act in the 
affective capacities outside our human investment or symbolic attachment, it is precisely 
through the sensuous qualities of the object – such as its ability to make physical and 
                                                          
52 I knew that at least one of the three participants were not familiar with the other two participants because I knew 
them personally. The other two participants may have been friendly with one another prior to the theatrical event, 
but they did not appear to attend the event together or know one another.  
53 For example, The 39 Steps, Superman, Twelfth Night to name but a few of an almost endless list. 
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emotional contact, its causal interactions, and its participation in relational networks – 
that objects become oddly present, often uncannily calling attention to themselves as 
actors.  
Gillespie, 2014, p.152. 
By placing the aprons over each participant, the sensuous qualities of the apron created a 
relational network which linked together the participant, their role as a ‘Johnson’ within the 
scene, the narrative, the performance, the event, the production and so on. This supplemented the 
idea that they – the participants – were the thing they stood for. Gatsby had already claimed that 
the participants were ‘the Johnsons’ prior to the aprons, and perhaps some audience members 
had already accepted that claim as if it were true which may have actuated the proposition. Yet 
the labour of the apron here enhances the claim and allows the spectators to separate themselves 
from the spect-actors. That distinction between performer / audience or in this case involved / 
not involved, although it appears to contradict the principle of immersive theatre by not having 
the whole performance fully interactive for all its participants and aligning more with traditional 
and passive audience arrangements, in this instance it helped to actuate the spect-actors as being 
the thing they stood for. One of the participants moved chairs and tables, the other brought 
crockery, and another swept, but they all became ‘the Johnsons’.   
 
Myrtle’s death scene 
In the original novel, Myrtle was run over by Daisy who was driving Gatsby’s car. In The Great 
Gatsby (2019), they kept this same plotline. Unlike on a proscenium arch stage where anything 
can be used to represent any and/or everything, the production had established an implicit sense 
of realism regarding its objects. The objects used were always used to represent themselves, i.e., 
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they always served their principal function. For this scene, they had to make the sensual object 
that I and the audience perceived not only represent but become a car in order to align with the 
goal of immersive theatre – the illusion of the reduction of the gaps between the quotidian and 
the theatrical – and support the indicative claim that ‘this car killed Myrtle’.  
Everyone was aware that this was a theatre performance, and that the performer playing the role 
of Myrtle was acting / pretending to be killed. But that was not the challenge here. The challenge 
was being able to convincingly make the claim that ‘this theatrical object killed that theatrical 
object’ and for that claim to be supported and actuated by the interactivity of the qualities of the 
involved objects.  
In the scene, Nick Carraway, Tom Buchanan, Gatsby and Daisy were playing cards around a 
table in the main room. All the audience-participants were stood or sat spectating the scene. This 
was a pre-scripted scene where it was implicitly suggested that we as an audience were not 
supposed to attempt to interact with the performers. At that moment we were passive audience 
members – the kind which immersive theatre “work claims to dismantle” (2017:94). Whilst the 
audience surrounded and observed the table scene, George Wilson and Myrtle were arguing 
loudly in the drugstore space next door. The shutter and the large wooden doors – which Jordan 
Baker swung open for us to originally enter the main room from the drugstore – were closed, and 
one could hear banging coming from the space where the pair were arguing. Nick Carraway 
began narrating how Gatsby and Daisy were driving in the night towards “the valley of ashes”, 
towards “death”. The other three characters around the table froze, and the performers presented 
a neutral being. A being that was neither the character they had been portraying, nor themselves, 
but purely objects of the performance. As Nick was telling the story of how Gatsby’s car 
approached the valley of ashes and Myrtle ran into the road, pre-recorded sound effects of a 
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car’s horn being held down whilst screeching noises similar to the sound of a car braking and 
skidding at a high speed played through the multiple surround-sound speakers which were 
scattered in the corners of the room and along various exposed beams in the warehouse. Myrtle 
screamed loudly and despairingly. A loud crash played through the speakers in time with the 
opening of the large wooden doors and there were two bright lights shining in our faces which 
began to repetitively flash in a strobe like manner. Smoke filled the space around the lights to 
represent fog and caused my visibility of the object(s) creating the beams of light to be 
compromised. The beams of light were side-by-side and spaced a cars width apart. As the doors 
to the room had swung open, the beams of lights jolted swiftly forwards and stopped just before 
the entrance to the main room which to me represented that a car’s headlights were flashing on a 
full beam.  
The brake noise, the screeching, the banging, the scream, the lights, the smoke and so on, all 
supplemented the idea that a car crash had just occurred and that the overall sensual object I 
could perceive through those doors was ‘a car’, more specifically ‘Gatsby’s car’. Due to the 
bright lights and the volume of smoke, I was prevented from witnessing the qualities of whatever 
the object(s) before me were. This along with sound effects, banging, screaming etc., 
manipulated my senses and so my imaginative engagement with the story helped create an 
overall picture in my mind which was ‘that is a car’. I can even recall thinking ‘how have they 
managed to get a car inside the warehouse and drugstore whilst the show was going on with no 
one noticing?’, and ‘how did it fit inside the building?’, ‘maybe behind the red curtain are 
loading bay or garage doors’. I oscillated those real-world modes of attention for a moment then 
through the thoughts away to remain attentive to the narrative that was unfolding before me. So 
as that display occurred, I was adamant that the real object was indeed a car, and that a car was 
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being used to represent itself as a car. I indicatively agreed to the sub-proposition that the sensual 
object I perceived before me was a car and agreed to the proposition that ‘that particular car 
killed Myrtle’ in the subjunctive mood as if it were true. 
Unfortunately, it was at this moment that the fire alarm sounded within the warehouse and 
everyone had to be evacuated mid-performance. The house lights were raised, the red curtain 
within the drugstore was drawn, and the audience-participants and I had to walk past the objects 
that had created the visual effect of Gatsby’s car, and continue out the fire exit – which did turn 
out to be a large ground floor side door for loading and unloading items. I could now clearly see 
that the real objects that had constructed the sensual object I had witnessed were two stage lights 
surrounded and raised by wooden beams on wheels to create the illusion of a moving car. 
Discovering this changed the conditions of the proposition I agreed to. I no longer believed that 
the sensual object I had perceived was a car, instead I accepted the sensual object I had 
perceived was a car as if it were true. This did not affect my immersion in the storyworld and 
narrative of the theatrical world, only the conditions of how that sub-proposition was enacted 
and agreed. My immersion in the theatrical world was however affected by the fire alarm 
sounding and having to evacuate the inside of that world for around ten minutes or so.  
Whilst my immersion in the theatrical world was not affected at the time, my beyond-the-object 
memory of my personal immersive experience has changed. I can recall my initial experience of 
the network of sub-propositions which created my overall perception of the sensual object, 
assenting to the proposition that it was a car, and accepting the proposition it was a car. But now, 
I can also think that there were a multitude of theatrical objects working together whose qualities 
were interacting with one another to plant an image in my mind. An image which I could not 
definitively state what the real objects and real qualities of those objects were, since I was not 
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indicatively certain of what the object(s) before me were. I still assented to and accepted the 
proposition that the object was a car as if it were true, but the memory of my vivacity of my 
belief and immersion within that specific detailed fragment of the production has been 
downgraded from an actual occurrence to a believable occurrence. What remains to be the case 
though, is that the actuation of an agreed proposition within a theatrical event, cannot change 
retroactively. The conditions of the propositions enactment and agreement can shift as just 
shown, but the actuality of the proposition remains intact. The rolling, car-width stage lights on 
wooden beams (RO) was the thing it stood for in that moment. The sensual object I perceived 
was a car.  
 
Conclusion 
In discussing how theatrical objects within The Great Gatsby (2019) offered possibilities to be 
considered it has shown how the conditions of a proposition can change. It is possible that the 
illusion of the reduction of the gaps between the quotidian and the theatrical can cause one to 
accept a sub-proposition indicatively. This does not necessarily mean that the audience member 
forgets or believes that the whole theatrical experience has become or is reality, but that the 
detailed fragment they are immersed in is fact.  
By analysing the actuality of the proposition(s) relating to the objects within these locations and 
scenes, it has shown the possibilities that become available to the experiencer in specific 
moments such as choosing to discard real-world thoughts to be (or remain) imaginatively 
engaged in the theatrical world (RWD). Also, the discussion revealed the roles that objects can 
take on, both in the theatrical and quotidian worlds, and the functions that those objects can 
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have, as well as how performing objects can blur the boundaries between worlds and by doing so 
can fulfil the ‘goal’ of immersive theatre work. 
 
2.4 The Murdér Express 
 
On Wednesday 17th April 2019, I experienced The Murdér Express performed by Funicular 
Productions. The Murdér Express is a murder mystery immersive dining experience set in early 
20th Century.54 The production was created by Funicular Productions co-founder, Craig 
Wilkinson, and production director Ed Borgnis, and the show is currently running at the fictional 
Pedley Street station – Arch 63, Pedley Street, London, E1 5BW.  
Set onboard a glamorous train with lavish furnishings, the brand’s [(Funicular 
Productions)] debut show, ‘The Murdér Express’ transports guests back in time to the 
grandeur of the 19th century. Travelling by train for pleasure is in its infancy and with it 
comes a special kind of thrill. Departing from Funicular’s ‘Pedley Street Station’, 
passengers are invited to experience ‘The Murdér Express’ as it makes its first historic 
journey from London to the fictional town of Murdér in France. 
Entering via the Pedley Street Station ‘Seven Sins’ Bar, passengers of ‘The Murdér 
Express’ will wet their whistles whilst luggage is packed onboard. Joined by characters 
such as Frank, an East End Costermonger, Tilley, a music hall star, Vera, a widow in 
search of adventure, and Cliff, a local antique dealer as they embark on the trip of a 
lifetime. Guests will board via the elegant dining car, which features plush booth seating 
and is lit by atmospheric period table lamps. The menu, designed by BBC One’s 
MasterChef 2017 finalist, Louisa Ellis, will be served throughout the experience, as the 
story of the ‘The Murdér Express’ unfolds. 
                                                          
54 Gingerline theatre company describe immersive dining as “a catch all term which simply means experiencing a 
meal within an immersive environment. […] Whatever techniques of immersion used, the essential thing is there is 
no divide between you as a dining guest and the performance space. […] It is important to note that not all 
immersive dining experiences contain a narrative and a plot. However, most immersive environments contain actors 
and characters who bring the dining world to life, telling a story or interacting with guests while they dine. In these 
environments the food itself is not just something nice to eat, it is a prop to reinforce the fantasy world that has been 
created. Some immersive dining experiences out there focus more on the ‘dining’ part, some more on ‘immersive’ 
part. [Gingerline claim to] place equal emphasis on ‘immersive’ and ‘dining’.” (Gingerline, 2018, n.p.). 
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Howard, 2020, n.p. 
Audience-participants act as, and are treated as, passengers aboard The Murdér Express train. 
Participants observe, partake and experience the performance at booths with other participants. It 
is at these booths that the participants are also served a four-course meal and dine with other 
audience participants they may, or may not, know personally. Whilst travelling to Murdér, Frank 
Fletcher, an East End spiv, is found dead by the conductor. All the characters aboard the train 
must attempt to prove their innocence during the journey. Ultimately, each booth within the 
train-carriage must discuss amongst themselves who they think committed the murder. Each 
booth then casts their vote by announcing who they think the murderer is. Whichever character 
has the most votes across all the booths is declared the murderer, and they are thrown off the 
moving train to their death.  
 
What is Funicular Productions? 
Funicular Productions is an immersive collective that is made up of talented event, brand, and 
theatre professionals. The company was formed at the start of 2018 with The Murdér Express 
being their debut show. Funicular Productions’s work is always performed at their site at Pedley 
Street, London. This follows the pattern of most immersive performances and/or theatre that are 
created by theatre companies in that Funicular’s works are performed at a specific site that was 
not originally intended for theatrical performance.55 Like Riptide’s The Lucky Ones, Funicular’s 
works are always created in response to the layout of their set, space and architecture, and so in 
                                                          
55 Companies such as Punchdrunk, WildWorks, Nimble Fish, Back to Back Theatre, to name a very small few, 
perform their theatres at specific sites and/or respond sympathetically to a specific site / landscape / location. For 
example, Punchdrunk’s The Drowned Man at the disused postal sorting office warehouse in Paddington, London. 
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that way their works are site-sympathetic. Whilst they do not define themselves as a site-
sympathetic theatre company, their works are all about place. For Funicular, the place or 
location of a performance – their set – is always a life-sized train carriage. Wilkinson, in an 
interview with Sophie Farrah for Toast.Life explains that the company was formed in 2018 due 
to the opportunity of saving the train-carriage from being binned after its tour of Europe was 
completed: “We couldn’t let it go to recycling! So we gathered all our friends and family and set 
about our business plan. […] We want to transport our guests in to our world for the time they 
are with us and offer them a completely unique experience they would not get anywhere else” 
(Wilkinson, 2018). Their business plan evidently is to use the train-carriage as their device on 
which to create immersive-dining experiences. Whilst The Murdér Express was their debut 
show, they have also performed The Greatest Snowman (2018), The Jewell of the Empire (2019) 
and Journey to the Underworld (2019) all at Pedley Street Station, and all following the same 
format: audience members / passengers board the train-carriage and are wined and dined whilst 
experiencing theatrical entertainment. The Jewell of the Empire is most like The Murdér Express 
as it too is a murder mystery come dining experience, but it is set in 1937. The audience must 
help the characters find the missing diamond and decipher who the killer is. The Greatest 
Snowman and Journey to the Underworld, like The Murdér Express and The Jewell of the 
Empire, are immersive dining-experiences too, but are different in genre to murder mystery. For 
example, Journey to the Underworld is a dark fairy-tale and love story where audience members 
/ passengers board the train-carriage to the underworld. The Greatest Snowman’s narrative 
proposes that audience members board the train-carriage to the Birmingham Christmas markets 
and they must help the character Ed Snow believe in Santa Claus once again. The food served 
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for audience members was different to that of the other shows as it was a seasonal feast for 
Christmas, plus, ‘The Murdér Express’ carriage became ‘The Arctic Express’ carriage.  
As with the analysis of The Great Gatsby (2019), I shall analyse the interactivity of the theatrical 
objects I experienced in The Murdér Express production via the two interwoven intentions of 
location and scene. These intentions shall not be structured in the same format as in ‘The Great 
Gatsby’ chapter: discrete and separate. Instead, these intentions will flow in and out of one 
another via a thorough descriptive walk-through of what / how I experienced the theatrical 
objects and propositional lures before me chronologically. This allows for a different way of 
analysing propositionality which explores how the enactment and agreement of accepted 
propositions can develop and change over time. The case study will still be supported by the 
application of OOO as The Lucky Ones and The Great Gatsby were, but this case study shall also 
analyse the production’s dining experience and food as a theatrical proposition. As the 
performance was an immersive-dining experience, the consumption of food and drink whilst the 
narrative was unfolding was not only encouraged but integral to the experience itself. 
Additionally, we audience members remained seated for the entirety of the show and were 
waited on by waiter/actors. Audience members only moved around the carriage if invited to by 
the characters, or to go to the toilet. That passivity is wholly different from the interaction and 
engagement of audience-participants in Riptide’s The Lucky Ones and The Immersive 
Ensemble’s The Great Gatsby. In these performances, audience-participants are actively moving 
around, dancing, seeking out secret rooms, clues and information etc. Whilst the descriptive 
walk-through discussion is interested in how theatrical objects within The Murdér Express 
transported, immersed and lured me into accepting the actuality of the propositional claim(s), as 
the Gatsby discussion was, this analysis also shows how sub-propositions do not always aid and 
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support one’s acceptance of the main proposition. In ‘The Lucky Ones’ chapter of this thesis, I 
stated that the enactment and agreement of little / sub-propositions are what help facilitate 
immersive sensations and experiences. The analysis and investigation of the sub-propositions I 
experienced pertaining to the food in The Murdér Express do not contradict my previous 
statement, but in fact show that when sub-propositions help facilitate immersive sensations and 
experiences, these do not always have to be related to the main proposition, but instead, the 
immersive sensation and/or experience can be in a small, detailed fragment, scene, object, and so 
on. Before the descriptive walk-through of how I remember experiencing The Murdér Express 
commences, consideration of the event’s venue in affecting my immersion through 
transportation and absorption is to be briefly discussed as it was with The Great Gatsby.  
 
Site-location 
As previously mentioned, the production’s site was performed at a venue which was not 
originally intended for theatrical performance. As I explained earlier, this was also the case with 
The Great Gatsby. There was nothing about the building (RO) itself, or its qualities (both RQ 
and SQ), which suggested that grandeur existed inside it, or, that theatre productions were staged 
and performed at the location. The only tell-tale sign was the ‘The Colab Factory’ sign attached 
to a fence out front.56 Contrarily, the performance site of The Murdér Express did suggest or 
propose something that, when combined with the name of the venue, aligned with the main 
proposition of the performance itself. The main proposition of the performance was that ‘you are 
a passenger aboard The Murdér Express train that is travelling to the fictional town of Murdér in 
                                                          
56 That being said, if one did know what / who The Colab Factory did / are then one may never have presumed that 
theatrical performances took place inside 74 Long Lane.  
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France’. When I booked the tickets to the show and received the address of the venue, the ticket 
read “Venue: Pedley Street Station”. As someone from the north of England that is not local to 
London, I was unaware whether Pedley Street Station was a functional and actual train station in 
East London. When I read that the address of Pedley Street Station was Arch 63, Pedley Street, 
London, E1 5BW, I presumed that the performance site was at an active or disused train station. 
When I arrived to the venue and saw that I was entering a warehouse space that was built into 
the arch of a railway bridge and so would not be experiencing the performance on a train-
carriage that was physically attached to an active railway line, my initial thought was ‘this is not 
as real’ and ‘this is not as believable’. A few interesting things to consider stem out of these 
thoughts. Firstly, the thoughts are incorrect / irrelevant. The production itself is framed as a 
performance, and as we know from Goffman (1974), that means that there is a physical and/or 
conceptual line created which separates the quotidian from fiction. So, no matter where the 
performance is performed, whether it be on a live railway track or not, it is still a performance; it 
is theatrical fiction. Not only this, but my concept of the extent of immersivity – how immersive 
an event is – seemed to be connected with how closely the performance, and the objects within 
it, and the artefact itself, represented reality. Allow me to restate that I deem the goal of 
immersive theatre to be the illusion of the reduction of the gaps between the quotidian and 
theatrical worlds. Therefore, it does not matter how much The Murdér Express aligns with 
reality, but how much it appears to align with it. Performing the show on a moving train may 
have facilitated the illusion of the closure of the gaps between quotidian and theatrical quicker 
and with more vivacity than a stationary train-carriage, but both would still have gaps between 
worlds. And as I shall soon explore, the fact that the performance site was underneath a railway 
line and inside the arch of an actual bridge did not take anything away from how the production 
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used theatrical objects to transport and lure me into a different way of feeling their world. It only 
affected the preconception I had arrived at the event with. Performing a theatrical event on a 
train-carriage, in a railway bridge arch, at a venue that has been named Pedley Street Station, is a 
very coy way of having objects interact and using semantics to propose a specific thing to be 
considered and did facilitate in transporting and luring me into a willingness to immerse.  
 
The Walk-through 
As with The Great Gatsby, and most immersive theatre productions I have experienced, on 
arrival to the venue of The Murdér Express at Pedley Street Station, the audience-participants 
and I had to wait outside the building until the performance began. There was no foyer with a 
box office and a bar or shop for audience members to wait, meet, drink and chat like there 
usually are at proscenium arch theatres such as The Old Vic, The Lyric, Wyndhams, The 
Lawrence Batley Theatre, The Alhambra etc. My friend and I stood on the pavement outside the 
warehouse with other audience-participants chatting and wondering if we somehow had all got 
the location wrong. When the warehouse doors flung open, there was a man sat at a desk and 
audience-participants began to form a line in front of him. When my friend and I got to the front 
of the queue, the man greeted us and asked for our names. We gave them, and in exchange he 
provided us with individual train tickets. My friend and I both had the same number on our 
ticket; number one. The man provided us with some ‘guidelines’ about what we could and could 
not do; this was Funicular’s way of explicitly and implicitly informing participants of the 
‘contract for participation’ (Machon, 2013, pp.99-100). Some of these guidelines were in 
keeping with the time-period of the setting, and some were not. For example, the man informed 
us that flash photography and videos were not allowed, but we could take photographs via our 
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phones even though camera phones were not invented until 1999. We could also purchase drinks 
from the bar using our bank cards and phones too. Once the man had finished informing of us of 
the health and safety measures and specific details in the contract for participation with the 
production, he permitted us beyond the desk and inside the warehouse.  
As my friend and I wandered in slightly we were confronted by a large stone wall which forced 
us to walk around it to the right and head down a sort of corridor. Along the stone wall was a 
cloakroom with an attendant who offered to take our coats. We gave our coats over and she told 
us to continue walking straight towards the ‘7Sins’ bar. At the end of the stone wall / corridor as 
I entered the space, the toilets were the first thing I saw. They were directly in front of us when 
we entered the space. The toilets had saloon western style swing doors which I thought was odd. 
My understanding of the production was that it was set in 1937 in Europe, not in latter half of the 
19th century in Mississippi or West America. Along the same wall and attached to the toilets was 
the 7sins bar which was open for audience-participants to purchase drinks at. As my attention 
shifted from the bar and I began to observe the rest of the performance space before me, the 
space opened into one large warehouse space. When witnessing the entirety of the performance 
space, my eyes could not help but jump straight to the train-carriage itself on the left side of the 
space. It was a dark, life-size, replica of an early 20th century style train-carriage, except, the 
windows were opaque and could not be opened, and there were no wheels on the carriage since 
it was not on a track. There was a metal sign fixed to the carriage that read ‘Murdér Express’ 
which of course signified and proposed that the train-carriage not only represented, but was, the 
Murdér Express train. And one door to the carriage, led up to by a few wooden steps, which we 
audience-participants would eventually enter the carriage through. As I stared at the train-
carriage (SO) examining all its sensual qualities, steam was abruptly emitted from the side of the 
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undercarriage along with the loud, sudden noise that trains make when the pressure of steam is 
released. The interacting qualities of the carriage, sound, steam and haze etc., proposed to me 
that the Murdér Express was a functioning steam train. Steam continued to be sparsely expelled 
from the carriage in the lead up to the audience-participants boarding the carriage.  
The wall at the back of the performance space that the carriage led up to was made of red brick. 
There was a about a three-metre gap between the carriage and the ‘7Sins’ platform bar which 
was on the right side of the space. That three-metre gap between carriage and bar, in which you 
could see the red brick which separated and joint the spaces, signified the platform at Pedley 
Street Station. I interpreted the space as representing a train platform because of the interaction 
of the qualities of the objects before me and the signs they signified. As well as the name of the 
platform bar, there was also a large number seven attached to red brick wall in between the bar 
and the carriage which signified the specific platform we were all at, was platform seven. There 
was also a large analogue clock which had a sign integrated into it which read ‘Pedley Street 
Station’, and an early 20th century lamppost.  
Whilst my friend and I, and several audience-participants that were already inside the space 
assessed our new environment and waited for the remainder of audience-participants to be 
admitted entry and be given their train tickets, individuals began to chat with one another and 
purchase drinks from the bar. The platform space served as a sort of liminal zone between 
worlds. This was Funicular’s way of lowering barriers to immersion and gradually removing 
participants from the real world. Funicular created a foyer like atmosphere like one typically 
expects to find at traditional theatre venues, except, the performance had (sort of) already begun. 
The audience was already on, and in, the set, interacting and coming into contact with theatrical 
objects and one another. Characters would walk around the platform and strike up a conversation 
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with individual audience members whilst waiting for the conductor to declare that the train was 
to depart. For example, the character of Frank Fletcher, subtly walked over to my friend and I 
and asked us if we “wanted to buy some coupons”? “What are the coupons for?”, I responded. 
“Beer or wine, or something.” We both declined as the character’s demeanour, attire and 
aloofness proposed to us that he was not to be trusted. In that moment, I entertained the 
propositional lure and possibility and chose the action of not purchasing the coupons. This does 
not mean that I was unwilling to (be) immerse(d), but rather that that particular fragment hooked 
me into the character’s narrative and further into the theatrical world causing me to accept the 
proposition that ‘Fletcher was not trustworthy’ as if it were true.  
After striking out with my friend and I, Fletcher wandered over to another cluster of audience-
participants and asked them the same question. A couple of the participants paid him two pounds 
for a coupon, and he said, “much obliged” and wandered off to talk with other participants that 
were entering the space. The character playing the role of the train conductor approached the 
same participants that had purchased the coupons and said “you should be more careful” when 
dealing with Frank Fletcher. As I observed the participants’ interactions, I contemplated a 
number of sub-propositions such as ‘can those coupons (actually) be used for drinks?’, ‘have 
those individuals (actually) been duped?’, ‘will they be given their money back?’, ‘will the 
bartender play out a scripted conversation with the participant where they give them a ‘free 
drink’ for their troubles?’, and so on. Both my friend and I, and the participants that exchanged 
the coupons for money, entertained the propositional lure of Fletcher’s coupons, but in differing 
ways. However, this does not necessarily mean that our willingness to immerse, or our state of 
immersion, was different in degree. I do not know what thoughts were going through the other 
participants’ minds once the conductor had insinuated that they had been duped by Fletcher, but 
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I imagine they were weighing up whether to confront him, or test the coupons out at the bar, or 
complain to another participant or character etc. Ultimately, the two participants did go and raise 
their concern / complain to the waiter/actors at the bar. I overheard and witnessed the 
waiter/actors give the participants two pounds off the price of a drink of their choice to 
counteract the purchase of the coupons so that they were not out of pocket. In complaining to the 
bar staff, perhaps, however improbable it may be, the participants took the coupon exchange 
with Fletcher personally i.e., were offended or negatively affected by the exchange on a personal 
level as the participant in The Lucky Ones: Lucy was that refused to break in to the flat and 
threatened to call the police. A state of delusion may have taken hold where an unawareness of 
fictionality left the individual feeling disgruntled and frustrated that they had been conned. 
Alternatively, it could have had a negative effect on their willingness to immerse in the theatrical 
world. Maybe they became more aware of the fictionality and theatricality of the character’s 
interaction by considering asking the actor for their money back once the narrative was over. 
Either way, or any other possible action they considered and/or emotion were left feeling, one 
can see how entertaining / not entertaining a propositional lure, and the different ways of 
entertaining a propositional lure can leave one feeling wholly different. The sub-proposition that 
I and the other participants initially considered when engaged in overt participation with Fletcher 
was whether to respond, and how to respond / act. I chose to act by not purchasing the coupons 
and the other participant chose to act by purchasing them. Those decisions could then have had a 
direct impact on our immersion in the theatrical world.57 I could have had a less intense state of 
immersion than the other participant by not coming into contact with a fragment of the theatrical 
                                                          
57 I use ‘could’ here, since I do not know if / how that particular audience-participant’s state of immersion was 
altered. For me though, my decision did have a direct impact on my state of immersion in the theatrical world. In 




world that they accepted access to. By denying myself tangible access to the object itself, I was 
unable to become absorbed in that particular fragment.58 Contrariwise, the other participant 
could have had a less intense state of immersion than I did at that moment because tangible 
access to the coupon (RO) forced the participant to remember the artificiality of the theatrical 
world and therefore not be absorbed and/or transported into its realm. From the same example 
one can also see that when a participant is observing an interaction rather than participating in 
an interaction, the sub-propositions one considers become more passive. When I observed the 
participant purchase the coupons, the sub-propositions I then considered were all related to a 
sense of wonder around how the narrative before me will unfold. Whereas the participants that 
were actively engaging in explicit interactions with the characters and theatrical world 
presumably were considering what specific action to take.  
 
Inside the Train-Carriage 
When all the audience-participants had finished purchasing refreshments, the conductor rang a 
bell and blew her whistle which signified that the train to the fictional town of Murdér was 
almost ready to depart. The audience-participants and I began to enter the train-carriage little by 
little. My friend and I climbed the few wooden steps up to the train-carriage door and the 
conductor asked for our tickets. We handed over the individual rail tickets with the number one 
on that we were given by the man at the desk when we entered the venue, and the conductor 
informed us that we were sat at ‘booth one’ and pointed towards the table on our immediate left. 
                                                          
58 Here, I do not mean that I denied myself access to the real-object itself as OOO claims this unattainable, but 
rather that I denied myself access to coming into contact with the object. Per OOO, objects come into contact with 
one another through vicarious causation – the images that the objects present to one another.  
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The interior of the train-carriage was very glamorous. There were two rows of four plush booths 
with an aisle through the middle displaying an elegant and chic blue patterned carpet. There 
were six audience-participants per booth. The booths appeared ostentatiously lavish and opulent 
with blue chesterfield style leather seats to match the carpet and dark wooden tables dressed in 
thick white tablecloths. The tables were lit by small period lamps, but LED lights ran along the 
ceiling of the aisle which illuminated the performance space. The windows of the train-carriage 
were LCD TVs which upon entry displayed images of the platform we all had just come from. I 
remember thinking that that explained why the windows were opaque. Sophie Farrah describes 
the televisions in her interview with Wilkinson:  
To ensure that the experience is truly immersive, the Funicular set is equipped with eight 
large format LCD displays in the interior 'windows' of the carriage, which display 
original 4k footage shot on a heritage steam railway in the Welsh Highlands, so guests 
can well and truly sit back, relax and enjoy the beautiful scenery along the way.  
The train carriage sound system also consists of an impressive eight discrete audio 
channels which when combined with the video, gives the train a very convincing sense 
of movement. 
Farrah, 2018, n.p. 
The inclusion of these objects and their qualities along with the steam proposed the idea that The 
Murdér Express was a functioning steam train. Equipping the set with these objects did not 
create a ‘truly immersive’ experience as Farrah suggests since the train was not actually moving. 
It did provide ‘a very convincing sense of movement’ for me, but I was always aware the 
carriage was stationary, and if I needed to use the toilet during the performance, I would have to 
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step off the ‘moving’ train to use the platform toilets. Furthermore, as Farrah states, the footage 
that was displayed on the screens during the performance was of the Welsh Highlands. And 
even if one ignores / puts to one side / suspends belief / that the Welsh Highlands are different in 
appearance to France – Murdér is a fictional town, and its appearance could be identical to the 
Welsh Highlands if that is what the narrative claims – one cannot ignore that the starting 
location of the train was from Pedley Street Station in East London. When the footage began, I 
expected to see buildings from the surrounding areas of East London, but we immediately found 
ourselves looking out on to a rural and barren landscape, and the footage on the screens only 
ever displayed rural landscapes. Funicular failed to close all the gaps between the quotidian and 
theatrical worlds for me here, but I was still able to accept the proposition that the train-carriage 
was moving as if it were true through the interacting qualities of the images on the LCD screen, 
the audio sounds, the steam and haze, and so on. In using propositionality here it allows for a 
discussion of how the proposition is enacted and agreed. The proposition that ‘the train-carriage 
is moving’ is enacted by the claim that the theatrical object – the train-carriage set – is the thing 
it stands for, and I as an audience-participant accept that proposition due to the interacting 
qualities of the objects within the train-carriage set; the LCD screens as windows being one of 
them.  
Another barrier to my immersion that I had to put aside was the durational element of the 
performance. As per Machon’s scale of immersivity, one knows that “time is treated as an 
organic and important experiential element of the event” in immersive theatre and performance 
(Machon, 2013, p.96). The narrative claimed that the journey from Pedley Street Station, 
London, to Murdér, France took one hour by steam train. In reality, I am aware that the Eurostar 
from London to Paris takes over two hours, so how can I believe and accept that I can travel 
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from London to a fictional town in France within an hour? Nik Wakefield in his PhD thesis 
Performing Temporalities (2016) discusses three core principles that underpin time-specific 
performance making.59 Wakefield states that “the platform of time-specific performance making 
establishes an approach to work that is enmeshed with temporality and entails a sense of how 
performance makes time and is not only made by it” (Wakefield, 2016, p.347). The narrative of 
The Murdér Express makes its own durational time that is discrete from quotidian clock time. 
The theatrical event does indeed last two hours, but Funicular’s framing of the performance 
allows for a world that creates its own durational quality that has rules for time that is separate 
from the quotidian rule for time i.e., the performance creates a world where travelling from 
Pedley Street Station to Murdér takes one hour in quotidian clock time, and we as audience-
participants accept that proposition due to the parameters and otherworldliness of the event.   
As the train ‘departed’ the murder-mystery plot began. The character Frank Fletcher was found 
dead in a different car by the conductor. Neither the audience-participants or I saw Frank’s body 
nor how he died, but we all accepted the proposition that ‘Frank is dead’ via the enactment of the 
conductor’s propositional utterance. As the investigation began into his death and the narrative 
developed, the first course was brought to each audience-participant at their booth. The theatrical 
narrative and individual scenes were performed intermittently with gaps for audience-
participants to eat, chat, drink, and waiters to bring / collect dishes. The first two courses – an 
amuse bouche and a starter – were both vegan and so most dietary requirements were covered.60 
There was also no multiple choice with these courses. For the main course and the dessert, on 
                                                          
59 The three core principles are: “1. Using clock time as a container for performance encourages the emergence of 
duration […] 2. Memories and documents perform the past in the present […] 3. Use the temporality that is always 
future and always changing as a focus for performance” (Wakefield, 2016, pp.345-346).  
60 Funicular Productions asked audience-participants to inform them of any specific dietary requirements e.g., 
coeliac disease, via email prior to the performance so they could cater for that.  
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the other hand, we could choose between a meat or vegan dish for the main, and a dairy or vegan 
dish for the dessert. There was a menu and checklist on each table, and we participants had to 
tick how many of our booth’s six wanted which dish. A simple and convenient fragment for 
taking one’s order without the waiter/actors going around to each participant asking for orders 
whilst the performance was running. Funicular Productions could have asked for our orders 
when we purchased our ticket, offering a proposition to be considered at the time of booking 
before the theatrical event itself took place. Instead, they opted for the checklist to be completed 
during the event and so it became a theatrical object and propositional lure to be entertained. 
Whilst this may sound like an untheatrical act – since meal orders are placed in a variety of 
methods every day in restaurants, fast-food chains, via phone, online, via an app, on an 
aeroplane etc. – the dining experience of The Murdér Express was a theatrical act and 
immersive-style performance. The menu and checklist were offerings to be considered and 
lowered a barrier to my immersion. For table one (the booth that my friend and I were situated 
on), the checklist facilitated audience-participant interaction with one another. Our table 
discussed which food choices we were going for and which meal sounded nicer, and in turn this 
led to general social discussions about what to expect from the performance, what other 
performances we’d seen, whether we were local, what theatre performances we would 
recommend, and so on. Although I was conversing with these four audience-participants about 
quotidian things that were exterior to the theatrical event itself, rather than always / only 
discussing the plot and aspects of the performance, these conversations gradually led me to 
feeling more relaxed and immersed in the overall experience. I was interacting with participants 
as ‘myself’ i.e. I was not playing the role of a character, or the “character named spectator” 
(Nield, 2008). I was coming into contact with theatrical objects on my table that were part of the 
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performance, I touched the menu, the tablecloths, the cutlery, the lamps; I smelt and tasted the 
food and drink; I heard the audio sounds of a rumbling train and the conversational utterances of 
the participants; I witnessed the interacting qualities of a host of objects. I, the real-object I / the 
executant I of I and the sensual object that is I were interacting with quotidian objects that when 
framed within a performance facilitated my immersion in the performance’s theatrical world 
through detailed fragments.  
Characters from the plot would come and sit at individual booths and strike up conversational 
utterances with audience-participants too. These were not entirely scripted scenes that were 
universally spectated by all participants – although they were rather contrived – but rather 
intimate one-on-ones, or one-on-five’s depending how many participants were at one’s booth. 
For example, whilst the participants and I that were sat at ‘booth one’ were eating our starters, 
Tilley Tulip “a music hall star” (2020) sat down and conversed with us. Prior to Frank’s death, 
Tilley and Frank had an argument where we, the audience-participants, were all informed that 
the two characters used to date. When Tilley sat down at our booth and began conversing with 
us, she informed us that she was scared that we would think she was the murderer. Tilley stated 
that Frank was horrible to her during their relationship, and she despised him for it, but she was 
“not a killer”. In this moment, and other moments like it that were occurring with different 
characters at different booths, the interactions were part of the ‘immersive’ and theatrical part of 
the performance. These moments fused the dining aspect of the performance with the theatrical 
narrative and allowed them to run alongside one another. Yet, these moments, particularly the 
Tilley interaction that I was overtly involved in, were also quite contrived. It was clear that these 
moments were scripted, artificial, and a little forced, rather than allowing them to develop 
naturally. The performers wanted to propose specific things to be considered to / by participants 
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to affect their vote at the end of the narrative. This was similar to how interactions and intimate 
scenes were constructed in The Great Gatsby i.e., Gatsby’s business meeting and the discussion 
about the gin. Incorporating real objects into the artificial and theatrical interactions such as the 
gin in The Great Gatsby, and the food in The Murdér Express, and allowing participants tangible 
access to the sensual theatrical object(s) within these moments facilitates immersion in scenes 
that consist of a greater aesthetic distance; where audience-participants are aware of their 
fictionality.     
Whilst courses were consumed, audience-participants were mostly left to their own devices, but 
as the plates were taken away, one knew a scene would emerge gradually or suddenly from out 
of the blue. This usually happened whilst a character, most commonly Vera, “a widow in search 
of adventure” (Howard, 2020) aboard the Murdér Express, was stood in the aisle conversing 
with participants. Then another character would enter the carriage from the door at the back of 
the aisle – which proposed the idea that they came from another car – and began speaking with 
Vera, or whichever character it happened to be, loudly enough for all audience-participants to 
hear. This signified the commencement of a new scene to be witnessed by all so that one could 
follow the plot. We were guided back into the narrative by these segues and signs. Whilst we 
were continuously inside the theatrical world and event, the gaps in clock time between scenes 
meant that what one was immersed in may have shifted. For me, I was more immersed in the 
food and the conversation than the storyline of the performance itself, but I would flit from one 
to the other following the format of the production. As I discussed at the start of this thesis, 
during my initial research into immersive style performances in 2016, I created a hypothetical 
template for audience-participants that became immersed in the Forget Me Not (2016) 
performances. Whilst this template cannot be applied to other immersive-style performances 
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without being tested, the ideas can be transferred over to help analyse my experience in The 
Murdér Express. When I was flitting from observing a scene, to participating in a discussion, to 
eating, and so forth, I had to begin perceiving and assessing the particular qualities of the objects 
that were relevant to that fragment again. The propositions and the lure for feeling that one feels 
pertaining to a particular proposition, had been framed, then dismissed so that a different 
proposition could be proposed, then reframed again. I remember having to perceive the qualities 
of the proposition all over again to remind myself that ‘that was proposing x’ and later on that 
same thing ‘was proposing y’. This is what I called Layer 1 – Proposition Assessment. This is a 
mediating layer and what I posit that I underwent as I was perceiving and assessing the qualities 
of the objects and the sub-proposition(s) before me. Continuously flitting from narrative to 
dining, and dining to narrative, forced me to reassess the conditions of the sub-propositions 
before me, and ultimately, this affected my immersion in the piece. You are reminded of the 
quotidian world and the gaps between worlds when you converse with participants. These 
moments both aid and hinder one’s immersion in the world as they are simultaneously enhancing 
and decreasing aesthetic distance rendering it “in a constant state of flux” (Naverson, 2001, p.3).  
Refocusing attention to the food and dining experience within the performance allows for the 
exploration of how the theatrical narrative ran alongside the dining experience. This provides 
another aspect of propositions that has yet to be discussed in the two previous case studies. In the 
two previous case studies, audience-participants paid to be entertained, to be immersed, to solve 
a mystery, to play a game etc., but not to dine; not to be fed. In The Murdér Express, audience-
participants were paying for both theatrical entertainment and a dining experience 
simultaneously. If Funicular Productions wants their participants to be immersed in both 
activities at the same time, or one and then the other, then the two activities need to be 
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intertwined and supported by one another so that the participants’ role, and the proposition(s) 
related to that, posits a claim that aligns with the conditions of the theatrical world and can be 
accepted as if it were true. So, how did the theatrical narrative and dining experience run 
alongside each other? How was the proposition that I was / became a combination thrice of 
passenger, diner, and audience-participant enacted and agreed?  
The main proposition The Murdér Express asserts to its participants is that ‘you are a passenger 
on the 20th century Murder Express train when a passenger dies’. This is asserted and claimed 
indicatively as being true. Within the performance, there was a network of sub-propositions 
which when I entertained and accepted them, helped to facilitate immersive sensations and 
experiences for / within myself. As stated in ‘The Lucky Ones’ chapter of this thesis, sub-
propositions are enacted and agreed in various moods and the sub-propositions related to the 
audience-participants collective and individual dining experiences were no different. As I shall 
soon discuss, these sub-propositions were claimed and accepted indicatively e.g., the existence 
of the food in both worlds. Other times, sub-propositions were claimed and accepted in the 
subjunctive-mood e.g., Vera’s dog was claimed and accepted to be a dog as if it were true when 
in actuality it was a puppet. And sometimes, sub-propositions were claimed indicatively and 
accepted in the subjunctive-mood, like the main proposition of an immersive performance 
always is. What was different about the sub-propositions that I experienced in The Murdér 
Express though, was that when I entertained and accepted them, they did not always support my 
acceptance of the main and overarching propositional claim ‘that I was a passenger on the 20th 
century Murder Express train when a passenger died’.  
This may seem improbable since Funicular and the director have purposely made decisions to 
help facilitate immersive experiences which support the main proposition of the performance, 
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but I theorise that this is because The Murdér Express focused more on the ‘dining’ element of 
the experience than on the ‘immersive’ or ‘theatrical’ element of it. The performance was still 
theatre, and was theatrical too, but the performance’s narrative did not discuss the food. It was 
almost as if the characters and the theatrical objects were part of a different realm than the food. 
The audience-participants, food, theatrical objects, characters etc., were all simultaneously both 
apart of multiple worlds – the theatrical and the quotidian – yet the treatment of the food by the 
performers and performance was discrete and separate from their treatment of the narrative. 
There were times when the performance continued whilst I and other audience-participants were 
dining, plus, there were a couple of individuals that were interacted and engaged with by 
characters whilst participating in the activity of dining, as my booth was with Tilley, but these 
were few and far between. The result of this left me more engaged and immersed in the dining 
experience and in discussing quotidian related things with the participants at my booth, rather 
than in the narrative itself. So, whilst I was portraying the role of a passenger on the 20th century 
Murder Express train as a passenger had died, the sub-propositions of ‘this is my dinner’, ‘this 
lamb is lovely’, ‘these people are nice’, ‘I wonder where they are from’, ‘that show they 
recommended sounds interesting’ etc., were not supporting my engagement and acceptance of 
the theatrical narrative and main proposition of the performance, but instead, facilitating my 
engagement and immersion in the dining experience / section of the performance.  
This does not mean that the dining aspect of the performance always removed my attention, 
engagement and interaction with the narrative and immersive aspects of the performance. On the 
contrary, the tangibility of both the food and the theatrical combined hooked me further into 
specific stories. Throughout this thesis I have posited that immersive theatre and performance 
makes a claim in the indicative mode and is accepted by audience-participants in the 
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subjunctive-mood; accepted as if it were true. The food (both RO and SO) in The Murdér 
Express is not an exception to the rule, but an example of how sub-propositions can be enacted 
and agreed in various moods. Here, Funicular Productions’ treatment of the object(s) food, and 
the audience-participants acceptance of the claims pertaining to the food are accepted 
indicatively, not in the subjunctive, i.e., as if it were food. I do not simply mean that because the 
production incorporated real and edible food into its performance that that is why I accepted the 
food as food indicatively. If this were the case, then no matter the performance style, venue and 
arrangement, real food would always be treated and accepted as being or actuating food 
indicatively. Rather, I mean that the placement and function of the real-object ‘food’ in the 
theatrical world, on a dining table, performed its quotidian use in serving as food for 
consumption by the audience participants, by me, in both worlds. This combined with my 
tangible access to the sensual object food within the theatrical world, along with my role as ‘the 
diner’ being true in both worlds, led me to accepting that the food was food in both the 
subjunctive-mood and indicative. It represents and actually is food for consumption, and its 
consumption is to be performed by me. And so, as the food is food, and the dining experience 
that one experiences is an actual dining experience, the interactions with characters and the 
narratives one hears and experiences during these moments appear to be that much more real and 
believable. In having tangible access to a fragment of the performance, in this case the food, I 
was in a way granted access to the inside of the performance. As Gingerline state “in these 
environments the food itself is not just something nice to eat, it’s a prop to reinforce the fantasy 
world that has been created” (2018).  
Paradoxically, the theatrical elements of the interactions with characters and the theatrical world 
appear all the more theatrical and artificial because of the food’s actuality. Whilst I was eating 
185 
 
my main course, the conductor lined up the characters Vera Vanderdale and her dog Fluffy 
Vanderdale, Tilley Tulip, the Murder Express waiter, and Cliff the antique dealer, in darkness 
throughout the aisle as suspects in the murder of Frank Fletcher. The period lamps at each booth 
remained on so that participants could see and eat their food, but the LED lights down the aisle 
were switched off. The conductor then proceeded to individually go through each character in 
the line-up and ask the passengers / audience-participants if they thought it could be them that 
killed Frank. The conductor suggested possible motives that each character may have had which 
proposed a number of sub-propositions to be considered and contemplated by myself and the 
other audience-participants regarding who we thought was the murderer. As the conductor said 
the next character’s name, a spotlight individually shone on each character from above their 
heads. This scene was extremely melodramatic and histrionic. For example, when it shone on 
Vera Vanderdale’s head, Vera began exaggeratingly trembling and presented herself as 
overemotional. Once the spotlight moved on to the next person in the line-up, Vera sharply 
stopped whimpering and trembling. Moments like this which occurred simultaneously alongside 
my interactions with real and tangible objects (my meal) increased the aesthetic distance 
between me and the performance. I became more aware of the fictionality and theatricality of the 
scene that I was observing before me. This was partly because of the theatrical elements and 
devices used to signify the melodramatic i.e., the stage lighting changes, the characterisation, the 
references to other genres of theatre and performance etc., and partly because of my tangibility 
to the actualised quotidian objects inside the theatrical world.  
As the performance was drawing to an end and the desserts were being served and eaten, each 
booth was asked by the conductor to vote on who they thought had committed the murder. Being 
set a direct task by the show’s narrative and theatrical object conductor which we, the audience-
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participants, had to discuss amongst ourselves at our individual booths and relay our verdict 
back to the conductor and theatrical narrative / world was one of the few times where an 
interaction between the dining and theatrical elements of the performance aided and supported 
one another in facilitating engagement and immersion in both worlds. The dining and narrative 
elements of the performance still had clear boundaries and distinctions though. The conductor 
via a propositional utterance offered a lure to be entertained within the confines of the dining 
element of the performance: ‘discuss amongst your booth who you think the murderer and come 
to a verdict’. The discussion at my table was now solely focused on the sub-propositions that 
each participant had assessed and considered, rather than discussing quotidian things outside of 
the narrative. Throughout the performance, we were offered a network of sub-propositions that 
all proposed further things to be considered such as ‘where was Vera at the time of the murder?’, 
‘was the murder Tilley’s revenge on her ex-partner?’, ‘are there any clues or hints that I have not 
picked up on?’ and so on. These sub-propositions all had to be considered so that when we were 
set the task of entertaining the proposition ‘who killed Frank?’, our decision, as a group, was 
made on probable and demonstrative reasoning. We were all immersed and engaged in 
contemplation of what we had witnessed and experienced over the past hour within the confines 
of the theatrical world. The booth at which I was sat came to the group decision that we though 
Vera was the murderer. The conductor went over to each booth individually whilst these 
discussions were ongoing and asked for each of their votes. The conductor wrote down each vote 
and tallied the results. The entertainment of that fragment – the conductor’s utterance – and the 
interaction with her as a theatrical object drew us further into the narrative and “into a different 
way of feeling [our] world” (2014:6). Imparting our verdict and information from the dining 
aspect of the performance to the theatrical narrative in turn affected the outcome of that 
187 
 
narrative. In ‘The Great Gatsby’ chapter of this thesis, I posited that the interactivity of objects 
creates a realm where the boundaries between the real and theatrical merge. Here, the 
interactivity of objects (the conductor and participants) linked the realms of dining and narrative 
which in turn created a realm where the boundaries between the real and theatrical merged. The 
outcome of the votes was announced by the conductor and the overall consensus was that the 
Murdér Express waiter was deemed to be the murderer by the audience-participants. All the 
remaining characters proceeded to grab the waiter, open the door to the train-carriage whilst the 
train was still ‘moving’ – the audio sounds and TV footage were still playing – and throw him 
overboard to his death.  
Subsequently, a ghost appeared in a white sheet with the voice of the performer that played the 
role of Frank Fletcher. The conductor removed the sheet from the individual’s body and revealed 
that Frank Fletcher was alive and well. Frank informed everyone that he had been sleeping the 
whole time and was never actually dead. Here, one can see how the enactment and agreement of 
propositions can develop, shift and change over time. Wakefield states that “experiences of time-
specificity are the actual temporal shifts that emerge through the shared time of living 
performance” (Wakefield, 2016, p.95). The temporal shifts that emerged throughout the 
performance led to myself needing to dissent from my original agreement to the proposition that 
‘Frank is dead’ and assent to and accept the proposition that ‘Frank is alive’. There are many 
sub-propositions throughout the performance, and all theatrical performances, which when 
considered alter one’s perception, understanding, and acceptance of (an) agreed proposition(s). 
This is different to liminality. In the next chapter I shall discuss how Tom Piper’s cube design in 
Romeo & Juliet can signify x in one scene, and y in another due to liminality and accepting a 
new proposal. In this instance though, as actual temporal shifts occur and develop through 
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shared experience the conditions of the agreed proposition that ‘Frank is dead’ changes to ‘Frank 
is alive’ due to the newly proposed arrangement and interactivity of theatrical objects and their 
qualities.   
Both my, and the rest of the audience-participants’, acceptance of the newly proposed 
proposition that ‘Frank is alive’ had further consequences on the theatrical narrative too. The 
largest consequence, which led to the outcome of the theatrical narrative, was that in actively 
participating in the narrative by voting for who we deemed the murderer to be, we, the 
passengers / audience, became the murderers aboard the Murdér Express. We all then had to 
accept the further sub-proposition that ‘we were the murderers’. 
 
Conclusion 
The immersive case studies I have discussed and analysed propositionality through up to this 
point have progressively become more theatrical. The Lucky Ones: Lucy and The Lucky Ones: 
Lailah were both closely aligned to ‘reality’ i.e., the quotidian world. They did not create their 
own theatrical world that was discrete from quotidian activities, but rather created a pervasive 
theatrical game within the geographical radius of Leeds, West Yorkshire, and attempted to create 
an illusion of the reduction of the gaps between the quotidian and theatrical. The immersive 
theatre experience of The Great Gatsby attempted to immerse their participants inside the plot of 
Fitzgerald’s novel by recreating and adapting iconic scenes and placing participants inside those 
scenes so they could, or at least felt they could, play out, change and affect the outcome of those 
scenes and moments in a very real way. For example, the immediacy and authenticity I thought I 
witnessed when the car lights shone in my eyes was so powerful due to the indicative claim that 
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the theatrical object proposed, but the deconstruction of that moment illuminates how extremely 
theatrical and artificial that theatrical object and propositional claim and lure actually was; it 
shows how abundant my willingness to immerse and be immersed was in that moment. Thirdly, 
this discussion of The Murdér Express, which is more closely related to the format and style of 
proscenium and/or ‘traditional’ theatre than the other two case studies because (a), audience-
participants mostly remain sat down observing scenes rather than actively participating within 
them, and (b), the production’s performance style is more exaggerated and melodramatic than 
the performance styles of The Lucky Ones and The Great Gatsby.61 This journey of immersive 
theatre and immersive-styled performance which has edged closer in style towards artificiality 
shows that propositionality works as a means of analysis in understanding what is being actuated 
in both realistic and theatrical performances where interaction and engagement with the 
theatrical world is possible and accessible for audience-participants. It shows how the 
interactivity of the qualities of theatrical objects help facilitate immersion through transportation 
and absorption in said objects and world. Plus, it has shown how the emergence of shifts in 
temporality and the reassessment and acceptance of propositions can change the conditions of a 
previously agreed upon proposition. This occurs through the entertainment of further 
propositional lures that are offered to audience-participants throughout the duration of the 
performance and within their direct experience. Propositionality also caters for the discussion of 
an audience-participants willingness to (be) immerse(d) in the theatrical world. But what 
happens in theatrical environments that do not cater for audience participation? Does 
                                                          
61 Whilst The Murdér Express is more closely aligned with proscenium theatre than The Lucky Ones productions 
and The Great Gatsby, it certainly is not ‘traditional’ in its theatrical arrangement nor is it performed on a 
proscenium stage. Also, The Lucky Ones and The Great Gatsby do not conform to the theatrical forms of naturalism 
and realism. I am merely suggesting that they attempt to create the illusion of aligning with reality much more so 
than The Murdér Express which is happy for the distinction between the genuine and artificial to be acknowledged, 
seen and understood for the audience-participants’ entertainment.  
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propositionality still work as a means of an analysis, or does it reach its limits? The next chapter 
addresses this very concern and explores any differences by drawing on the theatrical 
performances of Romeo & Juliet (2019) and Dorian (2019). The theatrical objects, and the 
qualities of those objects, that are discussed and analysed within these performances are still to 
be viewed via the ontological placement of OOO.  
 
2.5 Romeo & Juliet and Dorian 
 
Introduction 
There has been a common format throughout this thesis so far. I have offered a brief walk-
through and/or synopsis of immersive and pervasive styled performances and analysed how the 
theatrical objects within these performances have proposed a possibility; a lure for feeling. 
Throughout the analysis of The Great Gatsby (2019), I discussed two interwoven concepts that 
were manipulated to facilitate immersion as absorption and transportation for the participants of 
the experience. I will follow a similar format going forwards. In the RSC’s Romeo & Juliet 
(2019) and Proper Job’s Dorian (2019), I shall explore the two interwoven intentions of location 
and scene, except, the categories of immersion as absorption and transportation shall not be 
discussed since these groups, as Machon (2013) defines them, do not apply to traditional 
theatrical forms. One can still become immersed in the drama and narrative during proscenium 
arch theatre, cognitively and emotionally, but this does not mean the requirements for immersion 
as absorption are met since the audience member is not a participant, only a spectator. There is 




Specific theatrical objects and props shall also be discussed alongside and within the location 
and scene discussions during the analysis of each production. This again repeats the same 
structure and thread running through the previous aspects of the thesis. However, this 
conversation will not necessarily endorse propositionality’s pertinency to semiotics, but rather 
display where propositionality reaches its limits. This does not mean that propositionality 
entirely breaks down in different environments and audience arrangements, but it will 
demonstrate how, in proscenium arch theatre, audiences are still lured into a different way of 
feeling the theatrical world, yet they do not have the possibility of touching / encountering the 
world as one does in immersive theatre. A transaction still occurs between production and 
spectator in these performances, but perhaps one that is not as deep. One that does not have as 
many, or perhaps any, sub-propositions. When sub-propositions do exist for audience members 
within a performance, I will show that / how they operate differently than those discovered in 
interactive theatrical events such as immersive and pervasive performances.   
It may be presumed, since I was simply a witness / observer / spectator to Romeo & Juliet (2019) 
and Dorian (2019), that the most appropriate method for analysis here would be semiotic 
analysis. Obviously, a semiotic analysis of a show does not offer a new contribution to 
knowledge since applying this method of analysis to theatre experienced its initial breadth of 
study in the nineteen-thirties and forties with the work of the Czech formalists and has continued 
ever since.62 I am therefore using these shows as tools for displaying how propositionality goes 
beyond semiotics in immersive theatre but does not in proscenium – this is where my 
contribution lies.  
                                                          
62 What started the Prague School of thought and its period of intense investigation in structuralism was “Zich’s 
Aesthetics of the Art of Drama and Jan Mukařovský’s ‘An Attempted Structural Analysis of the Phenomenon of the 
Actor’” (Elam, 1980, p.5) which were both released in 1931. 
192 
 
Another feature which differs from the story and structure of the thesis so far is that in this 
chapter, Romeo & Juliet (2019) and Dorian (2019) shall be analysed together. This is because 
sub-propositions operate differently in proscenium, and so the depth of analysis and the volume 
of questions that can be discussed are smaller than in the chapters on Riptide and The Great 
Gatsby. Also, further proposals that derive from the analyses of these performances are similar 
or cross-over with one another i.e., location and scene.  
Before commencing the analysis of propositionality within a traditional audience arrangement, it 
is vital to remind oneself that when propositions are discussed in these forms e.g., proscenium 
theatre, they are to be viewed in the same way as with participatory forms of theatre: as the 
sharable objects of cognitive acts and attitudes operating as lures. However, this discussion will 
show how the enactment of a proposition differs from that within immersive theatre. The claim 
that is made as a result of a proposition in proscenium theatre is not indicative as it is in 
immersive theatre. Instead, a claim is made in the subjunctive mood and accepted in this mode 
too.  
When referring to a production I attended such as Romeo & Juliet (2019) and Dorian (2019), I 
shall use the word ‘witnessed’ as opposed to ‘experienced’ to help describe my role. I witnessed 
the performance in the traditional or conventional sense of attending the theatre: sitting and 
observing in the auditorium whilst the action occurred on stage. The rest of the audience and I 
were spectators, observing the performance through a one-way mirror. Both the Alhambra 
theatre’s main stage and the Lawrence Batley Theatre’s (LBT) main stage are proscenium arch 
stages, and so the audience and I looked through those arches.63 We were provided an 
                                                          
63 I witnessed Romeo & Juliet (2019) at the Alhambra, and Dorian (2019) at the LBT. 
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architectural frame of reference through which to peer and witness the action. We of course did 
experience the action too, but due to the various forms of theatre that attempt to blur the 
boundaries between performer / spectator and stage / auditorium in postmodern and 
contemporary theatre practice, I reserve the word experience for events in which the audience’s 
role is not only to watch, but to participate.  
This distinction may seem a mundane one, but if one meticulously analyses theatrical discourse, 
this distinction identifies whether it may be more appropriate to analyse theatre from a semiotic 
perspective or a propositional one. As this discussion will reveal, there comes a point where 
propositionality meets its limit in traditional audience arrangements. It still works in these 
arrangements, but it does not go as far or deep as it does in participatory practices. It is the role 
of the audience member that is paramount for propositionality. As previously stated, 
propositionality differs from semiotics through its sensory dimension. Contemporary practices, 
such as immersive theatre, can affect an audience-participants experiences via all five human 
senses (Di Benedetto, 2011) whereas the traditional theatre – as I’m defining it – only tends to 
make use of two to three: sight, hearing and occasionally smell.64 The sensation of touch allows 
audiences to interact with objects / art / theatre on a heightened level of intimacy; it can be 
perceived as being more personal. Immersive and pervasive experiences have often been 
described as bespoke due to this reason as Riptide’s The Lucky Ones was. Yet, these levels of 
intimacy cannot be measured through semiotics alone. Semiotics becomes obsolete in these 
moments as it cannot identify the difference in quality between an object that represents 
something in proscenium theatre and an object that represents something in immersive theatre. 
                                                          
64 This does not mean that traditional theatre is not capable of manipulating the human senses of touch and taste, 
only that it happens less frequently. The theatre genres of music hall and pantomime have regularly provoked these 




For example, with the Forget Me Not cups discussed earlier: semiotics could not tell if they were 
cardboard cups or porcelain cups since they were both signs of a cup, i.e., an object is always a 
sign of an object on stage. Propositionality on the other hand claims that an object is the thing it 
stands for; it does not merely represent it. This propositional claim allows possibilities for 
suggesting why an object created such an effect in the receiver. It cannot necessarily answer that 
question, but it can ask further questions which offer further proposals and possibilities for new 
ways of bridging the gap between the question and the unknown answer. Put in its simplest form 
then, if one was a witness to a performance, semiotics can ask what did that represent? If one 
experienced a performance, or better yet participated in a performance, propositionality can ask 
what (actually) was that?  
The question that needs investigating in this chapter then, is, what can propositionality ask when 
one witnessed a performance? Does propositionality also ask – what did that represent? – in 
traditional arrangements in the same way that semiotics does, or does it go further, or even not as 
far as semiotics? My argument is that the role of the audience member and their potentiality to 
physically interact with objects – along with the parameters of the thing being investigated / 
researched etc. – decides whether a semiotic or propositional analysis would be more 
appropriate. 
 
Proscenium Arch Analysis 
Before examining how objects propose in immersive theatre, I initially described its form, along 
with the characteristics of immersive works and performances. The same must be done for the 
proscenium arch theater so that one understands what it is that separates works which are 
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associated with the term ‘immersive’, and art which is performed on a proscenium stage. To 
begin describing this ‘traditional’ arrangement of experiencing theatre, it is worth explaining 
how one comes to understand the traits of an activity such as theatrical activity. Gregory 
Bateson’s Steps to an Ecology of Mind (1972) and Erving Goffman’s Frame Analysis (1974) 
define activities as having frames which are placed around an event by an individual to organize 
their understanding. Goffman calls this the “frame of activity” (1974:247). Elam describes 
frames as “conceptual or cognitive structures to the extent that they are applied by participants 
and observers to make sense of a given ‘strip’ of behaviour, but derive from the conventional 
principles through which behaviour itself is organized” (Elam, 1980, p. 87).  
Elam goes on to describe the theatrical frame as: 
the product of a set of transactional conventions governing the participants’ expectations 
and their understanding of the kinds of reality involved in the performance. The 
theatregoer will accept that, at least in dramatic representations, an alternative and 
fictional reality is to be presented by individuals designated as the performers, and that 
his own role with respect to that represented reality is to be that of a privileged 
‘onlooker’.  
Elam, 1980, p.88.  
This description of the theatrical frame aligns with all forms of theatre. The only aspect which 
one could argue is different is that in some forms of theatre, such as immersive theatre, the role 
of the ‘theatregoer’ is more than, or goes beyond, that of an ‘onlooker’. The role is of an 
audience-participant / participant / spect-actor and so on. Elam (1980) references Bateson and 
Goffman in his work, but specifically Goffman when discussing the theatrical frame, since 
Goffman’s chapter named ‘The Theatrical Frame’ (1974, pp.124-155) discusses it in detail. 
Although, Goffman describes the frame of a theatrical performance as limited to that which has a 
staging area and an audience region – like the proscenium theater. This narrow definition does 
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not leave room for certain participatory practices which include the spectator as part of the 
performance e.g., immersive theatre and most site-specific and sympathetic works. This is 
understandable since Goffman (1974) and Elam (1980) were both writing at a time prior to the 
creation of such theatres which were visceral and physically inhabited by an audience. This type 
of theatre arose from the visual and physical theatre of the nineteen-eighties and, according to 
Machon (2013), was when the term ‘immersive’ was starting to be associated with these types of 
work.  
A performance, in the restricted sense in which I shall now use the term, is that 
arrangement which transforms an individual into a stage-performer, the latter, in turn, 
being an object that can be looked at in the round and at length without offense, and 
looked to for engaging behaviour, by persons in an “audience” role. […] A line is 
ordinarily maintained between a staging area where the performance proper occurs and 
an audience region where the watched are located. The central understanding is that the 
audience has neither the right nor the obligation to participate directly in the dramatic 
action occurring on the stage.  
Goffman, 1974, pp.124-125.  
Goffman’s narrow frame of performance is restrictive since it does not accommodate all forms 
of theatre. Performance is such a broad concept which incorporates a wealth of styles, forms, 
practices, activities, sports, games, interactions etc. After all, theatre is only one type (which falls 
under the umbrella category) of performance that exists as a separate entity from all other types 
of performance e.g., dance, magic, comedy, improvisation and so on. Yet, I have quoted 
Goffman’s narrow definition of the term because it outlines the fundamental differences between 
theatrical forms and components. In proscenium arch performances where that “line” is 
maintained between performance / auditorium and performer / audience, exists what Elam calls 
the “crucial axiom in the theatrical frame” (1980:88), i.e., “the understanding that the audience 
has neither the right nor obligation to participate directly in the dramatic action occurring on 
stage”. In immersive theatre whilst there are pre-scripted scenes, which when performed for a 
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live audience implicitly suggest that the audience are not supposed to interact with the 
performers, the “frame of the activity” is that the audience are “actually there, physically 
inhabiting the fantasy world created”; and that “the audience-participant-performer-player is 
anchored and involved in the creative world via her or his own imagination” (Machon, 2013, 
pp.61-62) (emphasis in original). The corporeality of the audience is present in immersive 
theatre and that is wholly opposite to proscenium arch performances. During a proscenium arch 
performance “it is only fellow performers who respond to each other as inhabitants of the same 
realm; the audience responds indirectly, glancingly, following alongside, as it were, cheering on 
but not intercepting” (1974:125).  
There are anomalies to Goffman’s statement. For example, when actors hold the action for 
laughs. This is clear communication between performer / audience; the audience’s response of 
laughter does intercept the actor’s realm, though not explicitly. Plus, it is the actors that are 
holding for laughs, not the characters. Also, there are proscenium arch shows which include 
direct address. In Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Hamlet addresses the audience which acknowledges 
their presence in the theatre. The audience are momentarily invited into the performer’s realm 
meaning that performer / audience inhabit that realm together. Similarly, with the musical Cats, 
performers would often enter the audience dancing and grinding with / on audience-members. In 
the late nineteen-nineties, one audience member sued the production after David Hibbard, who 
performed the role of Rum Tug Tugger, thrust his pelvis in their face. Do moments, like this, of 
performer-audience interaction change or affect the propositionality? Pantomimes are all about 
breaking the proscenium arch barrier and including the audience in the theatrical realm of the 
performance. Arguably, at the point of “it’s behind you!”, the show becomes immersive to an 
extent. The audience’s presence has been acknowledged and their actions / utterances affect the 
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actions / utterances of the performers on stage. This moment of audience interception in 
pantomime is renowned; it is a choreographed transaction that all that attend pantomimes pay for 
and expect when attending the show. There is not only explicit interaction via utterances and the 
sensation of touch, but pantomimes commonly hand out sweets to child audience members. In 
accepting and digesting these sweets, they are placing a part / object of the performance inside 
themselves which “deeply involves” them in the theatrical activity. In this regard, the pantomime 
is more ‘immersive’ than immersive theatre shows that only manipulate (some of) the senses of 
sight, hearing, touch and smell.  
 
Romeo & Juliet 
On Friday 15th February 2019, I witnessed the Royal Shakespeare Company’s (RSC) Romeo & 
Juliet (2019) at the Alhambra theatre in Bradford, England. The main proposition asserted by 
Romeo & Juliet (2019) was that the elements and objects on / within the stage / performance 
space (re)presented the theatrical world of Shakespeare’s Romeo & Juliet. The aim of this 
proposition was to make the classic text appear like “a world as close to our own as possible”, 
thus creatively modernising it so it appeals to a younger audience “who could recognise 
themselves” in it and specifically the characters of Romeo and Juliet (Whyman, 2019). Despite 
the aim of Whyman’s production, the stage elements did not aid this proposition. The set 
consisted of a rusted-stone-framed proscenium arch with matching backdrop which was dark and 
grey. It was grey in the multitude of tones which Mark Rothko’s famous Untitled Black on Gray 
is grey. There was only one object on stage at the beginning of the performance – this 
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predominantly remained the case throughout – which was a cube centre stage.65 The cube 
remained centre stage for the performance’s entirety. This was the focal point; a liminal object 
which represented a multitude of varying locations as the narrative transpired. It represented and 
functioned as the performance’s set, and it is this object and its scenic metonymies, that will be 
the focus of the analysis here and in the location and scene discussion combined with performing 
objects from Dorian. Michael Billington describes Tom Piper’s design of the rotating cube as 
“oddly nondescript” (Billington, 2019, n.p.). Of the six sides to the cube, only five were visible. 
The bottom face was solid and acted as the ground for whichever location the performance 
signified the characters were in. The top face was solid, and characters would often climb onto 
it, stand on it, sit on it, converse on it etc. Two sides of the cube were therefore solid, opaque, 
and suggested ‘the back’ of whichever location the object and narrative denoted in a scene, i.e. a 
wall, backdrop etc. The remaining two sides were open spaces and so were not sides at all. 
Characters could step onto the bottom face of the cube and appear to the audience as if they were 
inside (of) it. There was a hatch in the top face of the cube and a ladder which led from the 
surface of the bottom face, through the hatch out onto the above surface of the top face, allowing 
the performers to move from inside the cube to above it. This set did not make the classic text 
appear like “a world as close to our own as possible” in terms of its physical appearance. When 
other stage elements were introduced such as costume and props, these mainly did replicate the 
appearance of our shared world in 2019, albeit not always. For example, the fashion of both the 
Montagues and the Capulets was like that of the different generations and classes one sees in UK 
society today. The young lovers Romeo and Juliet both wore tight skinny jeans in black and light 
blue, respectively. Romeo wore black Nike trainers whilst his father – performed by Paul Dodds 
                                                          
65 The cube represented and functioned as the performance’s set. Other theatrical objects that appeared on stage 
were the actors, costumes, and props which were brought on and off when needed. 
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– epitomised my interpretation of the smart-casual look of a modern day, middle-aged, middle-
class, white male by wearing a formal shirt tucked into dark, regular fit jeans with a blue blazer 
and dark brown brogues. Whereas Raphael Sowole whom performed Tybalt wore a leather knife 
holster around his chest which is not a fashion accessory adopted by many in modern society, 
certainly not in the UK or Verona. For me then, it was not Whyman’s use of stage elements that 
were attempting to achieve her artistic intent, but the casting.  
For Whyman it was important that the “cast was in every sense diverse, and representative of the 
UK’s complex differences” (2019). Whyman wanted to tease out some of the text’s covert 
“references to sex and sexuality and [match] them to our more (but not entirely) liberated world” 
(2019). She goes further and states that since the character roles within Shakespeare’s original 
play text were conceived to be performed by men, she wanted to have a wider range of women 
performing on stage so that “women as well as men could truly see themselves” (2019). 
Whyman, along with casting directors Hannah Miller and Matthew Dewsbury, cast Bally Gill 
and Sakuntala Ramanee as Romeo and Lady Montague respectively, and so some members of 
the Montague family were British Asian. Karen Fishwick was cast as Juliet and performed with 
her Scottish accent even though no other character within the Capulet family had a Scottish 
accent in the performance. Mercutio was performed by Charlotte Josephine, and not only can 
you see the director’s attempt to make the world of the classic text like our own here, but you 
can also see her attempt to pose questions about equality and violence today.  
Having identified Whyman’s aims and means for achieving the performance’s main proposition, 
the enactment of the proposal had been stipulated. But how was the proposition agreed? Was it 
agreed? Well, one cannot speak for other audience members, but I accepted the proposition that 
the performance space existed as and represented the narrative of Shakespeare’s Romeo & Juliet. 
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I did not think that the performance achieved its aims in relating to a present-day young 
audience, but I am not here to review the quality or success of the production. What is important 
for the purposes of this thesis is that fundamentally, the performance succeeded in representing 
the play Romeo & Juliet.  
 
Location & Scene 
The cube 
The cube that was used to represent varying locations and scenarios within the play’s narrative 
suggested things to be considered. Both semiotic and propositional analysis cater for signs / 
suggestions / proposals. But where do each of them fail and/or bump up against its limits? As 
previously touched on, the cube’s appearance was ‘nondescript’. Nondescript in the way that the 
likes of Meyerhold and Popova’s theatre of Russian constructivism “excluded the use of picture 
or colour signs”. Yet, like constructivism, “the arrangement of the construction [often] failed to 
create an unambiguous theatrical sign” (Honzl, 1940, pp.77-78). Honzl explains how 
Meyerhold’s construction in The Death of Tarelkin made use of a cylindrical object which 
“could have suggested any number of things, but none of them without ambiguity” (1940:78).66 
In comparing the RSC’s cube with Meyerhold’s cylindrical object one can see the similarities in 
how nondescript theatrical objects can suggest a multitude of things to be considered. In order to 
suggest / propose a specific thing, the collaboration of various stage properties and objects are 
required. Honzl suggests that: 
                                                          
66 Honzl suggests that the cylindrical object could have represented a meat grinder, a circular window, a round cage, 
or a huge mirror. 
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The sign (representative) function of the scenery and props is determined solely by the 
movements of the actor and by the manner in which he uses them, but even their 
representative function is not entirely ambiguous.  
Honzl, 1940, p.78. 
Prior to this statement in the “Dynamics of the Sign in the Theater”, Honzl, similarly to how 
OOO separates objects from the conception that they are only inanimate and nonhuman, frees 
the concept of ‘actor’ from solely being a human representing a character: “not only can a person 
be an actor but so can a wooden puppet or a machine or anything at all” (1940:75).67 Honzl 
presumably is referring to ‘actor’, in this sense, as a human representing a character, since he 
genders the actor – “…by the manner in which he uses them” – but, since Honzl himself frees 
‘actor’ from the confines of  ‘human representing character’ to “anything at all”, it allows one to 
view actors as objects in theatre as OOO does.  
Returning then to the RSC’s cube and its relation to Meyerhold’s staging of The Death of 
Tarelkin one can see that when actors / objects interact they work as parts; parts that represent a 
whole. In The Death of Tarelkin, Honzl explains that: 
it is only when we see the actor pacing back and forth in the cylindrical structure like a 
prisoner and clutching its slats like bars that we realize the function of this stage prop: it 
is a cell. Simultaneously, however, there remain in our minds all the associations of form 
that originated during our first glance at the said prop. The idea of a “meat grinder” in 
combination with the idea of a “prison cell” acquires mutual polarization of new 
meanings.  
Honzl, 1940, p.78. 
Honzl uses the study of signs to show what is actualized by the combination of the signifying 
objects in this specific moment of The Death of Tarelkin i.e., the fact that ‘it is a cell’. However, 
                                                          
67 Honzl “frees the concept of actor” in this context by defining ‘acting’ as that which “merely consists in 
representation of the dramatic character by something else” (1940:75).  
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that which is actualized is subjunctive. ‘It is a cell’ actualizes the object as standing for that 
object, not actually being that object. It actualizes as if it were true; as if it were that object. 
Whilst this actualization succeeds at representing, it fails at being. The quality of a subjunctive 
claim of actualization is therefore different from the quality of an indicative claim. To reiterate, 
this is where semiotics misses the mark. As Honzl goes on to stipulate: 
It is true, that our theaters have not deviated from this method of indicating dramatic 
place, since it is all the same (precisely with regard to action as an element of drama) 
whether a change of scene is indicated by an inscription or by a costly stage set of a 
terrace, throne room, cemetery, battlefield, and so on.  
Honzl, 1940, p.92. 
For semiotics, it is “all the same” whether a sign be simple or lavish, witnessed or experienced, 
intangible or tangible. This is not the case for propositionality. Propositionality identifies the 
quality of the sign in a way that semiotics leaves out and provides a method for exploring one’s 
willingness to immerse. Similarly, though, both semiotics and propositionality allow for the 
“mutual polarization of new meanings”. One can be aware of both Meyerhold’s “meat grinder” 
and “prison cell” despite their sharp division of meaning from the perspective of either semiotics 
or propositionality. An object can represent different things in all forms of theatre. It can 
represent different things because of liminality. Liminality, as previously mentioned, describes 
the transitional stage within a rite of passage e.g., nuptial rites, funeral rites etc. Therefore, when 
an object is framed within / as performance, it is open to interpretation, meaning that liminality 
is always possible. Like semiotics, propositionality can handle liminality, yet there is a slight 
difference in the enactment of a proposition in an immersive environment, to a proscenium one.  
When a claim is (quasi)indicatively made e.g., in the cases of immersive and pervasive 
experiences, and one accepts the claim as if it were true, the object becomes the thing, and the 
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only thing, that it is claiming to be. So, whilst one can polarize different meanings and oscillate 
different modes of attention, in the exact moment of agreement to an indicatively claimed 
proposition, the object is no longer what it previously was, only what it presently is. That is not 
to say that it cannot revert to what it was claiming to be, or even become something else entirely, 
but that an object usually does not get used in a different way as it might ‘spoil the illusion’ of 
the implicit realism fundamental to the form of immersive theatre. Although, this is not the case 
for claims made in the subjunctive-mood i.e., the mode in which claims made in traditional 
arrangements exist, such as Proper Job’s Dorian (2019) and the RSC’s Romeo & Juliet (2019). 
In this regard, it is not that propositionality breaks down in traditional audience arrangements 
then, but that, how an object is labelled differs between the two environments. By looking at an 
example from the RSC’s cube, one can see the difference between how an object is intended to 
be seen, and how it is ultimately labelled. 
In Romeo & Juliet (2019), Karen Fishwick’s Juliet was sat on top of the cube whilst conversing 
with Bally Gill’s Romeo who was stood in front of it looking up to her. This was the RSC’s 
dramatic portrayal of the famous balcony scene. This signified that Juliet was in her bedroom 
looking out of her window, and Romeo was in the courtyard outside of Juliet’s bedroom window 
declaring his love for her. Then, in a later scene, a dress was hung from the top of the cube 
whilst a chair was placed in front of it, which Juliet’s nurse (played by Ishia Bennison) sat on. 
The placement of these objects and costume signified that that scene took place inside Juliet’s 
bedroom. The interaction of the onstage theatrical objects alongside the utterances of the play 
text represented these things as if they were true. It was the addition and interaction of the 
performing objects / ‘actors’, per Honzl, which actualized the relocation of the scene. Upon 
perceiving, assessing and accepting the signs displayed before me, I in turn accepted the 
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proposition that the first scene took place at the courtyard outside of Juliet’s bedroom as if it 
were true. Likewise, I accepted the second scene inside her bedroom as if it were true. These are 
two separate propositions that I need to accept to follow, and become immersed in, the narrative. 
I, as audience, accept the shifts in meaning of the cube (there are new propositions being made 
with each shift) because I was shown each time what those meanings were – what it came to 
represent. Once the locale had been relocated though, I was still conscious of the previous 
location and idea. The possible interactions between the qualities of the cube and the qualities of 
the objects interacting with the cube, allowed for the consideration of both the courtyard and the 
bedroom simultaneously, as well as any other locational suggestion which was subsequently 
proposed. There was no ultimate point of arrival where the cube was Juliet’s bedroom, and only 
Juliet’s bedroom, since the claim was made in the subjunctive-mood. Obviously, all objects are 
representative since they are framed as (part of a) performance, but if the propositional claim 
was (quasi)indicative, then it would affect the propositions enactment. This may seem like a case 
of splitting hairs regarding how an object is labelled, but it is an objects’ label that differs 
between immersive and proscenium environments, not propositionality’s ability to explore an 
audience’s willingness to immerse. That does not break down. When one accepts each 
proposition and shift in meaning, it lures one into a different way of feeling regardless of 








Bedroom and Recording Studio  
Similarly, to the RSC’s use of the cube, the set and performing objects within Dorian (2019) 
also constructed and suggested to the audience that certain scenes took place within a character’s 
bedroom. Proper Job Theatre’s production of Dorian (2019) was a contemporary performance 
inspired by the novel The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890) by Oscar Wilde. As well as 
highlighting the pressure of toxic masculinity and gym culture, different media devices (such as 
webcams and smartphones) recorded particular moments of the onstage live action and 
screencast them on to large screens within the backdrop of the set to explore the impact of social 
media on the characters. Music was performed live throughout the play, predominantly 
instrumental music via keyboard, but there were also vocals from the characters too. This was 
especially the case with the characters of Sam and Sarah as they were pursuing a career in music 
within the narrative. The focus, however, was on the character of Dorian who was constantly 
aspiring to look like a fitter, more muscular photoshopped version of himself, and the extremes 
he went to, to achieve that. 
The set design for Dorian (2019) was quite complex. The flats along the back of the stage were 
segregated into numerous squares and rectangles of varying sizes. There was one much larger 
rectangle in the upper-central position of the backdrop which was a monitor used for projecting 
close-ups of the on-stage action, videos, imagery, and so on. At the beginning of the 
performance, the smaller sections of the backdrop initially appeared to be mirrored, as I could 
see the reflection of some of the onstage objects in a few of the individual quadrilateral sections. 
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But, as the performance developed, every square and rectangular section within the backdrop 
displayed media which was either projected or screencast.  
The layout of the set created three separate zones. These zones depicted various settings / 
locations / places / rooms. Stage right’s zone depicted the character Sam’s bedroom, and in other 
scenes it depicted his recording studio. The performer playing the role of Sam very rarely 
departed his position upstage right where he sat at a keyboard located on top of a raised 
platform. The keyboard had a webcam / recording device attached above it that was facing Sam 
whilst he was sat at the keyboard. In front of the platform was a wooden structure on wheels 
which could be moved around, and a block on which rested a collection of dumbbells and gym 
weights. Tucked in the corners, both downstage right and left, were mannequins elevated on 
blocks. These mannequins were initially covered in blankets, and so it was not until later in the 
show’s narrative that the audience witnessed them since they were concealed from their view. 
Similarly, stage left’s zone depicted a bedroom and recording studio, but these belonged to 
Sarah’s character instead. Stage left also contained a keyboard with webcam / recording devices 
attached to it, but this keyboard was not elevated on a platform as Sam’s was. It simply lay on 
top of a keyboard stand which was on the stage’s ground level like the rest of the set, props and 
performers. Moving slightly inwards towards centre-stage (on the right of the Sarah’s keyboard) 
was another wooden structure on wheels which again could be moved around the stage by the 
performers. The final zone was centre stage which depicted a number of different settings, such 
as Harry’s gym, a restaurant, Dorian’s house, the landing outside of Sam’s bedroom, and so on.  
I will not describe every aspect of the set because I am not investigating all the production’s 
performing objects, and this would require too much attention which is best spent elsewhere. 
Nonetheless, the details pertaining to the projector screen wall, upstage right, the wooden-frame 
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structures on wheels, and the mannequins, shall be paid greater attention to. Upstage right was 
on a platform – a raised-level – about a metre above the stage floor. There was a keyboard set up 
on a table with a chair tucked under it which faced offstage right. The performer playing the role 
of Sam, was sat on this chair, at the keyboard, for much of the performance. There was a 
laptop/tablet set up directly in front of the chair which lay on top of the keyboard, and another 
laptop that was raised on a shelf to the left of, and above, the keyboard. There was also a 
wireless webcam attached to the keyboard too. Occasionally the webcam projected the 
performer that played the role of Sam onto the screens within the backdrop whilst he was 
playing the piano, or, within the context of the play’s narrative, whilst Sam was speaking 
directly to his fans online via a vlog. This set-up ran along the back of the platform touching the 
screened backdrop flats.  
This detailed set-up of upstage right was used to represent a recording studio. Any dramatic 
action that took place on and was confined to the limits of this raised platform, depicted the 
location of the characters’ Sam and Sarah’s recording studio. However, when other theatrical 
objects were added / interacted with the overall sensual object already created upstage right, the 
dynamics of the sign altered, which meant that the setting of the scene could be relocated. 
Earlier, I discussed how a courtyard metamorphosed into a bedroom through the interacting 
qualities of objects related to the onstage cube in Romeo & Juliet (2019), and here, a similar 
transformation process occurred from a recording studio to a bedroom with the addition of a 
wooden-frame structure. 
Amongst the set and design of the performance space were two large wooden structures on 
wheels which were slightly off-centre stage. These, like the cube in Romeo & Juliet (2019), 
appeared to have more of a utilitarian purpose and function than a decorative one, by clearly 
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indicating different locations within the play. The wooden structures were rectangularly shaped, 
with wooden beams formulating each side of the rectangular shape. The rectangle’s longest sides 
were vertical and the area inside the shape was empty meaning that objects / any-thing could 
pass through the structure. The wooden frame had a latch which meant part of the frame could 
be turned and rotated by the performers to give the impression of being opened and closed. The 
wooden structure was moved around by the performers on multiple occasions to denote various 
locations and scenes.  
Focusing on a later scene within the performance, the wooden structure was moved from stage-
left and positioned in front of the raised platform upstage right. Up until this point, the raised 
platform area had signified the location of a recording studio. With the addition of the wooden 
structure, we as an audience now had to perceive the dramatic action that occurred on the raised 
platform through the area between the wooden beams. Due to this, the wooden structure 
suggested and served as a window-frame like the picture-frame of the proscenium arch serves as 
itself. Through the frame, we saw the performer that played the role of Sam sat on a chair 
playing a keyboard. The theatrical objects on the raised platform had not altered or changed 
position, but the addition of the wooden frame in front of the platform now suggested a new 
sensual object. One that represented Sam’s bedroom, rather than a recording studio.  
This description is not ground-breaking. The dynamics and changeability of the theatrical sign 
and its ability to transform and represent varying places, objects, things, is the beauty, fun and 
essence of theatre make-believe. The Prague School has already taught us that what something 
represents can change, since signs are polyfunctional. But analysing this relocation of scene can 
make clear how propositionality reaches its limits in this form. It reaches its limits here due to 
the lack of sub-propositions that are created. In the scene, the performing object (wooden 
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structure) does not become the window-frame to his bedroom, it only represents / imitates / 
symbolises it. The only suggestion that is offered here is the subjunctive suggestion that ‘this 
represents Sam’s bedroom’. It does not offer any additional proposals to consider. Proposals 
such as ‘can I enter Sam’s bedroom?’, ‘am I allowed in Sam’s bedroom?’, ‘must I accept that 
Sam is in his bedroom’ etc., are not necessary to entertain as these possibilities have already 
been determined and ruled out by the format of the theatrical device and the contract assented to 
by the purchasing of a ticket. There are no further sub-propositions created in the mind of the 
spectator either, due to the initial proposals i.e., propositions such as ‘what happens if I enter / 
leave his bedroom?’, ‘should I move the window-frame?’, ‘would the characters recognise that, 
in moving the window-frame, I have changed the location of the scene?’, and so on. Analysing 
these types of questions and proposals is not possible in these types of audience arrangements 
since the performance does not facilitate or allow access and opportunity for them. 
Propositionality reaches its limits as a method of exploring further possibilities and one’s 
willingness to immerse here, and it recedes to the same level as semiotic analysis.  
Again, this can be proven by the same object being used in a different way. It was not only the 
qualities of the wooden-framed structure’s appearance and its placement in front of the raised 
platform which suggested that the sensual object represented Sam’s bedroom window, but Sam’s 
interaction with it too. As the narrative of the play developed, the character Sam developed an 
eating disorder. The performer playing the role of Sam turned the latch on the wooden structure 
and hence rotated the frame. This signified the opening of his bedroom window. He then 
proceeded to lean his body through the framed space – whilst his feet remained planted on the 
‘inside’ of the boundary – as he held, and placed his head inside, an opaque plastic waste-bin 
and made retching noises as if he were vomiting into it. He would then lean back so that all his 
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body was on the inside of the framed boundary, closing the latch to signify that his bedroom 
window was closed with him inside the room. The performer acted this on multiple occasions as 
the story unfolded to signify that the character’s condition was worsening. In a later scene, Sam 
was on the raised platform having not been seen by, or interacted with, any other characters for 
several scenes. This suggested that, within the story, he had confined himself to his bedroom for 
a few days. The performer playing the role of Dorian entered stage left whilst calling Sam’s 
name. Sam quickly moved the wooden-framed structure from facing horizontally in front of the 
platform, to facing vertically upstage centre along the side of the platform so that it was between 
both him and Dorian. Sam then sat down on the edge of the platform facing inwards towards his 
bedroom whilst pretending to lean against the wooden frame. Dorian went up to the frame, 
knocked on the wooden beams, and continued to call out Sam’s name. The performers’ actions, 
utterances and inter-actions with the theatrical objects combined to propose that Sam had locked 
himself in his bedroom and that the wooden frame now represented his bedroom door, rather 
than window. Sam was on one side of the door, leaning against it to prevent Dorian from 
entering the room, and Dorian was on the other side of the door, banging on it to try and make 
Sam let him in. A new boundary was created that divided the space between Sam’s bedroom and 
the landing of his house, with the wooden frame serving as the doorway between the two spaces.  
Here, the re-positioning of the theatrical object on stage once again affected the narrative’s 
setting. Though, rather than relocating the scene from one location to another, the placement of 
the wooden frame shifted the audience’s conceptual position of viewing from spectating through 
a character’s bedroom window, to spectating either side of a character’s bedroom door. Whilst I 
understood and accepted the proposition and transformability of the sign from window to door, 
the proposal offered was limited. I could only interpret the signs on display for meaning and 
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understanding and there was no possibility for further sub-propositions that acknowledge the 
presence of other entities to be considered. Regarding propositional analysis then, one can see if 
and how the proposition was agreed, but not what I accepted or thought. One cannot identify the 
effect my agreement had on my engagement with the theatrical world, nor the quality of the 
agreement. The actuality of the proposition is not attainable due to the limit of the subjunctive-
mood. Propositionality does not entirely collapse as a means of an analysis here, and in this 
form, but it is halted. It ceases to fulfil its purpose at identifying the quality of the sign, only if it 
was successful / unsuccessful.  
 
Technology in Dorian 
As I mentioned in my synopsis of Dorian (2019), the performance used different media devices 
to record and screencast specific moments of the dramatic action on to the screens that were built 
into the set’s backdrop. Every performer has their own smartphone or webcam which they use 
(at least once) to screencast their face, screencast their delivery of a line, project an image and so 
on. For example, the performer playing the role of Sam uses a webcam to screencast his 
keyboard performances, and the performer playing the role of Sarah uses a smartphone to 
screencast the character’s vlogs to her online fanbase. These technological objects used in 
Dorian (2019) have both a ‘real-world’ function in performing technological tasks for their uses, 
as well as a fictional function in representing the execution of the portrayed technological tasks. 
This is the same as when non-technological objects perform both a ‘real’ and ‘fictional’ function 
simultaneously i.e., a fork used by a performer on stage to eat food performs its real-world 
function – to pick up food – and its fictional function – to represent a fork. Yet, when 
technological objects in Dorian perform their real-world function, they affect the audience’s 
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relationship with the performance, and the theatrical artefact itself, in a way that is not the case 
when a performer uses a fork on stage to perform its quotidian function. This is because the use 
of these technological objects in Dorian changed the proximity between performer and audience 
and so the degree of aesthetic distance was able to shift.  
An example of this during the performance was when Sam had a breakdown during his 
‘livestream’. The context of the screencast, within the narrative, was that Sam was streaming his 
keyboard performance live online for his followers to see. People then left comments on the 
stream about his ‘awful’ appearance which Sam read out, displayed a fit of rage, and broke down 
into tears whilst the stream was still live. The webcam (RO) screencast the performer’s onstage 
actions onto the screens that were built into the backdrop of the set. As an audience member, I 
could view the performance on stage in front of me, and I could see the performer’s actions 
displayed on the large screen. The video on screen displayed the performer’s actions from his 
shoulders upwards, and so I had a zoomed in view of the character’s expressions. This 
screencast allowed us, as audience, a more intimate view of Sam and the effects caused by social 
media pressure and toxic masculinity.68 The proximity between myself and the performer (RO) 
had not shifted but displaying his performance via a stream meant that I had closer access to an 
image of the real object (Sam), via a different real object (screen). The proxemics of the 
performer / audience relationship were therefore reduced via the qualities of the sensual object I 
perceived on screen. 
Early on in this thesis, I referenced Ronald Naverson’s Scenographic Distance (2001) which 
suggests that “a true theater must exist between the two extremes of no distance and too little 
                                                          
68 Toxic masculinity was the theme that was being explored by Proper Job’s production. 
214 
 
distance. It must suspend the audience between a perception of fictionality and non-fictionality 
of the unreal and real” (Naverson, 2001, p.8). I suggested that immersive experiences were 
suspended closer towards non-fictionality / the real due to their arrangements and manipulation 
of space, place, game, story etc. This suggestion simultaneously implied that in works of 
proscenium theatre, these aspects of the performance tend to be unmoving. Whether that be 
accurate or not, it was not the case for Dorian. The distance and relationship between myself and 
the performing objects did shift, as evident from the screencast, and constantly so, too.  
Whilst the proxemics of the performer / audience relationship were both reduced and increased, 
constantly shifting throughout the performance – in part due to the technological objects used – 
the organisation and shaping of the theatrical objects still enforced a greater aesthetic distance. 
The use of a flat-screened media device to portray the onstage action reminded me of the 
fictionality of the performance and event. The two-dimensional quality of the real object was 
like a pictorial-sign. Signs manifest in paintings and picture frames like the proscenium arch 
itself: “for some the ornate proscenium frame with its origins in two-dimensional scenic 
representation helps to reinforce the fictionality of theatre” (Naverson, 2001, p.9). 
I have discussed proxemics and aesthetic distance here, because a closer proximity to an object 
does not always necessitate propositionality. This thesis posits that the tangibility of objects by 
audience members / participants is required for propositional analysis and the investigation of 
the various sub-propositions proposed. It also posits that even when an individual’s proximity to 
an object is reduced so much that the object is physically tangible, that does not necessarily 
mean that the possibility of touching / grasping / interacting with the object is accessible within 
the theatrical world. In the case of the technological objects in Dorian, the sensual object I 
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perceived of Sam on screen brought me closer to an image of him, and that sensual object / 
image actually was an image of the character Sam, yet the claim being made by the interaction 
of the onstage theatrical objects was still a subjunctive claim. The claim being made was that the 
screen represented Sam livestreaming to his followers, not that Sam was livestreaming to his 
followers. I was not able to entertain the possible sub-proposition that there were, and are, fans 
of Sam’s music that watch(ed) his videos online. By not being able to entertain possibilities such 
as this, I am reminded of the fictionality of the event which affects my engagement with the 
work. I was still engaged and immersed in the storyline unfolding before me, but one cannot 
retrospectively analyse how I approached the non-existent further proposals before me. Once 
again, this is where propositionality fails. It fails when there are no sub-propositions to be 
considered; no possibilities for the experiencing subject to entertain.  
Are there any moments in proscenium arch performances such as, Dorian (2019) and Romeo & 
Juliet (2019), where there are possibilities for the audience to entertain? Where propositionality 
as a means of analysis does not fail? I shall explore this via the props / theatrical objects of the 
mannequins within Dorian.  
 
Mannequins  
In both corners of downstage left and right, lay a brown box. The brown boxes had little 
discernible features except that they were dark, opaque, appeared sturdy, and were possibly 
made from wood, though it was hard to tell. They looked like podiums and were in fact raising 
unknown objects off the stage floor. The objects being raised were unknown to myself, and the 
audience, since they were covered by black sheets. When Harry was describing and depicting an 
216 
 
image of ‘the perfect body’ to Dorian, the performer playing the role of Harry removed the 
sheets from the covered objects and revealed mannequins which expressed the chiselled 
appearances of the male body.  
Whilst the mannequins were covered by the black sheets, one could argue that they were, to use 
Palmer’s phrase, ‘locked doors’. I, as an audience member, knew there was something beneath 
the sheet, I just did not know what it was yet. Yet, unlike in Riptide’s The Lucky Ones: Lucy and 
The Lucky Ones: Lailah, I had no method of finding out what was under the sheets other than 
waiting for the reveal. There was no game to play, no clues to decipher, no hoops to jump 
through, no puzzles to solve. Only sitting patiently through the temporality of the fictional world 
presented on stage would (potentially) reveal what was under the covers. Unlike Palmer’s 
‘locked door’ concept, we as an audience never knew if we would find out what was under the 
sheets or not. One may have had an urge or desire to know, to see, to discover etc., what was 
under the sheet, but one did not know if that desire was to be fulfilled. I myself was intrigued 
and wondered what the object could be, and assumed I would find out, but did not know for sure 
that I would. In this scenario, I could only entertain the possibility that I might find out what was 
under the cover – if the performers eventually remove it – in my mind. I could postulate what I 
may have witnessed, but I could not actively or physically entertain the possibility. I did not 
have access to the real object itself. That detailed fragment was not accessible for me and so I 
could not reveal the possibility.  
 
Is propositionality limited in this scenario, once again? Is wondering what is / was under the 
sheets a sub-proposition? To an extent, yes, it is. However, the proposition relies solely on the 
onstage performing objects to construct the considered proposal(s), and not you as a participating 
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object in that world. For example, one can think ‘what is under the sheets?’, yet one does not 
have the possibility of thinking ‘what happens if I look under the sheets?’, nor entertaining / 
performing / acting out the removal of the sheet or touching the sheet. In this instance, the 
entirety of propositionality does not collapse since it still caters for the consideration of what, 
i.e., ‘what happens if…?’ But the added quality and intense sensation one can feel when one is 
included in the lure is not obtainable. My initial presumption that propositionality always breaks 
down to the same level of semiotics is therefore premature. Propositionality can be used to 
analyse proposed things that an audience member has no impact or agency towards. Though, the 
extent to which the proposed thing can be analysed will still not go as far as could be possible 
for a sub-proposition within an interactive theatrical production. Sub-propositions exist within 
proscenium arch theatre then yet operate differently. Sub-propositions exist as detailed signs 
rather than means to ‘close the gaps’.  
 
Conclusion 
One can see through exploration into the proscenium arch performances of Romeo & Juliet 
(2019), and Dorian (2019), that when a claim is both made and accepted in the subjunctive 
mood by performer and audience, the result of this is that nothing actuates in these claims. The 
answer to the question I posed at the start of this chapter – what can propositionality ask when 
one witnessed a performance? -  is that it can only ask what semiotics can ask, i.e., what did that 
represent? The claims made in the examples shown only represented something as if they were 
true. Therefore, using propositionality as a means of analysis only goes as far as semiotics does 
in these types of performances. That is a possible reason why semiotic analysis has been used to 
analyse proscenium arch theatre for almost a century. However, one could still use aspects of 
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propositionality to discuss further proposals made in these styles of performances. It can still be 
used as a tool to explore an audience members willingness to immerse themself in a narrative. 
Sub-propositions can exist for audience members, as they did for me in Dorian, as detailed 
signs, yet they can only rely on external performing objects and not oneself as a performing 
object in their construction / proposal and entertainment.  Predominantly though, 
propositionality has more limitations as a means of analysis in proscenium work compared to 
interactive theatrical experiences. In proscenium arch theatre, both semiotic and propositional 
analysis only access the interpretations of signs and/or propositions. They both hold that “all the 
same” quality when propositionality bumps up against its limits due to the lack of possible 
physical interaction with the performance and objects. Where propositionality thrives then is in 
audience arrangements which include audiences as participants in the performance. 
Contrariwise, since the development of contemporary theatre audiences and audience 
arrangements and interactions from the nineteen-eighties onwards, semiotics has been missing 
the mark at identifying the possibilities, qualities and effects of agreeing to a propositional lure 
in immersive performances. For me, propositionality works well in both environments, and is an 
effective method for exploring one’s willingness to immerse. That being said, my argument is 
that: the role of the audience member and their potentiality to physically interact with objects 









In this conclusion I will answer the research questions that I proposed at the start and throughout 
the thesis and show how I have addressed my specified aims and objectives. In doing so, I will 
explain the significance and implications that theatre propositionality has as a means of analysis 
and the contribution to knowledge that I have made. Finally, I shall lay out questions for further 
research that this project provides.  
 
Research Question 
The research question that I proposed throughout this thesis asked how ‘propositions’ are 
enacted and agreed in immersive and proscenium theatrical environments; how are things 
proposed to audiences in these forms? This thesis has shown that they are proposed by the 
interacting qualities of objects. The sharable objects of cognitive acts and attitudes that one 
experiences are propositions themselves. These propositions operate in theatre as lures which 
create (a) possibility(-ies). In examining how I, and others, entertained specific possibilities in 
both immersive and proscenium environments, I have achieved my aim for this project: to 
decipher what is being actuated within the interplay of objects and/or things in theatre and 
performance. I did this by choosing five specific theatrical performances within the performance 
styles and environments of immersive and proscenium and unpacking what is / was actualised in 




a) in immersive theatre and/or performance propositions are enacted / claimed 
(quasi)indicatively i.e., as being actual.  
b) in proscenium arch performances propositions are enacted / claimed in the subjunctive-mood 
i.e., as if it were true.  
c) audiences and participants accept a performance’s main-propositions in the subjunctive-mood.  
d) sub-propositions can be enacted and agreed in various moods.     
And by expressing what it was that immersed me – as a participant – in separate immersive 
performances, it opens the endless possibilities for considering what is happening within 
experiences of theatrical performance. By examining these objects, I am offering further 
proposals to the questions within the processes of experiencing and making theatre which 
continually need to be asked. 
 
Significance and Implications 
The significance and implications that have derived from this project which postulates 
propositionality as a means for theatrical analysis can be seen via a review of the work’s two 
main chapters.  
Chapter one offers a definition of propositionality and its (non-)relation to semiotics. This 
chapter implies that the theatre semiotics that was pioneered by the Prague Structuralists is a 
branch of theatre propositionality. Not the other way around. It explains how propositional 
claims and what is actuated within the agreement of these claims between performer and 
audience differs within immersive and proscenium environments. The implications of this are 
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that semiotics cannot effectively analyse the difference in quality between a sign in immersive 
theatre and a sign in proscenium theatre, but propositionality can. Propositionality can do this 
because it explores the conditions of the sign and proposal. Conditions such as how the audience 
was arranged; whether the individual directly engaged in overt participation; what sub-
propositions they considered, and so on. This is what makes propositionality significant as it 
supplements a materialist-semiotic analysis of theatre.  
Chapter two adds to this significance in greater detail by suggesting that the role of the audience 
member and their potentiality to physically interact with objects – along with the parameters of 
the thing being investigated / researched etc. – decides whether a semiotic or propositional 
analysis would be more appropriate. The performances discussed start closer to the left side of 
Ben Chaim’s (1984) continuum and gradually move further to the right i.e., from a realism to a 
stylised realism. There is almost a delusional state of no aesthetic distance where participants 
may have an unawareness of fictionality, which performance-by-performance moves towards a 
greater aesthetic distance and an awareness of fictionality. The consequences and implications 
which emerge from this are that propositionality’s limits are reached. In interactive 
environments, the number of sub-propositions and possibilities that could be entertained may be 
infinite depending on the interacting qualities of the situational-utterance. Whereas this number 
is most likely to be much lower in proscenium arch performances which do not offer 
propositional lures in the same accessible and graspable format. This does not mean that 
propositionality does not work well in both environments though. What is perhaps most 
significant of all, is that the explorations discussed have shown that propositionality works as a 





The objective for this project was for others to understand the concept of propositionality within 
theatre and performance as a means of analysis. My contribution to knowledge is an offering of 
an alternative perspective for analysing theatre and the quality of audience engagement and 
immersion. This contribution is potentially most important when one considers the wider 
concerns and further research questions that are now possible due to this research project. I have 
solely investigated performances that are immersive, site-sympathetic, pervasive, environmental 
etc., as well as performances which are performed within the frame of the proscenium arch, but 
further studies now have the possibility for expanding those parameters to other performance 
styles and arrangements in theatre. Hybridised practices which incorporate theatre with other 
external theories and praxes could also be explored. Every theatrical performance entails a 
different arrangement of theatrical objects, and the interacting qualities of those objects now 
have a means of being explored and discussed so that audiences, artists, academics, practitioners 
etc., can pinpoint what is / was actually happening in the interactions they experienced; what 
was actuated.  
 
Conclusion 
I promote theatre propositionality as a means of analysis in theatre for those who are interested, 
like myself, in understanding how theatre and the arts communicate. Not so that one learns ‘art’s 
truth’, but so that one can recognise what, how, and why a performance or artefact has 
interested, engaged, immersed, and led one into a “different way of feeling” one’s world. In an 
interview with Jon Cogburn, Graham Harman states that: 
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Science is supposed to provide knowledge […] but this has never been the case in the 
arts. We do not understand a painting by Picasso by discovering an ever-lengthening list 
of true facts about it. The goal of art is not to create paraphraseable imagery, but to create 
something to which no paraphrase ever does justice. 




















1. Layer 0 – Pre-Perception 
Layer 1 – Proposition Assessment (A Mediating Layer) 
Layer 2 – Acceptance 
Immersion and Belief 
Layer 3 – Dissension 
Layer 4 – Reflection 
Figure 1: My initial proposed template of the layers of performance that can be accessed by audience 
members throughout their journey within a performance of Forget Me Not. 
 




Questionnaire Feedback Statistics and questions for Forget Me Not (2016) performances in 
November 2016.  
 
1. Did you at any point in the performance believe in what was happening? (1-5)   
2. Did you experience any kind of change as you crossed the threshold between the foyer and the 
performance space? (Yes or No)   
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 
1 0 X 23 0 X 0 X X X 
2 5 X 19 2 X 5 X X X 
3 11 X 17 9 X 6 X X X 
4 23 X 18 24 X 25 X X X 
5 27 X 30 31 X 29 X X X 
6 X X 4 X X X X X X 
NO X 6 X X 29 X 12 18 X 
YES X 60 X X 34 X 53 48 X 
YES&NO X X X X 3 X 1 X X 
UNANSWERED X X X X X 1 X X 23 
ACTOR X X X X X X X X 5 
INDIVIDUAL X X X X X X X X 35 
ACTOR&INDIVIDUAL X X X X X X X X 3 
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3. Did you experience any kind of change when..? (different moments 1-6)   
4. How did it affect your viewing when characters were speaking with audience members? (1-5) 
5. When the characters were telling stories (performatively) did these moments take you out of the 
immersion and alter your perception? (Yes or No)   
6. At any point, were you immersed in the reality of the performance? (1-5)   
7. Did you experience any kind of change as you left the space and crossed the threshold back into 
the foyer? (yes or No)   
8. Did you have direct interaction with a character? (yes or No)   
9. If yes to Q8, did you feel you were speaking to an actor or individual?   
 















4. Image of The Great Gatsby (2019) ticket. 
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